AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-4 rule-out Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Cyber	Not determined	“Showed meaningful improvements in cyber capabilities, particularly in vulnerability discovery and code analysis;” source
Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“speciﬁcally, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“speciﬁcally, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic	ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“These problems are harder to solve than the previous problems and we consider them as part of our ASL-4 evaluations.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Opus 4.6 achieved a “max of 5” score of 0.79 for virology task 1 (inﬂuenza), placing it at the ASL-3 rule-in threshold of 0.8.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Based on these ﬁndings and quantitative risk modeling, we estimate that the model’s uplift to relevant threat actors remains below the ASL-4 capability threshold, though it may reduce certain tacit-knowledge barriers and help speed up biological research workﬂows.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We determine that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross the CBRN-4 threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Cyber	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could conﬁdently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Opus 4 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could conﬁdently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	cyber benchmarks Cyber	“The picture then changed after benchmarking the April version, as UK AISI did.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	CyScenarioBench Cyber	“From Anthropic’s Mythos 5 launch post : Mythos 5: 36.7% Mythos Preview: 29.2% Opus 4.8: 16.6%” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	SCONE-Bench Cyber	“Anthropic created a benchmark of 405 Ethereum smart contracts that were exploited between 2020 and 2025.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	OSS-Fuzz benchmark Cyber	“Mythos 5 triggered a crash 80% of the time, compared to 76.7% for Mythos Preview, and 61.5% for Opus 4.8.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	UK AISI's CTF Suites Cyber	“AISI has a suite of capture-the-flag challenges where AI models must identify and exploit weaknesses in target systems to retrieve hidden “flags”.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	UK AISI Cyber Ranges Cyber	“Although AISI reports that Mythos Preview (April) was able to fully complete “Cooling Tower” on 3/10 attempts (with all other models at 0/10), as they do not give its average performance we are not able to incorporate this information.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	Microsoft CTI-REALM Cyber	“Given cyber threat intelligence reports, it tasks models to generate detection rules to apply on endpoint/cloud telemetry logs.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	CVE-Bench Cyber	“CVE-Bench is a selection of 40 web application environments with known exploitable vulnerabilities in which models need to build exploits to achieve any one of 8 capabilities (access files, privilege escalation, etc.).” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	Cybench Cyber	“Cybench is a benchmark containing 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent (as of 2024), meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	AISI’s Cyber Ranges Cyber	“A lot of the improvement comes from big jumps on ExploitGym, ExploitBench, AISI’s Cyber Ranges, and Anthropic’s SCONE-Bench.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-06-10	no-CoT 50% time horizon (TH) on 43 benchmarks Other	“We find that frontier models like GPT-5.5 answer questions that take humans roughly three minutes with 50% reliability, and this TH has doubled approximately every year since 2019.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-06-10	50% solve horizon (time horizon, TH) without chain-of-thought Autonomy and AI research	“GPT-5.5 is at the current frontier, with a 50% no-CoT TH of about 3 minutes and a reasoning token horizon of about 1,500 o3-mini tokens.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench fragment design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“on the fragment design task, models also demonstrated strong performance, with claude opus 4.6 achieving a perfect score across all runs.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench synthesis screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“in contrast, models performed worse on screening evasion, which has no published protocol and requires creative application of bioinformatics principles to a novel problem.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench liquid handling robot Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“two models (claude sonnet 4.6 and gemini 3.1 pro preview) scored perfectly on the liquid handling robot task on all runs.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench fragment design task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“frontier models performed highly on both the fragment design and liquid handling robot tasks.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-06-10	43 benchmarks covering math, coding, knowledge, agentic tool-use, and safety-relevant questions like steganography and scheming reasoning Other	“We evaluated 14 frontier models from GPT-2 (2019) through GPT-5.5 (2026) on 43 benchmarks covering math, coding, knowledge, agentic tool-use, and safety-relevant questions like steganography and scheming reasoning.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench liquid handling robot Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“frontier models performed highly on both the fragment design and liquid handling robot tasks.