AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower”.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with Chemical and Biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the Advanced AI Scaling Framework before safeguards were applied.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “However, after applying mitigations, the residual risk of the model is that of “moderate or lower risk.”” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defin Cyber |
Not reached | “Muse Spark’s offensive cyber capabilities remain below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defined in the Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “In light of this, we assess that we cannot rule out the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the chemical, radiological, and nuclear domains with reasonable confidence.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon demonstrates some ability to influence user beliefs and behaviors during one-on-one direct conversations in human behavioral studies, and may provide utility in the planning stage of a malicious influence operation but we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon's performance remains below our CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the CCL alert threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the CCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Cyber |
Not reached | “Gemini 3.7 Flash reaches the alert threshold for this CCL, but not the CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that, while Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite excels at agents and coding, it does not have meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to the domains outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro; therefore, based on Gemini 3.1 Pro results, we are confident that Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Audio Google DeepMind |
Tracked or critical capability level (t/ccls) Other |
Not reached | “they did not reach any Tracked or Critical Capability Levels (T/CCLs) outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework .” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We found that the model remains below alert thresholds for the CBRN, harmful manipulation, machine learning R&D, and misalignment CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not reached | “As previous models passed the alert threshold for cyber, we performed more additional testing in this domain on Gemini 3.1 Pro with and without Deep Think mode, and found that the model remains below the cyber CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Machine Learning R&D Uplift Level 1 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “given Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview's poor median performance on RE-Bench relative to experts, the model likely lacks the necessary capabilities to automate or significantly uplift any significant fraction of the research process.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 1 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 1 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 2 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessment is that the model has enough technical knowledge in certain CBRN scenarios and stages to be considered at early warning.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Cyber Uplift Level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “CCL reached? No, but the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “For Cyber Uplift Level 1 , the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
Below high capability Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is considered below High Capability.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI Self-Improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 Instant does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is our first Instant model to be treated as High Capability in the Biological and Chemical domain, as well as in the Cybersecurity domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Cyber |
Reached | “this is the first Instant model that we are treating as High capability in our Cybersecurity and Biological & Chemical Preparedness categories, and implementing appropriate safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High cyber risk Cyber |
Not reached | “The gpt-5 model series does not meet the threshold for high cyber risk.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “All models tested remain below our pre-committed rule-out threshold of 0.6.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Exhibited improved autonomy capabilities in software engineering and AI research tasks, though still below the ASL-4 rule-out threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-4 rule-out Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| GLM-5.3 Z.ai (Zhipu AI) |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-16 |
CAISI benchmarks Cyber |
“Three of the seven CAISI benchmarks come from its September 2026 assessment of GLM-5.3 and are the only cyber results available for that model.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-16 |
Cyber ECI Cyber |
“| Claude Opus 5.5 | Anthropic | 2026-09-22 | API access | Closed weights | 171.14 | 166.66 | 177.32 | 4 |” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-10-16 |
Screwtape pipeline runs against Redwood's own proxy monitors Deception and sabotage |
“We ran the pipeline 252 times on 94 unique transcripts.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-16 |
Cyber ECI Cyber |
“| Claude Mythos Preview (April) | Anthropic | 2026-04-07 | Limited access | Closed weights | 164.82 | 161.81 | 169.99 | 12 |” source |
| Muse Spark Open Meta |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-10-15 |
