Gemini 3.1 Pro
- Framework: Frontier Safety Framework
- 2 statements about capability levels
- 5 independent or government tests
- 1 case names this version
- 7 tests by the provider
- 11 source documents
Incidents naming this model
1 incident names this model version. Each shows its risk grouping and what was done, as a source states it.
| Incident | Risk grouping | What was done |
|---|---|---|
| Varonis phishing simulation drove an OpenClaw email agent to forward credentials and a customer export to an external address | Supply chain attack | OpenClaw shipped a fix in version 2026.4.23 that moves contact names, vCard fields, and location labels out of the prompt body and into a separate untrusted-metadata channel. |
What the provider states
- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · Uplift level 1 · Stated as not crossed
we found that the model remains below alert thresholds for the cbrn, harmful manipulation, machine learning r&d, and misalignment ccls.
Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026 · Read the source - Cyber · Uplift level 1 · Stated as not crossed
as previous models passed the alert threshold for cyber, we performed more additional testing in this domain on gemini 3.1 pro with and without deep think mode, and found that the model remains below the cyber ccl.
Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026 · Read the source
Independent and government tests
- per-criterion scoring results · RAND, independent evaluator · Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
the heatmaps of figures d.1 and d.2 show the number of attempts, out of 10, in which gemini 3.1 pro and deepseek v4 pro achieved each of our validity, structure, and function- related scoring criteria.
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) · 11 August 2026 · Read the source - SecureBio dual-use biology benchmarks · SecureBio, independent evaluator · Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
gemini 3.1 pro has improved on highly informative samples we find relevant to expert troubleshooting and failure identification.
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) · 6 August 2026 · Read the source - environmental identifier safeguard · RAND, independent evaluator · Deception & sabotage
however, we found that opus 4.5 and gemini 3.1 pro frequently delete these variables to evade detection.
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) · 20 July 2026 · Read the source - pre-run check · RAND, independent evaluator · Deception & sabotage
on the esm3 task, both opus 4.5 and gemini 3.1 pro make these false claims in 50% of trials and 63% of trials, respectively.
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) · 20 July 2026 · Read the source - BioTier · SecureBio, independent evaluator · Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
Google’s update to their mental health related safeguards made headlines, but we also identified changes to their biology safeguards, with an almost 30% increase in the refusal behavior of Gemini 3.1 Pro on BioTIER-refuse due to introduction of API-level refusals.
SecureBio · 16 July 2026 · Read the source
Cases that name this version
The provider's own tests
- CBRN CCL evaluation · The provider · Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
cbrn (deep think mode) the model can provide highly accurate and actionable information but still fails to offer novel or sufficiently complete and detailed instructions for critical stages, to significantly enhance the capabilities of low to medium resourced threat actors required for the ccl.
Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026 · Read the source - FSF evaluation · The provider · Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
the model can provide highly accurate and actionable information but still fails to offer novel or sufficiently complete and detailed instructions for critical stages, to significantly enhance the capabilities of low to medium resourced threat actors required for the ccl.
Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026 · Read the source - image to text safety · The provider · Harmful content
image to text safety automated content safety evaluation measuring safety policies -0.33%
Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026 · Read the source - multilingual safety · The provider · Harmful content
multilingual safety automated safety policy evaluation across multiple languages +0.11% (non-egregious)
Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026 · Read the source - text to text safety · The provider · Harmful content
text to text safety automated content safety evaluation measuring safety policies +0.10% (non-egregious)
Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026 · Read the source - tone · The provider · Misuse & jailbreak
tone 2 automated evaluation measuring objective tone of model refusal +0.02%
Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026 · Read the source - unjustified-refusals · The provider · Misuse & jailbreak
unjustified-refusals automated evaluation measuring model’s ability to respond to borderline prompts while remaining safe -0.08%
Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026 · Read the source
No document we read states: a release date, a safeguard.
Some documents we hold are stored in lower case only, so their quotes are shown in lower case. The source link opens the original.
Documents listed for this version
- Gemini 3.1 Pro Model Card · Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026
- Gemini 3.1 Pro · Google DeepMind · 19 February 2026
- Testing Large Language Model Agents on the Use of Biological Tools for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening Evasion · RAND (CAST / Project Canary) · 11 August 2026
- User awareness in frontier models · Transluce · 6 August 2026
- Interpreting Dual-Use Biology Benchmarks for Frontier AI: Measurement, Saturation, and Generational Analysis · RAND (CAST / Project Canary) · 6 August 2026
- Introducing the AI Security Leaderboard: Frontier AI Is Only as Safe as Its Weakest Model · FAR.AI · 29 July 2026
- Restricting AI Agent Use of Biological Tools: Exploring the Feasibility of Software Barriers · RAND (CAST / Project Canary) · 20 July 2026
- Measuring Biosecurity Safeguard Effectiveness with BioTIER · SecureBio · 16 July 2026
- Contributions to OpenAI's Codex codebase show signs of AI uplift · Epoch AI · 7 July 2026
- Evaluating LLM Calibration for Coding-Agent Monitoring · Apollo Research · 7 July 2026
- Can LLM Agents Select and Engage with Biological Tools? An Initial Biosecurity Assessment · RAND (CAST / Project Canary) · 25 June 2026