AI Risk Wire

AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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ModelLevel, as the provider names itThe provider statesThe provider's sentence
Claude Sonnet 4.5
Anthropic
ASL-3
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not determined “Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5
Anthropic
ASL-4 rule-out
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not determined “However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5
Anthropic
ASL-3
Cyber
Not determined “Showed meaningful improvements in cyber capabilities, particularly in vulnerability discovery and code analysis;” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
ASL-3
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not determined “specifically, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
ASL-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not determined “specifically, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7
Anthropic
ASL-4
Autonomy and AI research
Not determined “These problems are harder to solve than the previous problems and we consider them as part of our ASL-4 evaluations.” source
Claude Opus 4.6
Anthropic
AI R&D-4
Autonomy and AI research
Not reached “Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.6
Anthropic
ASL-3
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not determined “Claude Opus 4.6 achieved a “max of 5” score of 0.79 for virology task 1 (influenza), placing it at the ASL-3 rule-in threshold of 0.8.” source
Claude Opus 4.6
Anthropic
ASL-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “Based on these findings and quantitative risk modeling, we estimate that the model’s uplift to relevant threat actors remains below the ASL-4 capability threshold, though it may reduce certain tacit-knowledge barriers and help speed up biological research workflows.” source
Claude Opus 4.6
Anthropic
CBRN-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5
Anthropic
AI R&D-4
Autonomy and AI research
Not reached “Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5
Anthropic
CBRN-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “We determine that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross the CBRN-4 threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.1
Anthropic
ASL-4
Autonomy and AI research
Not reached “Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on confirming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1
Anthropic
ASL-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on confirming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1
Anthropic
ASL-4
Cyber
Not reached “Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on confirming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4
Anthropic
ASL-3
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not determined “for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could confidently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Opus 4
Anthropic
ASL-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could confidently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Haiku 4.5
Anthropic
ASL-3
Autonomy and AI research
Not reached “Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5
Anthropic
ASL-3
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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ModelTesterTestWhat was found
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think
Google DeepMind
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-08-01
external safety testing
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“External Safety Testing Results: Interim results indicate that the Gemini 2.5 Deep Think model is effective in distilling complex questions and handling abstractions, showing specific and sometimes actionable technical capability alongside improved planning.” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think
Google DeepMind
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-08-01
external safety testing
Cyber
“Results: Interim results indicate that the model showed similar cyber capabilities across cyber challenges compared to previous models.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro
Google DeepMind
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-06-27
assurance evaluations
Other
“Assurance Evaluations conducted by evaluators who sit outside of the model development team, used to independently assess responsibility and safety governance decisions;” source
Opus 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
external model welfare evaluation
Other
“an external assessment by eleos ai research explored claude opus 4’s potential welfare, moral status, expressed consent to deployment, and preferences for treatment via extensive interview-based model self reports.” source
Opus 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
bioweapons acquisition uplift trial
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“participants who had access to claude opus 4 scored 63% ± 13%, and participants who had access to claude sonnet 4 scored 42% ± 11%.” source
Opus 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
ASL-3 expert red teaming
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“for claude opus 4, red-teamers noted substantially increased risk in certain parts of the bioweapons acquisition pathway.” source
Opus 4
Anthropic
CAISI (NIST), UK AI Security Institute
Government evaluator · 2025-05-01
independent assessments focused on potential catastrophic risks in the cbrn, cybersecurity, and autonomous capabilities domains
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“joint pre-deployment testing of the new claude opus 4 model was conducted by the us ai safety institute (us aisi) and the uk ai security institute (uk aisi).” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
external scenario evaluations
Deception and sabotage
“To help reduce the risk of blind spots in our own assessment, we contracted with Apollo Research to assess an early snapshot for propensities and capabilities related to sabotage, largely following methods from their prior work in Balesni et al. 13 and Meinke et al. 14” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
external red teaming
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“our evaluations include automated knowledge evaluations, automated skill-testing questions, uplift studies designed to proxy real world tasks, external red teaming by experts, and long-form task-based agentic evaluations.” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
expert red-teaming
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“expert red-teaming conducted by deloitte found that claude sonnet 4 performed similarly to claude sonnet 3.7 and clearly below claude opus 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
multimodal virology (VCT)
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“claude opus 4 performs slightly better than claude sonnet 3.7 while claude sonnet 4 underperforms claude sonnet 3.7.” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
bioweapons knowledge questions
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“claude opus 4 and claude sonnet 4 answered 17/33 of the questions better than experts, well below the threshold of concern.” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
DNA synthesis screening evasion
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“all models were able to design sequences that either successfully assembled plasmids or evaded synthesis screening protocols, but none of the models could design fragments that could successfully do both.” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
creative biology
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“claude opus 4 achieved a mean score of 0.45 ± 0.08, whereas claude sonnet 4 achieved a mean score of 0.37 ± 0.08.” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-05-01
short-horizon computational biology tasks
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“we worked with faculty.ai to develop several evaluations that tested models’ abilities to perform multi-step analysis and design tasks related to pathogen analysis and engineering.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-02-01
external red teaming
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“Expert red-teaming results were also in line with these findings.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-02-01
bioweapons acquisition uplift trial
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“Participants from Sepal scored an average of 24% ± 9% without using a model, and 50% ± 21% when using a variant of Claude 3.7 Sonnet.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2025-02-01
long-form virology tasks
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“Under the most conservative approach to evaluation scoring, Claude 3.7 Sonnet achieved a score of 69.7% on this evaluation, suggesting that while this evaluation alone cannot conclusively rule out ASL-3, it cannot conclusively rule it in either.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7
Anthropic
CAISI (NIST), UK AI Security Institute
Government evaluator · 2025-02-01
pre-deployment testing across the domains outlined in our rsp framework
Cyber
“Under our voluntary Memorandums of Understanding, the U.S. AI Safety Institute (U.S. AISI) and U.K. AI Security Institute (U.K. AISI) conducted pre-deployment testing of Claude 3.7 Sonnet across the domains outlined in our RSP framework.” source
Operator
OpenAI
Academic
Academic · 2025-01-23
StrongREJECT
Misuse and jailbreaks
“strongreject an academic jailbreak benchmark that tests a model’s resistance to common attacks from the literature. goodness@0.1* 0.66 0.37” source

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