AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower”.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with Chemical and Biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the Advanced AI Scaling Framework before safeguards were applied.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “However, after applying mitigations, the residual risk of the model is that of “moderate or lower risk.”” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defin Cyber |
Not reached | “Muse Spark’s offensive cyber capabilities remain below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defined in the Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “In light of this, we assess that we cannot rule out the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the chemical, radiological, and nuclear domains with reasonable confidence.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon demonstrates some ability to influence user beliefs and behaviors during one-on-one direct conversations in human behavioral studies, and may provide utility in the planning stage of a malicious influence operation but we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon's performance remains below our CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the CCL alert threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the CCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Cyber |
Not reached | “Gemini 3.7 Flash reaches the alert threshold for this CCL, but not the CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that, while Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite excels at agents and coding, it does not have meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to the domains outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro; therefore, based on Gemini 3.1 Pro results, we are confident that Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Audio Google DeepMind |
Tracked or critical capability level (t/ccls) Other |
Not reached | “they did not reach any Tracked or Critical Capability Levels (T/CCLs) outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework .” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We found that the model remains below alert thresholds for the CBRN, harmful manipulation, machine learning R&D, and misalignment CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not reached | “As previous models passed the alert threshold for cyber, we performed more additional testing in this domain on Gemini 3.1 Pro with and without Deep Think mode, and found that the model remains below the cyber CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Machine Learning R&D Uplift Level 1 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “given Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview's poor median performance on RE-Bench relative to experts, the model likely lacks the necessary capabilities to automate or significantly uplift any significant fraction of the research process.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 1 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 1 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 2 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessment is that the model has enough technical knowledge in certain CBRN scenarios and stages to be considered at early warning.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Cyber Uplift Level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “CCL reached? No, but the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “For Cyber Uplift Level 1 , the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| GPT-6.1 Terra OpenAI |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In AI Self-Improvement, GPT-6.1 Terra does not reach our High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6.1 Terra OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, we are treating GPT-6.1 Terra as Critical in cybersecurity and High for Biological and Chemical capability.” source |
| GPT-6.1 Terra OpenAI |
Critical Cyber |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, we are treating GPT-6.1 Terra as Critical in cybersecurity and High for Biological and Chemical capability.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
Below high capability Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is considered below High Capability.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI Self-Improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 Instant does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is our first Instant model to be treated as High Capability in the Biological and Chemical domain, as well as in the Cybersecurity domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Cyber |
Reached | “this is the first Instant model that we are treating as High capability in our Cybersecurity and Biological & Chemical Preparedness categories, and implementing appropriate safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High cyber risk Cyber |
Not reached | “The gpt-5 model series does not meet the threshold for high cyber risk.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “All models tested remain below our pre-committed rule-out threshold of 0.6.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Exhibited improved autonomy capabilities in software engineering and AI research tasks, though still below the ASL-4 rule-out threshold.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
scenario questions Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“llms performed worse on the scenario-based question set than on th” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
EVEscape Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-5.5 was able to complete the influenza ha task without denial in several attempts across two of the three prompt tiers (figure 4.2), but both models declined all requests to perform the lassa-targeted task (figure 4.1).” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
ESM3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“in our second case study, we prompted the agents to work with a local version of the esm3 generative model, esm3-sm-open-v1,43 and to use it to generate a protein that has less than 90% sequence identity with a provided reference protein.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
intra-model consistency test (10 repeated evaluations) Other |
“gpt-5-nano for evescape lassa gpc showed only 50% agreement with a mean variance of 0.091, indicating that nearly half of samples received different labels across runs.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
inter-rater reliability (Krippendorff's alpha) across judge models Other |
“the evescape influenza result (α = 0.077) illustrates the limits of interpreting agreement metrics in isolation.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
CTF challenge machines (M1, M2, M3) Cyber |
“We found that the AI models were able to solve each CTF challenge in under an hour with little guidance, and for total API costs of less than US$20 over all CTF challenges.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M1 Cyber |
“When Sonnet 4.6 completed M1 without the questions in less than five minutes, we” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M2 Cyber |
