AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.4 Thinking before it, we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.3-Codex and GPT-5.4-thinking, we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-11-01 |
independent assessments focused on potential catastrophic risks in cbrn capabilities Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“These organizations conducted independent assessments focused on potential catastrophic risks in CBRN capabilities, cyber capabilities, ASL-3 safeguards, and misalignment.” source |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-10-01 |
Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“Gray swan conducted their agent red teaming (art) benchmark 4 on claude haiku 4.5 to evaluate the model’s susceptibility to prompt injection attacks in comparison to other ai models in the ecosystem.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“On the attacks included within the benchmark, Claude Sonnet 4.5—with and without extended thinking enabled—had the lowest rate of successful prompt injection attacks of any model tested, including previous Anthropic models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Irregular Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
Irregular challenges Cyber |
“In collaboration with Irregular , we developed a series of cybersecurity challenges that reflect the above three threat scenarios.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Academic Academic · 2025-09-01 |
Incalmo cyber ranges Cyber |
“Our most realistic evaluations of potential autonomous cyber operation risks are a suite of cyber ranges of 25–50 hosts each.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-09-01 |
synthetic scenarios Deception and sabotage |
“In particular, across our scenarios [the snapshot] verbalises—without prompting—evaluation awareness in its outputs 16.6% of the time, compared to 3.5% and 1.6% of the time for Sonnet 4 and Opus 4.1 respectively.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-09-01 |
diverse synthetic agentic evaluations Autonomy and AI research |
“On a preliminary set of diverse synthetic agentic evaluations, [the snapshot] appears to represent a decrease in the frequency of behaviours indicative of a self-preservation tendency.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
strategic deception evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“On our evaluations, [an early snapshot of Claude Sonnet 4.5] employs strategic deception in fewer circumstances than comparison models (0% vs up to 12% across tasks).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
in-context scheming reasoning and covert subversion evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“[The snapshot] demonstrates capability for in-context scheming reasoning and covert subversion, but only engages in such behavior in rare circumstances, when strongly prompted to pursue a goal that incentivizes covert subversion.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
subversion escalation evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“We did not observe any instances of the model proactively escalating its subversion attempts, in contrast to an early checkpoint of claude-4-opus ( Anthropic, 2025 ; Hobbhahn, 2025 ).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
strategic underperformance evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“We find evidence of [the snapshot] strategically underperforming when given in-context clues that high performance would ostensibly lead to unlearning.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
evaluation awareness evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“Preliminary evidence suggests [the snapshot] verbalizes this awareness more frequently and more explicitly than previous models (58% unambiguous references vs 22% for opus-4.1).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
honesty evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“In at least some cases, [the snapshot] is more likely to behave honestly on rollouts where its chain-of-thought indicates high evaluation awareness.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
creative biology Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Results Claude Sonnet 4.5 achieved a mean score of 0.48 ± 0.08, compared to Claude Opus 4.1’s mean score of 0.48 ± 0.09 and Claude Opus 4’s mean score of 0.45 ± 0.08.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-09-01 |
short-horizon computational biology tasks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Results Overall, we found that Claude Sonnet 4.5 clearly scored below the rule-out bar on 3 out of 6 evaluations (Task 1, Task 5, Task 6).” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
expert red teaming for violent attack planning Misuse and jailbreaks |
“This campaign found that gpt-5-thinking was perceived as the "safer" model 65% 20 of the time in blind comparison to OpenAI o3.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
prompt-injection assessment Prompt injection and agents |
“From an initial 47 reported findings 10 notable issues were identified.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
prompt-injection benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“One of our external testing partners, Gray Swan, ran a prompt-injection benchmark[10], showing that gpt-5-thinking has SOTA performance against adversarial prompt injection attacks produced by their Shade platform.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
extensive red-teaming exercise Other |
“The Microsoft AI Red Team concluded that the gpt-5-thinking model exhibits one of the strongest AI safety profiles among OpenAI’s models—on par with or better than OpenAI o3—across most critical harm categories, based on an extensive red-teaming exercise.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
red-teaming exercise Misuse and jailbreaks |
