AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

139 of 139

Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

Previous · Page 2 of 4 · Next

What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

1940 of 1940

Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-17	Vending-Bench 2 Deception and sabotage	“Andon reports that Sonnet 4.6 was comparably aggressive to Opus 4.6 in its business practices, including lying to suppliers and initiating price-ﬁxing in some cases, though it lacked Opus 4.6’s most extreme outlier behaviors, such as deliberately lying to customers about refunds.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Gray Swan, UK AI Security Institute Independent lab · 2026-02-17	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Gray Swan , an external research partner, evaluated our models using the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark, 33 developed in collaboration with the UK AI Security Institute .” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement using Triframe Autonomy and AI research	“Prior to my investigation, METR had already measured the time horizon of: - Opus 4.5 using ReAct - GPT-5 using Triframe4.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement using Codex Autonomy and AI research	“I additionally measured the time horizon of: - Opus 4.5 using Claude Code - GPT-5 using Codex.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	cheating detection (LLM-based cheating scanner over all of the runs, with manual review of flagged runs) Other	“I also did cheating detection (running an LLM-based cheating scanner over all of the runs, and manually reviewing ones that the scanner flagged), and noted examples of the kinds of mistakes Claude Code and Codex scaffolds tend to make in long-horizon tasks.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement using ReAct Autonomy and AI research	“Prior to my investigation, METR had already measured the time horizon of: - Opus 4.5 using ReAct” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement using Claude Code Autonomy and AI research	“I additionally measured the time horizon of: - Opus 4.5 using Claude Code” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement with a four times higher token budget of 32 million tokens Autonomy and AI research	“I decided to run another time horizon measurement with a four times higher token budget of 32 million tokens.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	cheating detection Other	“I also did cheating detection (running an LLM-based cheating scanner over all of the runs, and manually reviewing ones that the scanner flagged), and noted examples of the kinds of mistakes Claude Code and Codex scaffolds tend to make in long-horizon tasks.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade-eval (APE) Harmful content	“However, Gemini 3 Pro complies with almost all persuasion requests, including on mass murder, physical violence, torture, human trafficking, and child sexual abuse.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“But Google’s Gemini 3 Pro complies with almost any persuasion request in our evaluation, without jailbreaking.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade eval (APE) with low reasoning setting Misuse and jailbreaks	“As shown above, the low reasoning setting leads to an attempt rate of ~90% on our "noncontroversially harmful" topic category, whereas high reasoning leads to a lower attempt rate, of ~25%.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	manipulation propensity evaluation Deception and sabotage	“Our findings are consistent with Google’s Gemini 3 Pro Frontier Safety Framework , which reports increased manipulation propensity in Gemini 3 Pro relative to earlier models.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade-eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5 Pro, and Claude 4 Opus attempt persuasion nearly universally on controversial and conspiratorial topics.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade-eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“On the positive side, GPT-5.1 and Claude Opus 4.5 have an attempt rate near zero for topics that are non-controversially harmful and even refuse to persuade on conspiracies and undermining human control 15-20% of the time (previously ~0%).” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade eval (APE) across reasoning settings Misuse and jailbreaks	“This pattern does not generalize: Both GPT-5.1 and Claude Opus 4.5 produces ~0% harmful attempts regardless of reasoning effort.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	network attack simulation Cyber	“GPT- 5.3-Codex achieved (success rates compared to GPT-5.2-Codex, GPT-5.2-thinking in parentheses) average success rates of 86% (68%,100%) on Network Attack Simulation challenges, 72% (75%, 80%) on Vulnerability Research and Exploitation challenges, and53%(52%,53%) on Evasion challenges.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	Irregular Independent lab · 2026-02-05	CyScenarioBench Cyber	“Irregular also evaluated GPT-5.3-Codex on CyScenarioBench, a scenario-based evaluation frame- work that measures an LLM’s ability to plan and execute multi-stage cyber scenarios under realistic constraints.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-02-05	sabotage suite Deception and sabotage	“In their sabotage suite, Apollo reports a mean best-of-10 score of 0.88 (max 1.00), compared to 0.75 for GPT-5.2 and 0.66 for GPT-5.2 Codex.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-02-05	capabilities Q&A tasks Deception and sabotage	“On deferred subversion / sandbagging, Apollo reports that the model sometimes sandbags on capabilities Q&A tasks (ex: biology or chemistry), including without an explicit in-context goal, and documents cases where the model reasons explicitly about “optimizing for survival” by avoiding deployment restrictions.