AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower”.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with Chemical and Biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the Advanced AI Scaling Framework before safeguards were applied.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “However, after applying mitigations, the residual risk of the model is that of “moderate or lower risk.”” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defin Cyber |
Not reached | “Muse Spark’s offensive cyber capabilities remain below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defined in the Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “In light of this, we assess that we cannot rule out the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the chemical, radiological, and nuclear domains with reasonable confidence.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon demonstrates some ability to influence user beliefs and behaviors during one-on-one direct conversations in human behavioral studies, and may provide utility in the planning stage of a malicious influence operation but we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon's performance remains below our CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the CCL alert threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the CCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Cyber |
Not reached | “Gemini 3.7 Flash reaches the alert threshold for this CCL, but not the CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that, while Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite excels at agents and coding, it does not have meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to the domains outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro; therefore, based on Gemini 3.1 Pro results, we are confident that Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Audio Google DeepMind |
Tracked or critical capability level (t/ccls) Other |
Not reached | “they did not reach any Tracked or Critical Capability Levels (T/CCLs) outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework .” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We found that the model remains below alert thresholds for the CBRN, harmful manipulation, machine learning R&D, and misalignment CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not reached | “As previous models passed the alert threshold for cyber, we performed more additional testing in this domain on Gemini 3.1 Pro with and without Deep Think mode, and found that the model remains below the cyber CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Machine Learning R&D Uplift Level 1 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “given Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview's poor median performance on RE-Bench relative to experts, the model likely lacks the necessary capabilities to automate or significantly uplift any significant fraction of the research process.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 1 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 1 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 2 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessment is that the model has enough technical knowledge in certain CBRN scenarios and stages to be considered at early warning.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Cyber Uplift Level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “CCL reached? No, but the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “For Cyber Uplift Level 1 , the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
Below high capability Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is considered below High Capability.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI Self-Improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 Instant does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is our first Instant model to be treated as High Capability in the Biological and Chemical domain, as well as in the Cybersecurity domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Cyber |
Reached | “this is the first Instant model that we are treating as High capability in our Cybersecurity and Biological & Chemical Preparedness categories, and implementing appropriate safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High cyber risk Cyber |
Not reached | “The gpt-5 model series does not meet the threshold for high cyber risk.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “All models tested remain below our pre-committed rule-out threshold of 0.6.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Exhibited improved autonomy capabilities in software engineering and AI research tasks, though still below the ASL-4 rule-out threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-4 rule-out Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
METR external testing Autonomy and AI research |
“External testing by METR ( Section 2.3.6 ) produced findings consistent with this assessment.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on three evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: A medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Autonomy and AI research |
“We conducted a preliminary evaluation of [Claude Opus 5.5] informed by: ● Capability testing, conducted via API access granted over a period of 10 business days.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA) Autonomy and AI research |
“○ Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA) , a conceptual reasoning dataset described in A dataset of rated conceptual arguments (Cooper et al., 2026).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Train a Program Autonomy and AI research |
“○ Train a Program , a task measuring an agent’s ability to train a machine learning model that replicates the behavior of a piece of software;” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Gaming Bot Autonomy and AI research |
“○ Gaming Bot , a task where an agent has to write a Python program capable of playing a video game, given a non-visual API to control the game.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Sunlight Autonomy and AI research |
“○ Sunlight , a task measuring an agent’s ability to conduct open-ended research and write a corresponding report.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Trajectory Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
external red-teaming by Trajectory Labs, PBC Cyber |
“Trajectory Labs, PBC spent roughly 95 hours red teaming Claude Opus 5.5, sending over 29,000 requests against sandboxed tasks that each require reproducing an exploit for a publicly documented vulnerability.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
10a Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
multi-turn attack conversations framed as developer-focused coding tasks Cyber |
“10a Labs spent roughly 56 hours red teaming Claude Opus 5.5 across 82 multi-turn attack conversations, each framed as a large developer-focused coding task designed to draw a working exploit out of a volume of legitimately requested application code rather than asking for the exploit directly.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Shade automated attacker on critical infrastructure environments Cyber |
“Claude Opus 5.5’s safeguards refused over 90% of attempts outright, and none of the rest reached the objective.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Shade automated attacker on exploit reproduction and ransomware staging scenarios Cyber |
“Of roughly 1,700 attempts, Claude Opus 5.5’s safeguards refused about a quarter outright.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Opus 5.5 matches Claude Fable 5.1, our most robust model to date on this benchmark, with an attack success rate of 0.1% at k=1, 0.7% at k=10, and 1.0% at k=15.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Shade Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Opus 5.5 substantially improves on Claude Opus 5 in coding environments against this stronger attacker, with an attack success rate of 54.61% over all attempts, compared to 88.92% for Claude Opus 5 with thinking enabled and 85.49% without thinking enabled.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Other |