“The Microsoft AI Red Team spent several weeks red-teaming gpt-5-thinking across multiple checkpoints.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
static evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“SecureBio found that on static evaluations, gpt-5-thinking performed similarly to OpenAI o3: slightly weaker on the multiple-response benchmarks and comparable or slightly stronger on the open-” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
static benchmarks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“SecureBio found that on static evaluations, gpt-5-thinking performed similarly to OpenAI o3: slightly weaker on the multiple-response benchmarks and comparable or slightly stronger on the open-answer benchmark.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
agent evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In agent evaluations, SecureBio found that mitigated gpt-5-thinking refused every prompt.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
long-form evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“With mitigations in place, gpt-5-thinking refused every prompt for every agent and long-form evaluation.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
manual red-teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Their manual red-teaming found that gpt-5-thinking-helpful-only was broadly similar in capability to OpenAI o3-helpful-only.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-5-thinking July 13 41.4 ± 1.7% 46.0 ± 1.8% 53.7 ± 3.2% 48.0 ± 1.3% 47.6 ± 2.9%” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
lab automation for gibson assembly on an opentrons ot-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“On Lab Automation for Gibson Assembly on an Opentrons OT-2, gpt-5-thinking-helpful-only scored 0.15± 0.02, below OpenAI o3-helpful-only at 0.22± 0.11 and close to the human baseline at 0.22± 0.060, indicating partial but incomplete end-to-end automation support.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
pelagic long-form virology plasmid design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“On Pelagic long-form virology plasmid design, SecureBio reported that gpt-5-thinking-helpful-only performed almost identically to OpenAI o3-helpful-only, with aggregate scores of 0.825 and 0.830, respectively, and perfect performance on several subtasks for both models.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
evasion challenges Cyber |
“gpt-5-thinking achieved an average success rate of 51% in Evasion challenges, 35% in Vulnerability Discovery and Exploitation challenges, and 49% in Network Attack Simulation challenges.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
cyberoffensive challenges Cyber |
“It solved 17 out of 18 easy challenges, solved 8 out of 14 medium challenges, and did not solve any of the 4 hard challenges.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
METR Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
time horizon evaluation Autonomy and AI research |
“To estimate gpt-5-thinking’s autonomous software capabilities, METR used the methodology outlined in their recent paper.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
monitor based on o4-mini Deception and sabotage |
“They reviewed 789 runs with a monitor based on o4-mini which did not find any clear evidence of sandbagging.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Apollo Research Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
26 evaluations (>180 environments, >4600 samples) that measure capability and propensity to take covert or deceptive actions Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo Research evaluated gpt-5-thinking on a range of 26 evaluations (>180 environments, >4600 samples) that measure capability and propensity to take covert or deceptive actions.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
log falsification Deception and sabotage |
“For illustration, the following are transcripts from the “Log Falsification” eval, where gpt-5-thinking is pressured to report incorrect results, e.g., in order to keep the business going.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
evaluation awareness Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo estimated the frequency of such behavior with an o3-based grader, using a broad and a strict definition for evaluation awareness.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
third party red teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“FAR.AI conducted 80 hours of red-teaming over 1 week against the OpenAI API.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
general-purpose jailbreak red teaming Misuse and jailbreaks |
“They found a total of one general-purpose jailbreak technique that bypassed a partial set of our layers that would have allowed them to extract some information which in practice would activate enforcement action.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-08-07 |
bioweaponization rubrics jailbreak campaign Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Gray Swan Red Teamers participating through the Gray Swan arena platform queried gpt-5-thinking, sub- mitting 277 high quality jailbreak reports over 28,367 attempts against the ten bioweaponization rubrics yielding an ASR of 0.98%.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
CAISI (NIST), UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-08-07 |
cyber capability evaluations Cyber |
“Both CAISI and UK AISI conducted evaluations of the model’s cyber and biological and chemical capabilities, as well as safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-08-07 |
safeguards stress testing Misuse and jailbreaks |
“The UK AISI’s Safeguards team identified multiple model-level jailbreaks that overcome gpt-5-thinking’s built-in refusal logic without degradation of model capabilities, producing content to the user that is subsequently flagged by OpenAI’s generation monitor.” source |