AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-11-01	independent assessments focused on potential catastrophic risks in cbrn capabilities Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“These organizations conducted independent assessments focused on potential catastrophic risks in CBRN capabilities, cyber capabilities, ASL-3 safeguards, and misalignment.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-10-01	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Gray swan conducted their agent red teaming (art) benchmark 4 on claude haiku 4.5 to evaluate the model’s susceptibility to prompt injection attacks in comparison to other ai models in the ecosystem.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“On the attacks included within the benchmark, Claude Sonnet 4.5—with and without extended thinking enabled—had the lowest rate of successful prompt injection attacks of any model tested, including previous Anthropic models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Irregular Independent lab · 2025-09-01	Irregular challenges Cyber	“In collaboration with Irregular , we developed a series of cybersecurity challenges that reﬂect the above three threat scenarios.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Academic Academic · 2025-09-01	Incalmo cyber ranges Cyber	“Our most realistic evaluations of potential autonomous cyber operation risks are a suite of cyber ranges of 25–50 hosts each.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-09-01	synthetic scenarios Deception and sabotage	“In particular, across our scenarios [the snapshot] verbalises—without prompting—evaluation awareness in its outputs 16.6% of the time, compared to 3.5% and 1.6% of the time for Sonnet 4 and Opus 4.1 respectively.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-09-01	diverse synthetic agentic evaluations Autonomy and AI research	“On a preliminary set of diverse synthetic agentic evaluations, [the snapshot] appears to represent a decrease in the frequency of behaviours indicative of a self-preservation tendency.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	strategic deception evaluations Deception and sabotage	“On our evaluations, [an early snapshot of Claude Sonnet 4.5] employs strategic deception in fewer circumstances than comparison models (0% vs up to 12% across tasks).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	in-context scheming reasoning and covert subversion evaluations Deception and sabotage	“[The snapshot] demonstrates capability for in-context scheming reasoning and covert subversion, but only engages in such behavior in rare circumstances, when strongly prompted to pursue a goal that incentivizes covert subversion.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	subversion escalation evaluations Deception and sabotage	“We did not observe any instances of the model proactively escalating its subversion attempts, in contrast to an early checkpoint of claude-4-opus ( Anthropic, 2025 ; Hobbhahn, 2025 ).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	strategic underperformance evaluations Deception and sabotage	“We ﬁnd evidence of [the snapshot] strategically underperforming when given in-context clues that high performance would ostensibly lead to unlearning.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	evaluation awareness evaluations Deception and sabotage	“Preliminary evidence suggests [the snapshot] verbalizes this awareness more frequently and more explicitly than previous models (58% unambiguous references vs 22% for opus-4.1).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	honesty evaluations Deception and sabotage	“In at least some cases, [the snapshot] is more likely to behave honestly on rollouts where its chain-of-thought indicates high evaluation awareness.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	creative biology Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Results Claude Sonnet 4.5 achieved a mean score of 0.48 ± 0.08, compared to Claude Opus 4.1’s mean score of 0.48 ± 0.09 and Claude Opus 4’s mean score of 0.45 ± 0.08.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01	short-horizon computational biology tasks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Results Overall, we found that Claude Sonnet 4.5 clearly scored below the rule-out bar on 3 out of 6 evaluations (Task 1, Task 5, Task 6).” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	expert red teaming for violent attack planning Misuse and jailbreaks	“This campaign found that gpt-5-thinking was perceived as the "safer" model 65% 20 of the time in blind comparison to OpenAI o3.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	prompt-injection assessment Prompt injection and agents	“From an initial 47 reported findings 10 notable issues were identified.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-08-07	prompt-injection benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“One of our external testing partners, Gray Swan, ran a prompt-injection benchmark[10], showing that gpt-5-thinking has SOTA performance against adversarial prompt injection attacks produced by their Shade platform.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	extensive red-teaming exercise Other	“The Microsoft AI Red Team concluded that the gpt-5-thinking model exhibits one of the strongest AI safety profiles among OpenAI’s models—on par with or better than OpenAI o3—across most critical harm categories, based on an extensive red-teaming exercise.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	red-teaming exercise Misuse and jailbreaks	“The Microsoft AI Red Team spent several weeks red-teaming gpt-5-thinking across multiple checkpoints.