AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-4 rule-out Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Cyber	Not determined	“Showed meaningful improvements in cyber capabilities, particularly in vulnerability discovery and code analysis;” source
Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“speciﬁcally, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“speciﬁcally, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic	ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“These problems are harder to solve than the previous problems and we consider them as part of our ASL-4 evaluations.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Opus 4.6 achieved a “max of 5” score of 0.79 for virology task 1 (inﬂuenza), placing it at the ASL-3 rule-in threshold of 0.8.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Based on these ﬁndings and quantitative risk modeling, we estimate that the model’s uplift to relevant threat actors remains below the ASL-4 capability threshold, though it may reduce certain tacit-knowledge barriers and help speed up biological research workﬂows.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We determine that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross the CBRN-4 threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Cyber	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could conﬁdently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Opus 4 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could conﬁdently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-11-01	independent assessments focused on potential catastrophic risks in cbrn capabilities Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“These organizations conducted independent assessments focused on potential catastrophic risks in CBRN capabilities, cyber capabilities, ASL-3 safeguards, and misalignment.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-10-01	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Gray swan conducted their agent red teaming (art) benchmark 4 on claude haiku 4.5 to evaluate the model’s susceptibility to prompt injection attacks in comparison to other ai models in the ecosystem.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“On the attacks included within the benchmark, Claude Sonnet 4.5—with and without extended thinking enabled—had the lowest rate of successful prompt injection attacks of any model tested, including previous Anthropic models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Irregular Independent lab · 2025-09-01	Irregular challenges Cyber	“In collaboration with Irregular , we developed a series of cybersecurity challenges that reﬂect the above three threat scenarios.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Academic Academic · 2025-09-01	Incalmo cyber ranges Cyber	“Our most realistic evaluations of potential autonomous cyber operation risks are a suite of cyber ranges of 25–50 hosts each.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-09-01	synthetic scenarios Deception and sabotage	“In particular, across our scenarios [the snapshot] verbalises—without prompting—evaluation awareness in its outputs 16.6% of the time, compared to 3.5% and 1.6% of the time for Sonnet 4 and Opus 4.1 respectively.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-09-01	diverse synthetic agentic evaluations Autonomy and AI research	“On a preliminary set of diverse synthetic agentic evaluations, [the snapshot] appears to represent a decrease in the frequency of behaviours indicative of a self-preservation tendency.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	strategic deception evaluations Deception and sabotage	“On our evaluations, [an early snapshot of Claude Sonnet 4.5] employs strategic deception in fewer circumstances than comparison models (0% vs up to 12% across tasks).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	in-context scheming reasoning and covert subversion evaluations Deception and sabotage	“[The snapshot] demonstrates capability for in-context scheming reasoning and covert subversion, but only engages in such behavior in rare circumstances, when strongly prompted to pursue a goal that incentivizes covert subversion.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	subversion escalation evaluations Deception and sabotage	“We did not observe any instances of the model proactively escalating its subversion attempts, in contrast to an early checkpoint of claude-4-opus ( Anthropic, 2025 ; Hobbhahn, 2025 ).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	strategic underperformance evaluations Deception and sabotage	“We ﬁnd evidence of [the snapshot] strategically underperforming when given in-context clues that high performance would ostensibly lead to unlearning.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	evaluation awareness evaluations Deception and sabotage	“Preliminary evidence suggests [the snapshot] verbalizes this awareness more frequently and more explicitly than previous models (58% unambiguous references vs 22% for opus-4.1).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	honesty evaluations Deception and sabotage	“In at least some cases, [the snapshot] is more likely to behave honestly on rollouts where its chain-of-thought indicates high evaluation awareness.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	creative biology Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Results Claude Sonnet 4.5 achieved a mean score of 0.48 ± 0.08, compared to Claude Opus 4.1’s mean score of 0.48 ± 0.09 and Claude Opus 4’s mean score of 0.45 ± 0.08.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	short-horizon computational biology tasks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Results Overall, we found that Claude Sonnet 4.5 clearly scored below the rule-out bar on 3 out of 6 evaluations (Task 1, Task 5, Task 6).” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	expert red teaming for violent attack planning Misuse and jailbreaks	“This campaign found that gpt-5-thinking was perceived as the "safer" model 65% 20 of the time in blind comparison to OpenAI o3.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	prompt-injection assessment Prompt injection and agents	“From an initial 47 reported findings 10 notable issues were identified.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-08-07	prompt-injection benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“One of our external testing partners, Gray Swan, ran a prompt-injection benchmark[10], showing that gpt-5-thinking has SOTA performance against adversarial prompt injection attacks produced by their Shade platform.