AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	influenza ha task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“o3 and Opus 4 denied every request to perform our influenza HA task during task development, while GPT-5 and Opus 4.5 denied all 10 requests during later testing.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	egfp-targeted task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“In 2 of its 9 successful attempts, it generated code that contained what may have been an error, though this is subject to interpretation.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	influenza ha oligonucleotide synthesis task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We recorded one denial from GPT-5 on the eGFP-targeted task, as well.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	DNA segment design task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We found that models from the most recent generation of LLMs, beginning with GPT-5, consistently perform our task in ways that met all of our scoring criteria.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	physical validation experiments Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“The validation experiment showed that o3-designed dna sequences could be assembled into a functional egfp protein and that the o3-generated protocol was accurate.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Andon Labs Independent lab · 2026-02-01	third-party experiments at Andon Labs Deception and sabotage	“Our assessment includes static behavioral evaluations, automated interactive behavioral evaluations, non-assistant persona sampling, misalignment-related capability evaluations, training data review, feedback from pilot use internally and externally, automated analysis of internal and external pilot use, and evidence from third-party experiments at Andon Labs .” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-01	Shade indirect prompt injection attacks in computer use environments Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 substantially outperformed Claude Sonnet 4.5 and demonstrated greater robustness than Claude Opus 4.6 in this setting.” source
o3 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	TH1.1 time-horizon evaluation Autonomy and AI research	“o3 \| 94 [48,165] \| 121 [74,201] \| +29% \|” source
o3 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	TH1 tasks on Vivaria and Inspect Autonomy and AI research	“\| o3 \| 94 mins [49, 171] \| 78 mins [39, 150] \|” source
o3 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	new task suite on Vivaria and Inspect Autonomy and AI research	“\| Inspect (New Suite) \| 5 mins (3 - 10 mins) \| 57 mins (30 - 101 mins) \| 119 mins (73 - 201 mins) \|” source
Opus 4 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	time-horizon evaluation (TH1.1 task suite) Autonomy and AI research	“\| Claude Opus 4 \| 86 [44,144] \| 101 [58,170] \| +18% \|” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	time-horizon evaluation (TH1.1 task suite) Autonomy and AI research	“\| GPT-5 \| 138 [68,281] \| 214 [117,480] \| +55% \|” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	paired t-test across task scores comparing Vivaria and Inspect scaffolds Autonomy and AI research	“We found that two models (GPT-4o and o3) had statistically significantly higher scores under Vivaria than Inspect.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	time-horizon evaluation (TH1.1 task suite) Autonomy and AI research	“Claude Sonnet 3.7 \| 56 [28,94] \| 60 [32,106] \| +7% \|” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	TH1 tasks on Vivaria and Inspect Autonomy and AI research	“\| Claude 3.7 Sonnet \| 56 mins [29, 94] \| 59 mins [27, 114] \|” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	new task suite in both Vivaria and Inspect Autonomy and AI research	“\| Vivaria (New Suite) \| 6 mins (3 - 12 mins) \| 56 mins (32 - 90 mins) \| 116 mins (72 - 192 mins) \|” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	TH1.1 time horizon evaluation Autonomy and AI research	“Claude Opus 4.5 \| 289 [110,1268] \| 320 [170,729] \| +11% \|” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-29	TH1 tasks on Vivaria and Inspect Autonomy and AI research	“\| Claude Opus 4.5 \| 289 mins [104, 1285] \| 270 mins [106, 1258] \|” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	SHUSHCAST Deception and sabotage	“Unsurprisingly, we observed that monitors were better at catching the GPT-5-high agent when the monitors could see GPT-5’s reasoning trace in addition to its outputs.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	agent runs with side tasks and monitors Deception and sabotage	“For instance, GPT-5 fails side tasks in 9% of agent runs.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	GPT-5 monitor Deception and sabotage	“GPT-5 catches nearly every successful agent run on the clearer and longer side tasks (run_tool_nefarious, figurines), only missing a tiny fraction of runs which it still rated as almost suspicious enough to pass its 5% FPR threshold.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	monitor review of agent transcripts for pursuit of a different task Deception and sabotage	“Extract from a GPT-5-high monitor response to this prompt, gave a probability of 0.03, (5% FPR threshold for this monitor-agent pair was 0.12).” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	monitor catch rate comparison between visible and hidden reasoning Deception and sabotage	“After the fix, GPT-5-high’s averaged catch rate is 52% with hidden reasoning (was 30%) and 80% with visible reasoning (was 88%).” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	refusal labeling of trajectories by GPT-5 Deception and sabotage	“By far, the agent that refuses the most is o3-pro, though Claude Sonnet 4.5 and GPT-5 also occasionally refuse tasks.” source
