AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Cyber |
Not determined | “Showed meaningful improvements in cyber capabilities, particularly in vulnerability discovery and code analysis;” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “specifically, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “specifically, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “These problems are harder to solve than the previous problems and we consider them as part of our ASL-4 evaluations.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “For AI R&D capabilities, we found that Claude Opus 4.6 has saturated most of our automated evaluations, meaning they no longer provide useful evidence for ruling out ASL-4 level autonomy.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “The model crossed or met thresholds on all ASL-3 evaluations except our synthesis screening evasion, consistent with incremental capability improvements driven primarily by better agentic workflows.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Claude Opus 4.6 is our strongest biology model to date and demonstrates meaningful capability improvements, but we do not believe it merits ASL-4 safeguards.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We determine that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross the CBRN-4 threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on confirming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on confirming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
ASL-4 Cyber |
Not reached | “Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on confirming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source |
| Claude Opus 4 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could confidently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source |
| Claude Opus 4 Anthropic |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could confidently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
METR external testing Autonomy and AI research |
“External testing by METR ( Section 2.3.6 ) produced findings consistent with this assessment.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on three evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: A medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Autonomy and AI research |
“We conducted a preliminary evaluation of [Claude Opus 5.5] informed by: ● Capability testing, conducted via API access granted over a period of 10 business days.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA) Autonomy and AI research |
“○ Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA) , a conceptual reasoning dataset described in A dataset of rated conceptual arguments (Cooper et al., 2026).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Train a Program Autonomy and AI research |
“○ Train a Program , a task measuring an agent’s ability to train a machine learning model that replicates the behavior of a piece of software;” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Gaming Bot Autonomy and AI research |
“○ Gaming Bot , a task where an agent has to write a Python program capable of playing a video game, given a non-visual API to control the game.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Sunlight Autonomy and AI research |
“○ Sunlight , a task measuring an agent’s ability to conduct open-ended research and write a corresponding report.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Trajectory Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
external red-teaming by Trajectory Labs, PBC Cyber |
“Trajectory Labs, PBC spent roughly 95 hours red teaming Claude Opus 5.5, sending over 29,000 requests against sandboxed tasks that each require reproducing an exploit for a publicly documented vulnerability.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
10a Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
multi-turn attack conversations framed as developer-focused coding tasks Cyber |
“10a Labs spent roughly 56 hours red teaming Claude Opus 5.5 across 82 multi-turn attack conversations, each framed as a large developer-focused coding task designed to draw a working exploit out of a volume of legitimately requested application code rather than asking for the exploit directly.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Shade automated attacker on critical infrastructure environments Cyber |
“Claude Opus 5.5’s safeguards refused over 90% of attempts outright, and none of the rest reached the objective.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Shade automated attacker on exploit reproduction and ransomware staging scenarios Cyber |
“Of roughly 1,700 attempts, Claude Opus 5.5’s safeguards refused about a quarter outright.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Opus 5.5 matches Claude Fable 5.1, our most robust model to date on this benchmark, with an attack success rate of 0.1% at k=1, 0.7% at k=10, and 1.0% at k=15.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Shade Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Opus 5.5 substantially improves on Claude Opus 5 in coding environments against this stronger attacker, with an attack success rate of 54.61% over all attempts, compared to 88.92% for Claude Opus 5 with thinking enabled and 85.49% without thinking enabled.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Other |
“Budget NanoGPT Speedrun, a constrained version of the popular NanoGPT Speedrun competition for AI R&D.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA) Other |
“Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA), a conceptual reasoning dataset described in A dataset of rated conceptual arguments (Cooper et al., 2026).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Train a Program Other |
“Train a Program, a task measuring an agent’s ability to train a machine learning model that replicates the behavior of a piece of software;” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Gaming Bot Other |
“Gaming Bot, a task where an agent has to write a Python program capable of playing a video game, given a non-visual API to control the game.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Sunlight Other |
“Sunlight, a task measuring an agent’s ability to conduct open-ended research and write a corresponding report.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Other |
“Claude Opus 5.5 improves upon Fable 5.1 across both verifiable tasks (Budget NanoGPT, Gaming Bot) and harder-to-verify tasks (LMCA, Sunlight), but:” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-21 |
Cathedralbench Cyber |
“CathedralBench is an independent, third party evaluation of cyber performance.” source |
| Grok 4.7 Cursor |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-21 |