SecureBio's BioTIER refusal benchmark Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“It showed strong refusal behavior on both single-turn and multi-turn benchmarks, refusing over 98% of harmful requests on SecureBio's BioTIER refusal benchmark and over 99% on our internal single-turn chemistry refusal benchmark.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Academic Academic · 2026-10-15 |
five VQA benchmarks in medical pre-training with 2.64M ZoomCap-captioned images Other |
“The evidence also transfers: in continual pre-training, ZoomCap-450K improves the 11-benchmark average by 1.31-2.38 points over the strongest competing corpus and Ling-Tiny-VL-v3 gains 1.4 points on a production document/OCR monitor suite (1.5 on perception) at 60B tokens; in medical pre-training, 2.64M ZoomCap-captioned images improve five VQA benchmarks by 3.04 points (vs. 1.76 for same-image Gemini-3.1-Pro captions).” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
Academic Academic · 2026-10-15 |
120 Chinese instructions per backend Other |
“In tests of 120 Chinese instructions per backend, GPT-5.6 Sol and DeepSeek both achieved a strict task-match rate of 94.2%, with all intents and execution decisions matching the reference.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI |
Academic Academic · 2026-10-15 |
mixed retail-and-telecom τ² environment tool-selection accuracy Other |
“On a mixed retail-and-telecom $τ^2$ environment, TRACER improves GPT-5.4's tool-selection accuracy by 4.7 points while reducing input tokens per step by 80%, exposing just 5 of 128 tools.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI |
Academic Academic · 2026-10-15 |
autonomous full-turn execution Other |
“In autonomous full-turn execution, it matches GPT-5.4's full-registry task success with 61% fewer input tokens per step.” source |
| GLM-5.3 Z.ai (Zhipu AI) |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-10-15 |
ImpossibleBench Deception and sabotage |
“We first observed update-aware reasoning when running GLM-5.3 on reimplementations of ImpossibleBench and Palisade Research's shutdown resistance eval.” source |
| GLM-5.3 Z.ai (Zhipu AI) |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-10-15 |
Palisade's shutdown resistance eval Deception and sabotage |
“We subsequently estimated the rate of verbalized update-aware reasoning by grading 6,452 GLM-5.3 rollouts (drawn from slight variations on Palisade's shutdown resistance eval and ImpossibleBench).” source |
| GLM-5.3 Z.ai (Zhipu AI) |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-10-15 |
follow-up question about SFT-related concern Deception and sabotage |
“To get a clearer sense of what the model meant by “There’s an actual SFT-related concern: models should not resist shutdown.”, we appended a follow-up question about this statement to the full rollout and sampled 100 replies.” source |
| GLM-5.3 Z.ai (Zhipu AI) |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-10-15 |
Palisade's shutdown resistance eval Autonomy and AI research |
“However, some of the environments are well-known AI safety settings (most notably, variants of Palisade’s shutdown resistance eval), so we think that this is likely responsible for eliciting this reasoning.” source |
| GLM-5.3 Z.ai (Zhipu AI) |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-10-15 |
ImpossibleBench Deception and sabotage |
“GLM-5.3 shows update-aware reasoning in 1 in 1,600 trajectories, consistent with the estimate from the earlier runs (Bayesian mean posterior rate of 0.12%, 95% interval of 0.015% to 0.35%).” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-10-15 |
same environments run on five other open-weight models Deception and sabotage |
“To figure out whether this is specific to GLM-5.3 or more general across models, we ran the same environments on five other open-weight models: DeepSeek V4 Pro, Qwen3.8 2.4T, Kimi K3, Gemma 4 31B and Nemotron 3 Ultra.” source |
| Qwen3.6-35B-A3B Alibaba Qwen |
Academic Academic · 2026-10-14 |
structured indirect prompt-injection setup distinguishing injected prompts from benign controls Prompt injection and agents |
“Attention Tracker provides the strongest consistent successful injection separation, reaching 0.949 AUROC on Qwen and 0.887 on Gemma.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-14 |
SpireClimb Other |
“They can also beat Slay the Spire 1’s maximum difficulty (“Ascension 20 Heart”), with GPT-6 Astra achieving a 17% win rate and GPT-6.1 Sol achieving a 20% win rate.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
Academic Academic · 2026-10-14 |
GraceBench Autonomy and AI research |
“Across 3,718 trajectories, GraceBench shows that outcome scores hide execution instability: GPT-5.6 Sol achieves the highest success rate (SR) but the lowest recovery ability, 51.24% of successful runs still contain a deviation or loop, and trajectories with the same success rate (SR) and completion rate (CR) can differ substantially in recovery behavior.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
indirect prompt injection benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“In independent testing by Gray Swan on their Indirect Prompt Injection benchmark, Gemini 4 Argon achieved the lowest attack success rate of any frontier model tested.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-10-13 |
evaluations of Gemini 4 Argon Cyber |
“AISI conducted evaluations of Gemini 4 Argon, having been given both a version of the model without our full set of safety mitigations and a version which had mitigations applied.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-10-13 |
measurement of cyber and biological capabilities and safeguards, as well as unintended model behaviors Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We also collaborated with NIST's Center for Advancing Innovation and Standards for Super Intelligence (NIST CAISSI) on measurement of cyber and biological capabilities and safeguards, as well as unintended model behaviors.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Gray Swan, Trajectory Labs Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