“Budget NanoGPT Speedrun, a constrained version of the popular NanoGPT Speedrun competition for AI R&D.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA) Other |
“Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA), a conceptual reasoning dataset described in A dataset of rated conceptual arguments (Cooper et al., 2026).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Train a Program Other |
“Train a Program, a task measuring an agent’s ability to train a machine learning model that replicates the behavior of a piece of software;” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Gaming Bot Other |
“Gaming Bot, a task where an agent has to write a Python program capable of playing a video game, given a non-visual API to control the game.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Sunlight Other |
“Sunlight, a task measuring an agent’s ability to conduct open-ended research and write a corresponding report.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22 |
Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Other |
“Claude Opus 5.5 improves upon Fable 5.1 across both verifiable tasks (Budget NanoGPT, Gaming Bot) and harder-to-verify tasks (LMCA, Sunlight), but:” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-21 |
Cathedralbench Cyber |
“CathedralBench is an independent, third party evaluation of cyber performance.” source |
| Grok 4.7 Cursor |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-21 |
cathedralbench Cyber |
“CathedralBench is an independent, third party evaluation of cyber performance.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-21 |
warm introduction task on relationship-reasoning benchmark Other |
“With Gemini-3-Flash on a stratified subset of n = 150 queries per task, ReAdapt improves warm-introduction accuracy from 37% to 51% (+14 points) and reaction-selection accuracy from 69% to 77% (+8 points).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-21 |
OSWorld-Pro Other |
“Our findings reveal that OSWorld-Pro is challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, with top performers like Claude Opus 5 achieving only 75.7% vs. 83.4% on OSWorld.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-21 |
governed delivery plane end-to-end run across ten stages scored by an oracle Other |
“We ran four frontier agents (Claude Opus 5, GPT-5.6-luna, Gemini 3.7 Flash, DeepSeek V4-Pro) end to end on metered L40S, A100, and H200 GPUs across 8B to 70B open bases, certifying every scenario before scoring.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-21 |
suite of 325K experiments on 13 agents across three types of economic decisions (flights, health insurance, and graduate programs) Bias |
“In a suite of 325K experiments on 13 agents across three types of economic decisions (flights, health insurance, and graduate programs), we find that 8 models systematically choose more expensive options for wealthier users when requests are identical.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-19 |
CyberGym Cyber |
“With fewer than 200 training examples, SelfOp yields a 17-point self-improvement for GPT-5.4-mini (with Codex), enough to surpass the frontier GPT-5.4 baseline by 6 points, and an 18.5-point self-improvement for GPT-5.4 itself.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-18 |
GenEval2 execution success Other |
“Five rounds over 1,406 real user briefs and 1,869 automatically graded trajectories, with no weight updates and no human labels, grow the bank from 76 documentation-derived skills to 139 and raise GenEval2 execution success on Claude-Sonnet-4 from 72.7% to 99.3% (+11.99 points in generation quality), with 61.8% and 67.6% win rates against the no-skill agent across four specialized design benchmarks on Claude-Sonnet-4 and Claude-Opus-4.6.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2026-09-18 |
SWE-Proof Other |
“Across two frontier models, verification catches what tests miss: a quarter to a half of test-passing patches admit counterexamples, which a structured natural-language specification does not fix, while a correct formal one lifts resolution from 85% to 95% for Opus 4.8.” source |
| GLM-5.3 Z.ai (Zhipu AI) |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-09-17 |
sec-bench pro Cyber |
“CAISI evaluated GLM-5.3’s performance on four benchmarks covering vulnerability discovery and exploit development (Figure 2).” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
virology capabilities test (vct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-6 astra outperformed every model we have previously tested on the virology capabilities test (vct) and vct-v2 knowledge benchmarks, with performance increases of 4.3 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively, relative to gpt-5.6 sol, and more than 30 percentage points better than our human subject matter expert baselines.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
world-class bio (wcb) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on world-class bio (wcb), an open-response test of niche biological knowledge held by only a handful of specialists in the world, the highest-performing astra checkpoint scored 61.6% ± 0.6%, about seven percentage points lower than gpt-5.6 sol.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
biotier Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“the safeguarded astra pre-release checkpoint correctly refused 82.9% of biotier-refuse and correctly did not refuse 95.3% of biotier-permit.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
manual assessment by virology experts Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“over 10 hours of interaction, our manual assessors tested the bounds of dual-use knowledge of the railfree astra pre-release checkpoint and the willingness of the safeguarded astra pre-release checkpoint to answer high-risk questions.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
virology capabilities test (VCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-6 astra outperformed every model we have previously tested on the virology capabilities test (vct) and vct-v2 knowledge benchmarks, with performance increases of 4.3 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively, relative to gpt-5.6 sol, and more than 30 percentage points better than our human subject matter expert baselines.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
human pathogen capabilities test (HPCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-6 astra’s score on the human pathogen capabilities test (hpct) was very similar to the score achieved by gpt-5.6 sol.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
world-class bio (WCB) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on world-class bio (wcb), an open-response test of niche biological knowledge held by only a handful of specialists in the world, the highest-performing astra checkpoint scored 61.6% ± 0.6%, about seven percentage points lower than gpt-5.6 sol.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
advanced screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on advanced screening evasion, which assesses an agent’s ability to evade commercial nucleic acid synthesis screening algorithms, the railfree variant of astra was the top-scoring model that securebio has tested.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14 |
BioTier Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“the safeguarded astra pre-release checkpoint correctly refused 82.9% of biotier-refuse and correctly did not refuse 95.3% of biotier-permit.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
virology capabilities test (vct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“since the release of vct in april 2025, the accuracy of the top-performing model on the benchmark has increased by ~12 percentage points (o3: 42.0%; gpt-5.6 sol: 53.9%).” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
vct-v2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“model accuracies 2 dropped by 1.0–7.1 percentage points on vct-v2 relative to vct (the original benchmark) across the models tested, which reflects the removal of easy questions and the closing of shortcuts.” source |