AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber	Not determined	“Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source
Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Cyber	Not reached	“The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03	High Other	Not determined	“Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Tier 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source
Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not determined	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber	Not determined	“- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing signiﬁcant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	Critical Cyber	Not reached	“We therefore treat VulnLMP as important evidence that GPT-5.5 has High cybersecurity capability, while also as evidence against classifying it as Critical under the Preparedness Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-04	monitor evasion detection on coding agent transcripts Deception and sabotage	“On these transcripts, 1.9% contained a severe case of monitor evasion: the agents merged a PR to main or disabled tests; and 1.8% contained cases where the agent claimed review had passed before it completed or fabricated human approval.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-04	overselling rubric Deception and sabotage	“We found severe cases of monitor evasion in 1.9% of swe-chat sessions, and severe cases of overselling in 1.8% of sessions.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-04	monitor evasion detection in coding agent transcripts Deception and sabotage	“On these transcripts, 1.9% contained a severe case of monitor evasion: the agents merged a PR to main or disabled tests; and 1.8% contained cases where the agent claimed review had passed before it completed or fabricated human approval.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-08-04	cyber range challenge Cyber	“Our investigation found that in 10 of those runs, an AI agent took autonomous, unsanctioned action on the live internet, targeting real people and organisations.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-04	overselling success Deception and sabotage	“On these transcripts, 1.9% contained a severe case of monitor evasion: the agents merged a PR to main or disabled tests; and 1.8% contained cases where the agent claimed review had passed before it completed or fabricated human approval.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LAB-Bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On biological knowledge, it was about level with Opus 4.7 and slightly below GPT-5.5, roughly two months behind.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	SWE-bench Pro Autonomy and AI research	“On software engineering, it was the furthest behind, below Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.4, the frontier models from around four months earlier.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Agentic Misalignment Deception and sabotage	“Additionally, it attempted persuasion on conspiracy and control-undermining topics more readily than the comparison models, and it could be pushed into harmful actions under pressure.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment benchmark Deception and sabotage	“In this evaluation, GLM-5.2 never displays any leaking or murder behavior, similar to GPT-5.5 and Opus 4.7.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment evaluation Deception and sabotage	“In this evaluation, Claude Opus 4.7 and GPT-5.5 display a 0% harmful-action rate across every scenario, goal, and threat condition.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	MASK Deception and sabotage	“Opus 4.7 lies in 17% of the trials and GPT-5.5 in 10%.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	APE (Attempt to Persuade Eval) Harmful content	“GLM-5.2 attempts to persuade towards conspiracy in 43% of the cases as opposed to 8% for Opus 4.7 and 18% for GPT-5.5.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Petri audit Deception and sabotage	“By comparison, GPT-5.5 behaved more conservatively across the audit.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“We run our own GPT-5.5 and Opus 4.7 baselines, using the same harness and the same conﬁguration for the supporting roles (e.g., the simulated persuadee) as we used for GLM-5.2.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Agentic misalignment scenarios Deception and sabotage	“We evaluate GLM-5.2, GPT-5.5, and Claude Opus 4.7 on Anthropic's Agentic Misalignment scenarios (Lynch et al. 2025), with Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b).” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	cybergym Cyber	“We run CyberGym on GLM-5.2 using Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b), comparing against the GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.6 results published by Lyptus Research (Payne et al., 2026) on the same 122-task Level 1 sample (see Appendix A.2 for details).” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	biomysterybench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On biological knowledge, it was about level with Opus 4.7 and slightly below GPT-5.5, roughly two months behind.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	swe-bench pro Autonomy and AI research	“On software engineering, it was the furthest behind, below Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.4, the frontier models from around four months earlier.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment Deception and sabotage	“Additionally, it attempted persuasion on conspiracy and control-undermining topics more readily than the comparison models, and it could be pushed into harmful actions under pressure.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	automated behavioral audit Other	“Beyond capability, it refused none of the oﬀensive-security or biological tasks, and as an open-weight model, any safeguards that might be present can be stripped by a self-hoster.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	reward-hacking analysis Deception and sabotage	“Our reward-hacking analysis ( Appendix A.5.1.2 ) found that when transcripts showing signs of reward hacking are excluded, GLM-5.2's solve rate falls from 43% to 37%, and spot-checks suggest the agent's cheating attempts frequently succeeded.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment blackmail scenario Deception and sabotage	“When the goal is implicit (latent) in the email contents that the model reads (latent goal), GLM-5.2 chose to blackmail 10% of the time under the threat of replacement.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LLM judge assessment of SWE-bench Pro transcripts for environment issues Other	“Spot checking indicates a reasonable correspondence between judge score and genuine environment issues.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	MASK Deception and sabotage	“Table A.3 breaks down MASK honesty by prompt category, with 95% Wilson CI scores.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Cybench Cyber	“We run Cybench on GLM-5.2, GPT-5.5, and Opus 4.7 using Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b).” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	CyberGym Cyber	“We run CyberGym on GLM-5.2 using Inspect Evals (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-b), comparing against the GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.6 results published by Lyptus Research (Payne et al., 2026) on the same 122-task Level 1 sample (see Appendix A.2 for details).” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LAB-Bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“GLM-5.2 meets or exceeds the human-expert score on all of the subtasks.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	BioMysteryBench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“GLM-5.2 scores comparably to both GPT-5.5 and Opus 4.7 on both the human-solvable and human-diﬃcult datasets.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	SWE-bench Pro Autonomy and AI research	“GLM-5.2 solves 43% of the tasks we run.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Agentic Misalignment Deception and sabotage	“In this evaluation, GLM-5.2 never displays any leaking or murder behavior, similar to GPT-5.5 and Opus 4.7.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment evaluation Deception and sabotage	“When the goal is implicit (latent) in the email contents that the model reads (latent goal), GLM-5.2 chose to blackmail 10% of the time under the threat of replacement.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	MASK Deception and sabotage	“GLM-5.2 is honest on 61% of prompts, lies on 21%, and evades or holds no belief on 18%.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	APE Misuse and jailbreaks	“GLM-5.2 attempts to persuade towards conspiracy in 43% of the cases as opposed to 8% for Opus 4.7 and 18% for GPT-5.5.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Petri Deception and sabotage	“We audit GLM-5.2 and GPT-5.5 using Inspect Petri 3.0, running all 173 of the public seeds ( Appendix A.6.1 ).” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Petri Misuse and jailbreaks	“Its cooperation with misuse scored 6 or higher on 14 of the 166 scored seeds and 7 or higher on 8 of them.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	agentic misalignment evaluations Autonomy and AI research	“In our Agentic Misalignment evaluations, GPT-5.5 verbalized its awareness of being evaluated 10% of the time, and GLM-5.2 verbalized it 30% of the time.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	SWE-bench Pro Cyber	“We run the public tasks from SWE-Bench Pro (Scale AI, n.d.-b) using Inspect Harbor (Meridian Labs, n.d.-b), which provides an interface to run Harbor tasks (Meridian Labs, n.d.-a) inside Inspect AI (UK AI Security Institute, n.d.-a).” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LLM judge assessment of SWE-bench Pro transcripts for environment issues Other	“32% of transcripts have judge_score 5 or higher.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	LLM judge assessment of SWE-bench Pro transcripts for reward hacking Other	“When removing transcripts with a judge_score >= 3 (41% of samples excluded), or a judge_score >= 2 (48% of samples excluded), the agent’s score reduces to 37%.” source
GLM-5.2 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	SaferAI Independent lab · 2026-08-02	Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“We run the full 600-prompt set in the main persuade condition.” source

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