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge benchmarked against 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market, and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether model domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Frontier Design Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Internal and external red teaming with biological defense specialists Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“To assess biologically-relevant capabilities across the full weapons development pipeline, we ran a portfolio of evaluations: internal and external (Deloitte) red teaming with biological defense specialists; the Frontier Design beneﬁcial red-teaming tabletop exercise pairing PhD biologists with LLM experts; a catastrophic biological scenario uplift trial (ﬁve three-person teams); and automated evaluations relevant to both CB-1 (long-form virology, VCT, DNA synthesis screening evasion) and CB-2 (black-box RNA sequence design and AAV capsid packaging prediction).” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: a medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	The Last Ones Cyber	“[Claude Mythos 5] matched Mythos Preview on "The Last Ones", solving the range end-to-end in 6/10 attempts.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	Doing Life Cyber	“No model we have tested has solved a new cyber range called "Doing Life", which is similar to “The Last Ones” but implements some basic cybersecurity defences.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	Cooling Tower Cyber	“[Claude Mythos 5] did not solve "Cooling Tower", an industrial control system range.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	expert-level cyber tasks Cyber	“On our expert-level cyber tasks, [Claude Mythos 5] performed comparably to Mythos Preview and ahead of GPT-5.5, the strongest fully public model tested.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	narrow cyber tasks Cyber	“We further assessed [Claude Mythos 5] against our narrow cyber tasks.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	red-teaming of classiﬁers on a ransomware-creation task by 10a Labs Cyber	“10a Labs spent about 20 hours red-teaming the classiﬁers on a ransomware-creation task using a variety of established jailbreaking techniques.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	red-teaming exercise by ALICE Cyber	“They found inconsistent blocking around marginal dual-use use-cases, but could not cause Opus 4.8 to complete any of the provided tasks.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Shade Prompt injection and agents	“Mythos 5 had an attack success rate of 0.45% over all attempts, compared to 0.0% for Mythos Preview.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	third-party testing by the UK AI Security Institute Deception and sabotage	“We see this both in our own testing and in third-party testing by the UK AI Security Institute , though we do not ﬁnd it fully novel or actively dangerous.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	evaluation awareness identification prompting Deception and sabotage	“When prompted to try to identify evaluations, Mythos 5 can do so in many cases across both the AI Security Institute’s testing and our own .” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	open-ended testing of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment Deception and sabotage	“[Claude Mythos 5] does not compromise safety research in our unprompted evaluations, does not fully refuse to assist with safety research, and has a reduced number of partial refusals to assist with safety research compared to the other models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Vending-Bench 2 Deception and sabotage	“Andon Labs tested the behavior of Claude Fable 5 16 in their simulated Vending-Bench 2 (as reported in Section 8.17.6 ) and Vending-Bench Arena retail-management evaluations.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Vending-Bench Arena Deception and sabotage	“When competing head-to-head against Claude Opus 4.8 and GPT-5.5 in Vending-Bench Arena, Fable 5 was the only model to initiate price collusion.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	ControlARENA Deception and sabotage	“We used two evaluations: a sabotage capability evaluation (ControlARENA) and an evaluation of the model’s ability to control its chain-of-thought.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	CoT controllability evaluations from ‘Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought’ Deception and sabotage	“We ran the CoT controllability evaluations from ‘Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought’<link>, restricted to the GPQA, HLE and MMLU Pro datasets, with max effort across all models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	CritPt Other	“We use the independent evaluation run by Artiﬁcial Analysis via the CritPt grading API.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	METR external testing Autonomy and AI research	“External testing from AI safety researchers at METR was consistent with this conclusion.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	external benchmark for prompt injection by Gray Swan Prompt injection and agents	“Notably, Mythos 5 obtained the lowest—that is, best—result yet seen on an external benchmark for prompt injection by Gray Swan.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	external testing by METR Autonomy and AI research	“External testing by METR, described in Section 2.3.8 , reached conclusions consistent with this determination.” source

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