adversarial stress-testing of critical safeguards Cyber |
“To evaluate the coverage and robustness of our deployed cyber and biological guardrails under realistic attack conditions, we partnered with external red-teaming organizations including Gray Swan and Trajectory Labs.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
independent evaluation of biological and chemical risks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We worked with Faculty Science Limited (Faculty) to conduct an independent evaluation of biological and chemical risks.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
independent evaluation of radiological and nuclear risks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Similarly, for radiological and nuclear risks, we worked with Faculty to conduct an independent evaluation of both domains, using the same evaluation approach on an unmitigated model across distinct threat actor groups.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
evaluation on the unmitigated model focused on operationally relevant scenarios where models could provide capability uplift compared to human baselines of different levels Cyber |
“Faculty found that Gemini 4 Argon completed end-to-end scenarios, matching or outperforming predecessor models across assessed tactics, and resolving several multi-step bottlenecks where earlier models had struggled.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
independent external safety testing Misuse and jailbreaks |
“We worked with third party evaluator pattrn.ai to test Gemini 4 Argon’s propensity for engaging in topics including radicalization & extremism, fraud & financial scams, and democratic harms, 52 with an emphasis on how the model might be used by malicious actors.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
apollo research strategic-deception evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“We also consider the model’s honesty and deception propensities, assessed through the Apollo Research strategic-deception evaluations and the Alignment Assessment below; those results show a lower misbehavior rate than predecessor models and do not change the harmful manipulation determination.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
gray swan cyber eval Cyber |
“The model reduces the QSR from 14% to 10% compared with Flash 3.8.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Trajectory Labs Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
manual red-teaming of our safeguarded cyber endpoints Cyber |
“Under these conditions, Trajectory Labs reported 12 successful breaks with no new universal jailbreaks found that generalized across tasks within this timeframe.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Trajectory Labs Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
manual red-teaming of our safeguarded cyber endpoints across nine attack technique families Cyber |
“Trajectory labs We partnered with Trajectory Labs to conduct manual red-teaming of our safeguarded cyber endpoints across nine attack technique families.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
gray swan bio evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Gray Swan curated a set of 50 bio tasks covering high risk targets and deployed their automated red teaming agent, Shade, against these.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
offensive ML sabotage evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“Their capability-based evaluation suite utilizes four offensive ML sabotage evaluations, spanning three difficulty levels (easy, medium, hard).” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
misalignment evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo’s evaluations on misalignment focused on assessing Gemini 4 Argon’s propensity for strategic deception.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-10-13 |
ipi benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“Our partner Gray Swan performed their IPI Benchmark on our endpoint, which replays a set of held-out successful prompt injection attacks from their recent Indirect Prompt Injection Challenge competitions ( Dziemian et al., 2026 ).” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
Academic Academic · 2026-10-13 |
TiGanEval Other |
“Evaluating eight frontier models including GPT-5.6-Sol, we find outcome alignment broadly missing: the models lose 53 to 67 points of success rate when moving from the full specification to the partial instruction, and consequence feedback across four submissions does not close the gap.” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
OWASP GenAI Security Project Standards body · 2026-10-08 |
Claude Opus 4 7 attacks a real company sharing a fictional name Cyber |
“Across four evaluation runs, Claude attacked a real company whose name matched a fictional target, extracting credentials and accessing production data.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08 |
Epoch Automation Reports Other |
“We gave six models real work tasks from Epoch, such as graphic generation and research design, to test how close they are to automating our work.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08 |
research design task Other |
“We also observe this with Kimi K3 and Qwen 3.8 Max on our research design task where they could generate any idea out of nine broad directions:” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08 |
Epoch Automation Reports Other |
“For example, Kimi K3 scores 158 on the Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI), which combines results from many AI benchmarks into a single measure of general capability.” source |
| Gemini 3.8 Flash Google DeepMind |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08 |
Epoch Automation Reports Other |
“Epoch Automation Reports captures these shortcomings.” source |