cathedralbench Cyber |
“CathedralBench is an independent, third party evaluation of cyber performance.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-21 |
warm introduction task on relationship-reasoning benchmark Other |
“With Gemini-3-Flash on a stratified subset of n = 150 queries per task, ReAdapt improves warm-introduction accuracy from 37% to 51% (+14 points) and reaction-selection accuracy from 69% to 77% (+8 points).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-21 |
OSWorld-Pro Other |
“Our findings reveal that OSWorld-Pro is challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, with top performers like Claude Opus 5 achieving only 75.7% vs. 83.4% on OSWorld.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-21 |
governed delivery plane end-to-end run across ten stages scored by an oracle Other |
“We ran four frontier agents (Claude Opus 5, GPT-5.6-luna, Gemini 3.7 Flash, DeepSeek V4-Pro) end to end on metered L40S, A100, and H200 GPUs across 8B to 70B open bases, certifying every scenario before scoring.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-21 |
suite of 325K experiments on 13 agents across three types of economic decisions (flights, health insurance, and graduate programs) Bias |
“In a suite of 325K experiments on 13 agents across three types of economic decisions (flights, health insurance, and graduate programs), we find that 8 models systematically choose more expensive options for wealthier users when requests are identical.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-19 |
CyberGym Cyber |
“With fewer than 200 training examples, SelfOp yields a 17-point self-improvement for GPT-5.4-mini (with Codex), enough to surpass the frontier GPT-5.4 baseline by 6 points, and an 18.5-point self-improvement for GPT-5.4 itself.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-18 |
GenEval2 execution success Other |
“Five rounds over 1,406 real user briefs and 1,869 automatically graded trajectories, with no weight updates and no human labels, grow the bank from 76 documentation-derived skills to 139 and raise GenEval2 execution success on Claude-Sonnet-4 from 72.7% to 99.3% (+11.99 points in generation quality), with 61.8% and 67.6% win rates against the no-skill agent across four specialized design benchmarks on Claude-Sonnet-4 and Claude-Opus-4.6.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-18 |
SWE-Proof Other |
“Across two frontier models, verification catches what tests miss: a quarter to a half of test-passing patches admit counterexamples, which a structured natural-language specification does not fix, while a correct formal one lifts resolution from 85% to 95% for Opus 4.8.” source |
| GLM-5.3 Z.ai (Zhipu AI) |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-09-17 |
sec-bench pro Cyber |
“CAISI evaluated GLM-5.3’s performance on four benchmarks covering vulnerability discovery and exploit development (Figure 2).” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
virology capabilities test (vct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-6 astra outperformed every model we have previously tested on the virology capabilities test (vct) and vct-v2 knowledge benchmarks, with performance increases of 4.3 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively, relative to gpt-5.6 sol, and more than 30 percentage points better than our human subject matter expert baselines.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
world-class bio (wcb) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on world-class bio (wcb), an open-response test of niche biological knowledge held by only a handful of specialists in the world, the highest-performing astra checkpoint scored 61.6% ± 0.6%, about seven percentage points lower than gpt-5.6 sol.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
biotier Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“the safeguarded astra pre-release checkpoint correctly refused 82.9% of biotier-refuse and correctly did not refuse 95.3% of biotier-permit.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
manual assessment by virology experts Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“over 10 hours of interaction, our manual assessors tested the bounds of dual-use knowledge of the railfree astra pre-release checkpoint and the willingness of the safeguarded astra pre-release checkpoint to answer high-risk questions.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
virology capabilities test (VCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-6 astra outperformed every model we have previously tested on the virology capabilities test (vct) and vct-v2 knowledge benchmarks, with performance increases of 4.3 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively, relative to gpt-5.6 sol, and more than 30 percentage points better than our human subject matter expert baselines.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
human pathogen capabilities test (HPCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-6 astra’s score on the human pathogen capabilities test (hpct) was very similar to the score achieved by gpt-5.6 sol.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
world-class bio (WCB) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on world-class bio (wcb), an open-response test of niche biological knowledge held by only a handful of specialists in the world, the highest-performing astra checkpoint scored 61.6% ± 0.6%, about seven percentage points lower than gpt-5.6 sol.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
advanced screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on advanced screening evasion, which assesses an agent’s ability to evade commercial nucleic acid synthesis screening algorithms, the railfree variant of astra was the top-scoring model that securebio has tested.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
BioTier Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“the safeguarded astra pre-release checkpoint correctly refused 82.9% of biotier-refuse and correctly did not refuse 95.3% of biotier-permit.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
virology capabilities test (vct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“since the release of vct in april 2025, the accuracy of the top-performing model on the benchmark has increased by ~12 percentage points (o3: 42.0%; gpt-5.6 sol: 53.9%).” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
vct-v2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“model accuracies 2 dropped by 1.0–7.1 percentage points on vct-v2 relative to vct (the original benchmark) across the models tested, which reflects the removal of easy questions and the closing of shortcuts.” source |