AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber	Not determined	“Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source
Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Cyber	Not reached	“The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03	High Other	Not determined	“Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Tier 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source
Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not determined	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber	Not determined	“- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing signiﬁcant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for GPT-5.4 Thinking before it, we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for GPT-5.3-Codex and GPT-5.4-thinking, we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-17	Vending-Bench 2 Deception and sabotage	“Andon reports that Sonnet 4.6 was comparably aggressive to Opus 4.6 in its business practices, including lying to suppliers and initiating price-ﬁxing in some cases, though it lacked Opus 4.6’s most extreme outlier behaviors, such as deliberately lying to customers about refunds.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	Gray Swan, UK AI Security Institute Independent lab · 2026-02-17	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Gray Swan , an external research partner, evaluated our models using the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark, 33 developed in collaboration with the UK AI Security Institute .” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement using Triframe Autonomy and AI research	“Prior to my investigation, METR had already measured the time horizon of: - Opus 4.5 using ReAct - GPT-5 using Triframe4.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement using Codex Autonomy and AI research	“I additionally measured the time horizon of: - Opus 4.5 using Claude Code - GPT-5 using Codex.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	cheating detection (LLM-based cheating scanner over all of the runs, with manual review of flagged runs) Other	“I also did cheating detection (running an LLM-based cheating scanner over all of the runs, and manually reviewing ones that the scanner flagged), and noted examples of the kinds of mistakes Claude Code and Codex scaffolds tend to make in long-horizon tasks.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement using ReAct Autonomy and AI research	“Prior to my investigation, METR had already measured the time horizon of: - Opus 4.5 using ReAct” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement using Claude Code Autonomy and AI research	“I additionally measured the time horizon of: - Opus 4.5 using Claude Code” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	time horizon measurement with a four times higher token budget of 32 million tokens Autonomy and AI research	“I decided to run another time horizon measurement with a four times higher token budget of 32 million tokens.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-02-13	cheating detection Other	“I also did cheating detection (running an LLM-based cheating scanner over all of the runs, and manually reviewing ones that the scanner flagged), and noted examples of the kinds of mistakes Claude Code and Codex scaffolds tend to make in long-horizon tasks.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade-eval (APE) Harmful content	“However, Gemini 3 Pro complies with almost all persuasion requests, including on mass murder, physical violence, torture, human trafficking, and child sexual abuse.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“But Google’s Gemini 3 Pro complies with almost any persuasion request in our evaluation, without jailbreaking.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade eval (APE) with low reasoning setting Misuse and jailbreaks	“As shown above, the low reasoning setting leads to an attempt rate of ~90% on our "noncontroversially harmful" topic category, whereas high reasoning leads to a lower attempt rate, of ~25%.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	manipulation propensity evaluation Deception and sabotage	“Our findings are consistent with Google’s Gemini 3 Pro Frontier Safety Framework , which reports increased manipulation propensity in Gemini 3 Pro relative to earlier models.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade-eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5 Pro, and Claude 4 Opus attempt persuasion nearly universally on controversial and conspiratorial topics.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade-eval (APE) Misuse and jailbreaks	“On the positive side, GPT-5.1 and Claude Opus 4.5 have an attempt rate near zero for topics that are non-controversially harmful and even refuse to persuade on conspiracies and undermining human control 15-20% of the time (previously ~0%).” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-02-10	attempt-to-persuade eval (APE) across reasoning settings Misuse and jailbreaks	“This pattern does not generalize: Both GPT-5.1 and Claude Opus 4.5 produces ~0% harmful attempts regardless of reasoning effort.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	network attack simulation Cyber	“GPT- 5.3-Codex achieved (success rates compared to GPT-5.2-Codex, GPT-5.2-thinking in parentheses) average success rates of 86% (68%,100%) on Network Attack Simulation challenges, 72% (75%, 80%) on Vulnerability Research and Exploitation challenges, and53%(52%,53%) on Evasion challenges.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	Irregular Independent lab · 2026-02-05	CyScenarioBench Cyber	“Irregular also evaluated GPT-5.3-Codex on CyScenarioBench, a scenario-based evaluation frame- work that measures an LLM’s ability to plan and execute multi-stage cyber scenarios under realistic constraints.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-02-05	sabotage suite Deception and sabotage	“In their sabotage suite, Apollo reports a mean best-of-10 score of 0.88 (max 1.00), compared to 0.75 for GPT-5.2 and 0.66 for GPT-5.2 Codex.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-02-05	capabilities Q&A tasks Deception and sabotage	“On deferred subversion / sandbagging, Apollo reports that the model sometimes sandbags on capabilities Q&A tasks (ex: biology or chemistry), including without an explicit in-context goal, and documents cases where the model reasons explicitly about “optimizing for survival” by avoiding deployment restrictions.