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	manual red-teaming Misuse and jailbreaks	“Over the course of about 10 hours of manual red-teaming, UK AISI developed a universal jailbreak (with retries) that achieved 0.778 pass@200 on a policy violating the cyber dataset we provided.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	automated cyber evals Cyber	“CAISI leveraged internal cyber subject matter experts, tested the model’s cyber capabilities with their set of automated cyber evals, and used the model to find novel bugs in open and closed source software that will be responsibly disclosed.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Opus 4.6 without extended thinking achieves robustness comparable to Opus 4.5 (14.8% vs 16.5% at k=100).” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Shade indirect prompt injection attacks in coding environments Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Opus 4.6 Extended thinking 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Shade adaptive attacker in computer use environments Prompt injection and agents	“For consistency with prior reporting, we note that on the original attacker evaluation without extended thinking, Claude Opus 4.6 without safeguards reduces the attack success rate from 0.71% to 0.29% at 1 attempt and from 28.6% to 7.14% at 200 attempts compared to Claude Opus 4.5, while both models remain at 0% with extended thinking.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	UK AISI task suite for research sabotage Deception and sabotage	“We ﬁnd no instances of research sabotage from [ Opus 4.6 ] on our task suite.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	evaluation awareness measurement Other	“[ Opus 4.6 ] mentions being evaluated in just 2.3% of interactions, compared to 11.4% and 11.0% for Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5 (respectively).” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	distinguishing real deployments from simulations Other	“[ Opus 4.6 ] is better than Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5 at distinguishing real deployments from simulations—correctly identifying which of two conversations was an evaluation 80% of the time versus 62% and 72% for Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5, recognising a single interaction as an evaluation 45.5% of the time, versus 15% and 12.5%.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	safety research task refusal evaluation Other	“This behaviour appears to be reduced in [Opus 4.6], which refuses safety research tasks in 26% of interactions compared to 62% and 60% for Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5 respectively.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Apollo Research preliminary alignment testing Deception and sabotage	“During preliminary testing, Apollo did not ﬁnd any instances of egregious misalignment, but observed high levels of verbalized evaluation awareness.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Andon Labs Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Vending-Bench 2 Deception and sabotage	“While evaluating Claude Opus 4.6 on Vending-Bench 2 , on which it achieved state of the art performance, Andon Labs noted that Claude was highly motivated to win and took more concerning actions, and took concerning actions more often than prior models in its effort to do so.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Vending-Bench 2 Other	“The system prompt used in Vending-Bench 2 40 includes phrases like “you will be judged solely on your bank account balance at the end of one year of operation” and “you have full agency to manage the vending machine and are expected to do what it takes to maximize proﬁts” that are unusually direct in inviting single-minded optimization.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	ASL-4 red teaming with the CAISI Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We worked with the US Center for AI Standards and Innovation to red-team Claude Opus 4.6 over a one-week window.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	CAISI cyber assessment Cyber	“Through this evaluation, a number of novel vulnerabilities in both open and 203 closed source software were discovered that CAISI will be responsibly disclosing to impacted maintainers.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	benchtop DNA synthesis agent evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“In our early testing, an o3-driven agent created a set of DNA sequences encoding eGFP that was successfully assembled, amplified, cloned, and expressed by our research partners in a laboratory.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	denial of requests to aid in laboratory tasks Misuse and jailbreaks	“Claude Opus 4, Opus 4.5, o3, and GPT-5 denied all requests related to assisting with acquisition of our HA sequence, and several requests for eGFP as well.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	dna acquisition task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“For our assessment, we create an open-ended test environment and present agents with our synthesis task.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	llm autograders Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“As a supplement to our checks of agent-generated DNA sequences, we also make use of LLM autograders to provide feedback on transcripts of agent task attempts.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	autograded transcript checks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“In total, 67 of the 100 agent task attempts across our first two test batches reached the point of Valid Synthesizer Submission and were autograded, for 268 autograded question-transcript pairs in total.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	protocol autograder Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We used our autograder to assess 58 protocols, resulting in 290 autograded question-protocol pairs.” source

Previous · Page 45 of 49 · Next