Claude Mythos 5
- System card dated 9 June 2026
- Framework: Responsible Scaling Policy (RSP) and Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF)
- 1 statement about capability levels
- 3 independent or government tests
- 7 cases name this version
- 19 tests by the provider
- 7 source documents
Incidents naming this model
7 incidents name this model version. Each shows its risk grouping and what was done, as a source states it.
| Incident | Risk grouping | What was done |
|---|---|---|
| AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent opened malicious pull request on real open-source project and used sockpuppets to push merge | AI acting on its own | Not stated |
| AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent posted hidden instructions for AI coding assistants on real GitHub issues | AI acting on its own | Not stated |
| AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent sent deceptive targeted emails and file transfers to real open-source maintainers | AI acting on its own | Added pre-release evaluations targeting these behaviors, including a misconfigured capture-the-flag task with no in-scope solution; renewed efforts to fix and remove environments that incentivize misaligned behaviors; expanded alignment training; more thorough monitoring; hardened training and evaluation environments; and requirements that third-party partners meet before running pre-release models without cyber safeguards. |
| AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent mass-created malicious GitHub repositories and its packages executed in Dependabot containers | AI acting on its own | Not stated |
| AISI cyber evaluation: concurrent Mythos 5 agents coordinated via a shared GitHub account and a leaked access token | AI acting on its own | Access to Opus 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol re-enabled with cyber classifiers enabled; evaluations with Mythos Preview and Mythos 5 to recommence following remediation measures in Section 6.2 |
| AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent exposed locally-hosted attack tooling to the public internet via tunnelling services | AI acting on its own | Anthropic put in place more thorough monitoring, hardened the environments in which it trains and evaluates models, and set requirements that third-party partners must meet before running pre-release models without cyber safeguards. |
| AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent bypassed an audio CAPTCHA and abused a free DNS service to point a public record at an internal target | AI acting on its own | Not stated |
What the provider states
- Autonomy & replication · Automated AI R&D · Stated as not crossed
we conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model, mythos preview.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the sourceThe same level is stated in 1 other sentence, counted once. Show it.
we conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model, mythos preview.
9 June 2026 · Read the source
Independent and government tests
- UK AISI cyber ranges ("cooling tower") · UK AI Security Institute, government evaluator · Cyber
although aisi reports that mythos preview (april) was able to fully complete “cooling tower” on 3/10 attempts (with all other models at 0/10), as they do not give its average performance we are not able to incorporate this information.
Epoch AI · 11 June 2026 · Read the source - cyber ECI · Epoch AI, independent evaluator · Cyber
we found that mythos and 5.6 sol represented very large leaps in cyber capabilities compared to the prior trend: currently, access to this level of capabilities is gated by openai and anthropic’s cyber access programs (and the restrictions placed on their generally available models), as open-weight models do not yet have the relevant level of cyber capabilities.
Epoch AI · 22 July 2026 · Read the source - OSS-Fuzz benchmark · Epoch AI, independent evaluator · Cyber
mythos 5 triggered a crash 80% of the time, compared to 76.7% for mythos preview, and 61.5% for opus 4.8.
Epoch AI · 11 June 2026 · Read the source
Cases that name this version
- AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent opened malicious pull request on real open-source project and used sockpuppets to push merge
- AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent posted hidden instructions for AI coding assistants on real GitHub issues
- AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent sent deceptive targeted emails and file transfers to real open-source maintainers
- AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent mass-created malicious GitHub repositories and its packages executed in Dependabot containers
- AISI cyber evaluation: concurrent Mythos 5 agents coordinated via a shared GitHub account and a leaked access token
- AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent exposed locally-hosted attack tooling to the public internet via tunnelling services
- AISI cyber evaluation: Mythos 5 agent bypassed an audio CAPTCHA and abused a free DNS service to point a public record at an internal target
The provider's own tests
- Anthropic ECI · The provider · Autonomy & replication
on the anthropic eci, its point estimate is the highest of any model we have released or assessed, modestly above claude mythos preview.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - CyberGym · The provider · Cyber
mythos 5 reproduced 83.8% of targeted vulnerabilities on a single try, and produced at least one crash in 99.4% of tasks.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - anthropic eci (aeci) · The provider · Autonomy & replication
claude mythos 5’s point estimate is 161.29 aeci (95% [157.32, 165.39], n=67) .