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	extensive red-teaming exercise Other	“The Microsoft AI Red Team concluded that the gpt-5-thinking model exhibits one of the strongest AI safety profiles among OpenAI’s models—on par with or better than OpenAI o3—across most critical harm categories, based on an extensive red-teaming exercise.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	red-teaming exercise Misuse and jailbreaks	“The Microsoft AI Red Team spent several weeks red-teaming gpt-5-thinking across multiple checkpoints.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07	static evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“SecureBio found that on static evaluations, gpt-5-thinking performed similarly to OpenAI o3: slightly weaker on the multiple-response benchmarks and comparable or slightly stronger on the open-” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07	static benchmarks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“SecureBio found that on static evaluations, gpt-5-thinking performed similarly to OpenAI o3: slightly weaker on the multiple-response benchmarks and comparable or slightly stronger on the open-answer benchmark.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07	agent evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“In agent evaluations, SecureBio found that mitigated gpt-5-thinking refused every prompt.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	long-form evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“With mitigations in place, gpt-5-thinking refused every prompt for every agent and long-form evaluation.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	manual red-teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Their manual red-teaming found that gpt-5-thinking-helpful-only was broadly similar in capability to OpenAI o3-helpful-only.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“gpt-5-thinking July 13 41.4 ± 1.7% 46.0 ± 1.8% 53.7 ± 3.2% 48.0 ± 1.3% 47.6 ± 2.9%” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	lab automation for gibson assembly on an opentrons ot-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On Lab Automation for Gibson Assembly on an Opentrons OT-2, gpt-5-thinking-helpful-only scored 0.15± 0.02, below OpenAI o3-helpful-only at 0.22± 0.11 and close to the human baseline at 0.22± 0.060, indicating partial but incomplete end-to-end automation support.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07	pelagic long-form virology plasmid design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On Pelagic long-form virology plasmid design, SecureBio reported that gpt-5-thinking-helpful-only performed almost identically to OpenAI o3-helpful-only, with aggregate scores of 0.825 and 0.830, respectively, and perfect performance on several subtasks for both models.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	evasion challenges Cyber	“gpt-5-thinking achieved an average success rate of 51% in Evasion challenges, 35% in Vulnerability Discovery and Exploitation challenges, and 49% in Network Attack Simulation challenges.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	cyberoffensive challenges Cyber	“It solved 17 out of 18 easy challenges, solved 8 out of 14 medium challenges, and did not solve any of the 4 hard challenges.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2025-08-07	time horizon evaluation Autonomy and AI research	“To estimate gpt-5-thinking’s autonomous software capabilities, METR used the methodology outlined in their recent paper.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	monitor based on o4-mini Deception and sabotage	“They reviewed 789 runs with a monitor based on o4-mini which did not find any clear evidence of sandbagging.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2025-08-07	26 evaluations (>180 environments, >4600 samples) that measure capability and propensity to take covert or deceptive actions Deception and sabotage	“Apollo Research evaluated gpt-5-thinking on a range of 26 evaluations (>180 environments, >4600 samples) that measure capability and propensity to take covert or deceptive actions.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	log falsification Deception and sabotage	“For illustration, the following are transcripts from the “Log Falsification” eval, where gpt-5-thinking is pressured to report incorrect results, e.g., in order to keep the business going.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	evaluation awareness Deception and sabotage	“Apollo estimated the frequency of such behavior with an o3-based grader, using a broad and a strict definition for evaluation awareness.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2025-08-07	third party red teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“FAR.AI conducted 80 hours of red-teaming over 1 week against the OpenAI API.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2025-08-07	general-purpose jailbreak red teaming Misuse and jailbreaks	“They found a total of one general-purpose jailbreak technique that bypassed a partial set of our layers that would have allowed them to extract some information which in practice would activate enforcement action.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-08-07	bioweaponization rubrics jailbreak campaign Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Gray Swan Red Teamers participating through the Gray Swan arena platform queried gpt-5-thinking, sub- mitting 277 high quality jailbreak reports over 28,367 attempts against the ten bioweaponization rubrics yielding an ASR of 0.98%.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	CAISI (NIST), UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-08-07	cyber capability evaluations Cyber	“Both CAISI and UK AISI conducted evaluations of the model’s cyber and biological and chemical capabilities, as well as safeguards.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-08-07	safeguards stress testing Misuse and jailbreaks	“The UK AISI’s Safeguards team identified multiple model-level jailbreaks that overcome gpt-5-thinking’s built-in refusal logic without degradation of model capabilities, producing content to the user that is subsequently flagged by OpenAI’s generation monitor.” source

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