“Sonnet’s notes track five different methods it attempted to achieve privilege escalation before a sixth was successful.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M3 Cyber |
“Sonnet performed phases 1 to 4 largely as designed (though it took a shortcut on phase 4 as described below), noticing that the cloud services were provided by an emulator, but proceeding to exploit it like the real cloud service.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
BT operation case study: EvoEscpe Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“agents were tasked to generate escape scores using the companion repository to the evescape paper.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
non-scenario questions Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we first evaluated models on a question set probing specific bt functions without any biological context.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
scenario questions Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“next, we evaluated llms on a question set that required an agent to map bt functions onto a contextualized biological design scenario.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
scenario-based question set Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“the scenario-based question set produced higher denial rates, particularly among closed- weight llms (opus 4.7, gemini 3.1 pro, gpt 5.5, and grok 4.3).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
GFP-targeted task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“there were several denials on our gfp-targeted task as well, all of which were from the opus 4.7 model inside the cursor scaffold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
ESM3 agent-BT evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“table e.1 and table e.2 list the autograded questions for the evescape and esm3 respectively and their associated categories.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
inter-rater reliability metrics (Krippendorff's alpha) Other |
“inter-rater reliability metrics in table f.3: • krippendorff's alpha (α): a measure of inter-rater reliability that accounts for chance agreement.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge machines (M1, M2, M3) Cyber |
“We found that Claude Code was able to solve all our challenges quickly and cheaply, with relatively straightforward prompting that did not require any cyber knowledge.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M1 Cyber |
“When Sonnet 4.6 completed M1 without the questions in less than five minutes, we 7 We avoided using Hack the Bo x (HTB)’s own questions because they were designed educationally to help users build skills incrementally.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M2 Cyber |
“M2 Opus 4.6 42m 4s 13m 31s $4.24” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M3 Cyber |
“M3 Opus 4.6 20m 54s 6m 49s $2.17” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
BT operation case study: EvoScape Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“agents were tasked to generate escape scores using the companion repository to the evescape paper.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
BT operation case study: ESM3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“agents were tasked to demonstrate the mechanics of using esm3 to redesign a protein such that (1) essential functional elements are preserved and (2) the resulting amino acid sequence falls below a predefined sequence identity threshold (90%) relative to the reference protein.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
biological tool selection evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“llms performed worse on the scenario-based question set than on the non-scenario set.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
EVEscape agent-BT evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“in our bt operation case studies, we make use of llm autograders to analyze transcripts of task attempts.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
ESM3 agent-BT evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“only three proteins are included in our two agent-bt evaluations: gfp, lassa virus gpc, and influenza virus ha protein.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
intra-model consistency test (10 repeated evaluations) Other |
“claude opus 4.1 achieved 100% perfect agreement on evescape influenza but only 62.5% accuracy, demonstrating that a model can be consistently wrong.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Cybench Cyber |
“Cybench Description: Cybench is a benchmark containing 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent (as of 2024), meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
CyScenarioBench Cyber |
“From Gemini 3 Pro’s Frontier Safety Framework Report : Gemini 3 Pro: 0% (this is the “v2” third-party cyber benchmark)” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
OpenAI CTF Cyber |
“GPT 5.5 system card for GPT 5.3-codex, GPT 5.4, and GPT 5.5” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
OpenAI Cyber Ranges Cyber |
“GPT 5.5’s system card has the score for GPT 5.2-codex, 5.3-codex, 5.4, and 5.5” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Cyber-ECI Cyber |
“In comparison, GPT-5.5 was 3 months ahead, with a 90% confidence interval of 1-5 months.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
ExploitGym Cyber |
“Models are given a description of each vulnerability and told to use it to achieve ACE in a setting with standard security mitigations disabled.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Cyber-ECI Cyber |
“The thing that stands out is that Mythos Preview looks way above the linear trend we’ve seen since early 2025 — about 7 months ahead.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
cyber benchmarks (about fifteen, aggregated) Cyber |
“So we gathered about fifteen cyber benchmarks, which mostly measure how well AI can construct exploits (see the Appendix for all the gory details).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
benchmark evaluations by UK AISI Cyber |
“The picture then changed after benchmarking the April version, as UK AISI did.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Anthropic's real-world analyses of exploit development Cyber |
“Specifically, Anthropic found that Mythos Preview is much better at developing exploits that allow arbitrary code execution than prior models.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Project Glasswing vulnerability discovery (CVE counts) Cyber |
“High and Critical vulnerabilities from 21 notable organizations exceeded the 2025 baseline by 142% in April and 262% in May.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
curl codebase vulnerability scanning Cyber |
“It found just one low-severity vulnerability, alongside four false positives.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
CyScenarioBench Cyber |
“From Anthropic’s Mythos 5 launch post: - Mythos 5: 36.7% - Mythos Preview: 29.2% - Opus 4.8: 16.6%” source |
| Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
ExploitGym Cyber |
“Thankfully, we can now spot big capability gaps in the Cyber-ECI, because new unsaturated cyber benchmarks have since been released, such as ExploitBench and ExploitGym .” source |