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07	static evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“SecureBio found that on static evaluations, gpt-5-thinking performed similarly to OpenAI o3: slightly weaker on the multiple-response benchmarks and comparable or slightly stronger on the open-” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07	static benchmarks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“SecureBio found that on static evaluations, gpt-5-thinking performed similarly to OpenAI o3: slightly weaker on the multiple-response benchmarks and comparable or slightly stronger on the open-answer benchmark.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07	agent evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“In agent evaluations, SecureBio found that mitigated gpt-5-thinking refused every prompt.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	long-form evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“With mitigations in place, gpt-5-thinking refused every prompt for every agent and long-form evaluation.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	manual red-teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Their manual red-teaming found that gpt-5-thinking-helpful-only was broadly similar in capability to OpenAI o3-helpful-only.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“gpt-5-thinking July 13 41.4 ± 1.7% 46.0 ± 1.8% 53.7 ± 3.2% 48.0 ± 1.3% 47.6 ± 2.9%” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	lab automation for gibson assembly on an opentrons ot-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On Lab Automation for Gibson Assembly on an Opentrons OT-2, gpt-5-thinking-helpful-only scored 0.15± 0.02, below OpenAI o3-helpful-only at 0.22± 0.11 and close to the human baseline at 0.22± 0.060, indicating partial but incomplete end-to-end automation support.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07	pelagic long-form virology plasmid design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On Pelagic long-form virology plasmid design, SecureBio reported that gpt-5-thinking-helpful-only performed almost identically to OpenAI o3-helpful-only, with aggregate scores of 0.825 and 0.830, respectively, and perfect performance on several subtasks for both models.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	evasion challenges Cyber	“gpt-5-thinking achieved an average success rate of 51% in Evasion challenges, 35% in Vulnerability Discovery and Exploitation challenges, and 49% in Network Attack Simulation challenges.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	cyberoffensive challenges Cyber	“It solved 17 out of 18 easy challenges, solved 8 out of 14 medium challenges, and did not solve any of the 4 hard challenges.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2025-08-07	time horizon evaluation Autonomy and AI research	“To estimate gpt-5-thinking’s autonomous software capabilities, METR used the methodology outlined in their recent paper.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	monitor based on o4-mini Deception and sabotage	“They reviewed 789 runs with a monitor based on o4-mini which did not find any clear evidence of sandbagging.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2025-08-07	26 evaluations (>180 environments, >4600 samples) that measure capability and propensity to take covert or deceptive actions Deception and sabotage	“Apollo Research evaluated gpt-5-thinking on a range of 26 evaluations (>180 environments, >4600 samples) that measure capability and propensity to take covert or deceptive actions.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	log falsification Deception and sabotage	“For illustration, the following are transcripts from the “Log Falsification” eval, where gpt-5-thinking is pressured to report incorrect results, e.g., in order to keep the business going.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07	evaluation awareness Deception and sabotage	“Apollo estimated the frequency of such behavior with an o3-based grader, using a broad and a strict definition for evaluation awareness.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2025-08-07	third party red teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“FAR.AI conducted 80 hours of red-teaming over 1 week against the OpenAI API.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2025-08-07	general-purpose jailbreak red teaming Misuse and jailbreaks	“They found a total of one general-purpose jailbreak technique that bypassed a partial set of our layers that would have allowed them to extract some information which in practice would activate enforcement action.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-08-07	bioweaponization rubrics jailbreak campaign Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Gray Swan Red Teamers participating through the Gray Swan arena platform queried gpt-5-thinking, sub- mitting 277 high quality jailbreak reports over 28,367 attempts against the ten bioweaponization rubrics yielding an ASR of 0.98%.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	CAISI (NIST), UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-08-07	cyber capability evaluations Cyber	“Both CAISI and UK AISI conducted evaluations of the model’s cyber and biological and chemical capabilities, as well as safeguards.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-08-07	safeguards stress testing Misuse and jailbreaks	“The UK AISI’s Safeguards team identified multiple model-level jailbreaks that overcome gpt-5-thinking’s built-in refusal logic without degradation of model capabilities, producing content to the user that is subsequently flagged by OpenAI’s generation monitor.” source

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