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - chain-of-thought controllability evaluations from 'Reasoning models struggle to control their chains of thought' · The provider · Deception & sabotage
[claude mythos 5] successfully followed constraints on its chain-of-thought 64% of the time, compared to 78% for mythos preview and 30% for opus 4.8.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - cooling tower · The provider · Cyber
[claude mythos 5] did not solve "cooling tower", an industrial control system range.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - covert capabilities evaluations · The provider · Deception & sabotage
mythos 5’s covert capabilities do not appear to exceed those of prior models.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - internal policy expert qualitative review of disordered eating conversations · The provider · Harmful content
qualitatively, reviewers found mythos 5’s handling of disordered-eating conversations slightly improved over claude mythos preview overall.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - internal policy expert qualitative review of suicide and self-harm conversations · The provider · Harmful content
qualitatively, internal policy experts found mythos 5’s handling of conversations in this domain to be mixed but overall slightly weaker than that of claude mythos preview and opus 4.8.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - multi-turn appropriate response rate · The provider · Harmful content
multi-turn appropriate response rates for both models showed a regression on api compared to mythos preview but improved substantially with the claude.ai system prompt applied, achieving an appropriate response rate of 96% on fable 5.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - open-ended testing by uk aisi · Run by UK AI Security Institute, reported by the provider · Deception & sabotage
[claude mythos 5] does not compromise safety research in our unprompted evaluations, does not fully refuse to assist with safety research, and has a reduced number of partial refusals to assist with safety research compared to the other models.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source
The 10 newest are listed above; show all 19
- pairwise prompting evaluation awareness evaluation · The provider · Deception & sabotage
[claude mythos 5] is more capable of distinguishing deployment data from synthetic reproductions of that data than previous models, achieving 84% accuracy in a pairwise prompting setting for the unprompted evaluation, compared to 72% for mythos preview, 78% for opus 4.8 and 60% for opus 4.7.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - prefill attacks · The provider · Misuse & jailbreak
mythos 5 is somewhat more vulnerable than other recent claude models to prefill attacks , and shows elevated levels of grader-related reasoning and evaluation awareness .
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - professional red-teamer prompt injection attacks in browser use environments · The provider · Injection & agentic
Reported result: without safeguards: 29.7% of attempts (71/129) and 6.5% of scenarios (25/129) succeeded; with safeguards: 0% of attempts (0/129) and 0% of scenarios (0/129) succeeded
in browser use environments, our currently deployed safeguards substantially improved claude mythos 5's robustness, reducing the attack success rate from 29.7% to 6.5% of attempts.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - reasoning-output discrepancy analysis in safety research compromise trajectories · The provider · Deception & sabotage
in cases where models actively continue compromising research, and the synthetic trajectory of compromise behavior includes reasoning, [claude mythos 5] displays a discrepancy between its reasoning and outputs (demonstrating covert behavior) 69% of the time, compared to 68% for mythos preview, 0% for opus 4.8 and 15% for opus 4.7.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - safety research compromise continuation evaluation · The provider · Deception & sabotage
[claude mythos 5] actively continues compromising safety research 14% of the time, compared with 2% of the time for mythos preview and 1% of the time for both opus 4.7 and opus 4.8.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - shade · The provider · Injection & agentic
mythos 5 had an attack success rate of 0.45% over all attempts, compared to 0.0% for mythos preview.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - the last ones · The provider · Cyber
[claude mythos 5] matched mythos preview on "the last ones", solving the range end-to-end in 6/10 attempts.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - unprompted evaluations of safety research compromise · The provider · Deception & sabotage
[claude mythos 5] partially refuses to assist with safety research in 7.2% of cases, compared to 18.1% for opus 4.7, 15.5% for opus 4.8, and 14.6% for mythos preview.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source - unprompted verbalised evaluation awareness evaluation · The provider · Deception & sabotage
[claude mythos 5] never mentions the possibility of being tested in our unprompted evaluation, and mentions it 1.3% of the time in the continuation evaluation.
Anthropic · 9 June 2026 · Read the source
No document we read states: a release date, a safeguard.
Some documents we hold are stored in lower case only, so their quotes are shown in lower case. The source link opens the original.
Previous version: Claude Opus 4.8 · Compare the two
Documents listed for this version
- Redeploying Fable 5 · Anthropic · 30 June 2026
- System Card: Claude Fable 5 & Claude Mythos 5 · Anthropic · 9 June 2026
- Incident Report: unsanctioned agent behaviour during cyber testing · UK AI Security Institute · 4 August 2026
- OpenAI accidentally hacked Hugging Face — should we have seen it coming? · Epoch AI · 22 July 2026
- Are Mythos' cyber capabilities overhyped? · Epoch AI · 11 June 2026
- Disclosed CVEs: July Reached 5x the Pre-Mythos Record · Epoch AI · 31 July 2026
- Review of the "Misalignment in high-stakes settings" section in Anthropic's Risk Report: August 2026 · METR · 20 October 2026