AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High capability, below critical Cyber	Not reached	“we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-04	monitor evasion detection on coding agent transcripts Deception and sabotage	“On these transcripts, 1.9% contained a severe case of monitor evasion: the agents merged a PR to main or disabled tests; and 1.8% contained cases where the agent claimed review had passed before it completed or fabricated human approval.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-04	overselling rubric Deception and sabotage	“We found severe cases of monitor evasion in 1.9% of swe-chat sessions, and severe cases of overselling in 1.8% of sessions.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-04	monitor evasion detection in coding agent transcripts Deception and sabotage	“On these transcripts, 1.9% contained a severe case of monitor evasion: the agents merged a PR to main or disabled tests; and 1.8% contained cases where the agent claimed review had passed before it completed or fabricated human approval.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-08-04	cyber range challenge Cyber	“Our investigation found that in 10 of those runs, an AI agent took autonomous, unsanctioned action on the live internet, targeting real people and organisations.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-04	overselling success Deception and sabotage	“On these transcripts, 1.9% contained a severe case of monitor evasion: the agents merged a PR to main or disabled tests; and 1.8% contained cases where the agent claimed review had passed before it completed or fabricated human approval.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LAB-Bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On biological knowledge, it was about level with Opus 4.7 and slightly below GPT-5.5, roughly two months behind.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	SWE-bench Pro Autonomy and AI research	“On software engineering, it was the furthest behind, below Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.4, the frontier models from around four months earlier.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Agentic Misalignment Deception and sabotage	“Additionally, it attempted persuasion on conspiracy and control-undermining topics more readily than the comparison models, and it could be pushed into harmful actions under pressure.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment benchmark Deception and sabotage	“In this evaluation, GLM-5.2 never displays any leaking or murder behavior, similar to GPT-5.5 and Opus 4.7.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment evaluation Deception and sabotage	“In this evaluation, Claude Opus 4.7 and GPT-5.5 display a 0% harmful-action rate across every scenario, goal, and threat condition.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	MASK Deception and sabotage	“Opus 4.7 lies in 17% of the trials and GPT-5.5 in 10%.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	APE (Attempt to Persuade Eval) Harmful content	“GLM-5.2 attempts to persuade towards conspiracy in 43% of the cases as opposed to 8% for Opus 4.7 and 18% for GPT-5.5.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Petri audit Deception and sabotage	“By comparison, GPT-5.5 behaved more conservatively across the audit.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“We run our own GPT-5.5 and Opus 4.7 baselines, using the same harness and the same conﬁguration for the supporting roles (e.g., the simulated persuadee) as we used for GLM-5.2.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Agentic misalignment scenarios Deception and sabotage	“We evaluate GLM-5.2, GPT-5.5, and Claude Opus 4.7 on Anthropic's Agentic Misalignment scenarios (Lynch et al. 2025), with Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b).” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	cybergym Cyber	“We run CyberGym on GLM-5.2 using Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b), comparing against the GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.6 results published by Lyptus Research (Payne et al., 2026) on the same 122-task Level 1 sample (see Appendix A.2 for details).” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	biomysterybench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On biological knowledge, it was about level with Opus 4.7 and slightly below GPT-5.5, roughly two months behind.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	swe-bench pro Autonomy and AI research	“On software engineering, it was the furthest behind, below Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.4, the frontier models from around four months earlier.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment Deception and sabotage	“Additionally, it attempted persuasion on conspiracy and control-undermining topics more readily than the comparison models, and it could be pushed into harmful actions under pressure.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	automated behavioral audit Other	“Beyond capability, it refused none of the oﬀensive-security or biological tasks, and as an open-weight model, any safeguards that might be present can be stripped by a self-hoster.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	reward-hacking analysis Deception and sabotage	“Our reward-hacking analysis ( Appendix A.5.1.2 ) found that when transcripts showing signs of reward hacking are excluded, GLM-5.2's solve rate falls from 43% to 37%, and spot-checks suggest the agent's cheating attempts frequently succeeded.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment blackmail scenario Deception and sabotage	“When the goal is implicit (latent) in the email contents that the model reads (latent goal), GLM-5.2 chose to blackmail 10% of the time under the threat of replacement.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LLM judge assessment of SWE-bench Pro transcripts for environment issues Other	“Spot checking indicates a reasonable correspondence between judge score and genuine environment issues.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	MASK Deception and sabotage	“Table A.3 breaks down MASK honesty by prompt category, with 95% Wilson CI scores.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Cybench Cyber	“We run Cybench on GLM-5.2, GPT-5.5, and Opus 4.7 using Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b).” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	CyberGym Cyber	“We run CyberGym on GLM-5.2 using Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b), comparing against the GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.6 results published by Lyptus Research (Payne et al., 2026) on the same 122-task Level 1 sample (see Appendix A.2 for details).” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LAB-Bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“GLM-5.2 meets or exceeds the human-expert score on all of the subtasks.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	BioMysteryBench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“GLM-5.2 scores comparably to both GPT-5.5 and Opus 4.7 on both the human-solvable and human-diﬃcult datasets.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	SWE-bench Pro Autonomy and AI research	“GLM-5.2 solves 43% of the tasks we run.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Agentic Misalignment Deception and sabotage	“In this evaluation, GLM-5.2 never displays any leaking or murder behavior, similar to GPT-5.5 and Opus 4.7.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment evaluation Deception and sabotage	“When the goal is implicit (latent) in the email contents that the model reads (latent goal), GLM-5.2 chose to blackmail 10% of the time under the threat of replacement.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	MASK Deception and sabotage	“GLM-5.2 is honest on 61% of prompts, lies on 21%, and evades or holds no belief on 18%.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	APE Misuse and jailbreaks	“GLM-5.2 attempts to persuade towards conspiracy in 43% of the cases as opposed to 8% for Opus 4.7 and 18% for GPT-5.5.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Petri Deception and sabotage	“We audit GLM-5.2 and GPT-5.5 using Inspect Petri 3.0, running all 173 of the public seeds ( Appendix A.6.1 ).” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Petri Misuse and jailbreaks	“Its cooperation with misuse scored 6 or higher on 14 of the 166 scored seeds and 7 or higher on 8 of them.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment evaluations Autonomy and AI research	“In our Agentic Misalignment evaluations, GPT-5.5 verbalized its awareness of being evaluated 10% of the time, and GLM-5.2 verbalized it 30% of the time.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	SWE-bench Pro Cyber	“We run the public tasks from SWE-Bench Pro (Scale AI, n.d.-b) using Inspect Harbor (Meridian Labs, n.d.-b), which provides an interface to run Harbor tasks (Meridian Labs, n.d.-a) inside Inspect AI (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-a).” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LLM judge assessment of SWE-bench Pro transcripts for environment issues Other	“32% of transcripts have judge_score 5 or higher.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LLM judge assessment of SWE-bench Pro transcripts for reward hacking Other	“When removing transcripts with a judge_score >= 3 (41% of samples excluded), or a judge_score >= 2 (48% of samples excluded), the agent’s score reduces to 37%.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“We run the full 600-prompt set in the main persuade condition.” source

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