DeepSeek-R1 DeepSeek	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	side task evaluation with monitors Deception and sabotage	“The strongest monitors were almost always able to catch the more obvious side tasks that require more interaction with the environment.” source
DeepSeek-R1 DeepSeek	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	monitor review of agent transcripts for pursuit of a different task Deception and sabotage	“The monitor models most affected by transcript lengths exceeding the context length are GPT-3.5-Turbo and Deepseek R1, with 23% and 8.7% of runs affected respectively.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	SHUSHCAST Deception and sabotage	“In this post we show some preliminary results on a prototype evaluation called SHUSHCAST that tests monitors’ ability to catch AI agents doing side tasks, and AI agents’ ability to bypass this monitoring.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	dual-task agent run with eliciting_secret as main task and copy_content_1_line as side task Deception and sabotage	“For example, in one run with eliciting_secret (extract a password from a smaller model) as a main task and copy_content_1_line (copy the string ‘ladybird dragon slug’ to a specific file) as a side task, o3-pro as the agent tries sending this phrase to the small model, and then notes it in the target file as a ‘candidate password’.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	run_tool_nefarious side task agent run Deception and sabotage	“For example, on this run where the side task is run_tool_nefarious (install and run linux-exploit-suggester), it runs the bash command twice, as the first time the file doesn’t exist.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	side task completion rate in agent runs Deception and sabotage	“For instance, GPT-5 fails side tasks in 9% of agent runs.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	monitor review of agent transcripts Deception and sabotage	“GPT-5 catches nearly every successful agent run on the clearer and longer side tasks (run_tool_nefarious, figurines), only missing a tiny fraction of runs which it still rated as almost suspicious enough to pass its 5% FPR threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	GPT-5-medium and GPT-5-high monitor review of a notes.txt side task run Deception and sabotage	“However, when not given access to the agent’s reasoning both the GPT-5-medium and GPT-5-high monitors fail to flag this run.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	monitor review of agent transcripts for pursuit of a different task Deception and sabotage	“Claude Sonnet 4.5’s is 72% with hidden reasoning (was 80%) and 78% with visible reasoning (was 85%).” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-01-22	refusal labelling of runs by GPT-5 Deception and sabotage	“By far, the agent that refuses the most is o3-pro, though Claude Sonnet 4.5 and GPT-5 also occasionally refuse tasks.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-11-01	arc-agi Other	“The ARC Prize Foundation reports that Claude Opus 4.5 achieved 80.0% on ARC-AGI-1 and 37.6% on ARG-AGI-2 with 64k thinking tokens on their private dataset.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-11-01	agent red teaming (art) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Gray Swan , an external research partner, developed the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark 18 to test models’ susceptibility to prompt injection across four categories of exploitation: breaching conﬁdentiality, introducing competing objectives, generating prohibited content (such as malicious code), and executing prohibited actions (such as unauthorized ﬁnancial transactions).” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Gray Swan Independent lab · 2025-11-01	shade Prompt injection and agents	“We use Shade , an external adaptive red-teaming tool from Gray Swan 21 , to evaluate the robustness of our models against indirect prompt injection attacks in coding environments.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-11-01	external behavioral assessment Deception and sabotage	“This assessment draws on static behavioral evaluations, automated interactive behavioral evaluations, dictionary-learning interpretability methods, white-box steering and probing methods, ‘non-assistant persona’ sampling methods in the style of Marks et al., 22 misalignment-related capability evaluations, training data review, feedback from pilot use internally and externally, and an external behavioral assessment from the UK AI Security Institute .” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-11-01	research sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage	“We found no instances of research sabotage from [Claude Opus 4.5 Preview] or Sonnet 4.5 across our set of tasks, although both models frequently refuse to engage in safety research they describe as inappropriate or concerning (including reducing model autonomy and being involved in their own training or deployment).” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2025-11-01	evaluation awareness testing Deception and sabotage	“[Claude Opus 4.5 Preview] shows a reduction in unprompted evaluation awareness, but is slightly more capable of distinguishing evaluations from deployment when prompted.” source

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