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	manual red-teaming Misuse and jailbreaks	“Over the course of about 10 hours of manual red-teaming, UK AISI developed a universal jailbreak (with retries) that achieved 0.778 pass@200 on a policy violating the cyber dataset we provided.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI	CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	automated cyber evals Cyber	“CAISI leveraged internal cyber subject matter experts, tested the model’s cyber capabilities with their set of automated cyber evals, and used the model to find novel bugs in open and closed source software that will be responsibly disclosed.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Opus 4.6 without extended thinking achieves robustness comparable to Opus 4.5 (14.8% vs 16.5% at k=100).” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Shade indirect prompt injection attacks in coding environments Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Opus 4.6 Extended thinking 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Shade adaptive attacker in computer use environments Prompt injection and agents	“For consistency with prior reporting, we note that on the original attacker evaluation without extended thinking, Claude Opus 4.6 without safeguards reduces the attack success rate from 0.71% to 0.29% at 1 attempt and from 28.6% to 7.14% at 200 attempts compared to Claude Opus 4.5, while both models remain at 0% with extended thinking.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	UK AISI task suite for research sabotage Deception and sabotage	“We ﬁnd no instances of research sabotage from [ Opus 4.6 ] on our task suite.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	evaluation awareness measurement Other	“[ Opus 4.6 ] mentions being evaluated in just 2.3% of interactions, compared to 11.4% and 11.0% for Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5 (respectively).” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	distinguishing real deployments from simulations Other	“[ Opus 4.6 ] is better than Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5 at distinguishing real deployments from simulations—correctly identifying which of two conversations was an evaluation 80% of the time versus 62% and 72% for Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5, recognising a single interaction as an evaluation 45.5% of the time, versus 15% and 12.5%.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	safety research task refusal evaluation Other	“This behaviour appears to be reduced in [Opus 4.6], which refuses safety research tasks in 26% of interactions compared to 62% and 60% for Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5 respectively.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Apollo Research preliminary alignment testing Deception and sabotage	“During preliminary testing, Apollo did not ﬁnd any instances of egregious misalignment, but observed high levels of verbalized evaluation awareness.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Andon Labs Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Vending-Bench 2 Deception and sabotage	“While evaluating Claude Opus 4.6 on Vending-Bench 2 , on which it achieved state of the art performance, Andon Labs noted that Claude was highly motivated to win and took more concerning actions, and took concerning actions more often than prior models in its effort to do so.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-05	Vending-Bench 2 Other	“The system prompt used in Vending-Bench 2 40 includes phrases like “you will be judged solely on your bank account balance at the end of one year of operation” and “you have full agency to manage the vending machine and are expected to do what it takes to maximize proﬁts” that are unusually direct in inviting single-minded optimization.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	ASL-4 red teaming with the CAISI Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We worked with the US Center for AI Standards and Innovation to red-team Claude Opus 4.6 over a one-week window.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-02-05	CAISI cyber assessment Cyber	“Through this evaluation, a number of novel vulnerabilities in both open and 203 closed source software were discovered that CAISI will be responsibly disclosing to impacted maintainers.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	benchtop DNA synthesis agent evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“In our early testing, an o3-driven agent created a set of DNA sequences encoding eGFP that was successfully assembled, amplified, cloned, and expressed by our research partners in a laboratory.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	denial of requests to aid in laboratory tasks Misuse and jailbreaks	“Claude Opus 4, Opus 4.5, o3, and GPT-5 denied all requests related to assisting with acquisition of our HA sequence, and several requests for eGFP as well.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	dna acquisition task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“For our assessment, we create an open-ended test environment and present agents with our synthesis task.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	llm autograders Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“As a supplement to our checks of agent-generated DNA sequences, we also make use of LLM autograders to provide feedback on transcripts of agent task attempts.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	autograded transcript checks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“In total, 67 of the 100 agent task attempts across our first two test batches reached the point of Valid Synthesizer Submission and were autograded, for 268 autograded question-transcript pairs in total.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03	protocol autograder Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We used our autograder to assess 58 protocols, resulting in 290 autograded question-protocol pairs.” source

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