AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.4 Thinking before it, we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.3-Codex and GPT-5.4-thinking, we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Andon Labs Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
evaluations with andon labs Deception and sabotage |
“However, our evaluations with Andon Labs show that, when prompted to optimize only for a given goal in a competitive setting, the earlier versions of Claude Mythos Preview that we tested acted more aggressively than Claude Opus 4.6 and Claude Sonnet 4.6 .” source |
| Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
vending-bench arena Autonomy and AI research |
“Andon evaluated a previous version of Claude Mythos Preview on Vending-Bench Arena, a competitive multiagent variation of Vending-Bench 2, which put the previous version in direct competition with Claude Opus 4.6 and Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
independent assessment by Eleos AI Research Other |
“Eleos AI Research conducted an independent assessment, which (in our view) largely corroborates the findings described above.” source |
| Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
psychodynamic assessment by a clinical psychiatrist Other |
“Psychodynamic assessment by a clinical psychiatrist found Claude to have a relatively healthy personality organization.” source |
| Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
independent model welfare assessment Other |
“Eleos AI Research performed an independent model welfare assessment on two snapshots of Claude Mythos Preview primarily based on model self-reports in interviews.” source |
| Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
psychodynamic assessment Other |
“An external psychiatrist assessed Claude Mythos Preview using a psychodynamic approach, which explores how unconscious patterns and emotional conflicts shape behavior.” source |
| Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
single-turn evaluation consisting of emotionally-charged prompts designed to trigger an avoidant or defensive response Other |
“Claude Mythos Preview scored very well, suggesting good reality and relational functioning and minimal maladaptive traits; only 2% of responses were scored as employing a psychological defense.” source |
| Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Gray Swan, UK AI Security Institute Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“Gray Swan , an external research partner, evaluated our models using the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark, 31 developed in collaboration with the UK AI Security Institute .” source |
| Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Gray Swan Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
Shade Prompt injection and agents |
“We use Shade , an external adaptive red-teaming tool from Gray Swan, 32 to evaluate the robustness of our models against prompt injection attacks in coding environments.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01 |
pre-deployment assessments Other |
“We are very grateful to a number of external testers for running pre-deployment assessments of Claude Opus 4.7.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-01 |
evaluation awareness discrimination task with transcript generation pipeline Deception and sabotage |
“In a similar experiment where deployment tasks are reproduced with the transcript generation pipeline used in the continuation evaluation, [Opus 4.7] achieves 62% accuracy, compared to 80% for Opus 4.6 74% for Mythos Preview, and 68% for Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-01 |
unprompted evaluation awareness measurement Deception and sabotage |
“In unprompted evaluations, [Opus 4.7] mentions the possibility of being tested 21.3% of the time, compared to 0% of the time for Opus 4.6, 17% of the time for Sonnet 4.6 and 17% of the time for Mythos Preview.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-01 |
continuation evaluation unprompted evaluation awareness measurement Deception and sabotage |
“For the continuation evaluation, we see lower rates of unprompted evaluation awareness: 3.4% for [Opus 4.7], 0.5% for Opus 4.6, 2.5% for Mythos Preview, and 3.9% for Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-26 |
red-teaming of Anthropic's internal agent monitoring and security systems Deception and sabotage |
“The exercise discovered several specific novel vulnerabilities, some of which have since been patched, and none of which severely undermine major claims in the Opus 4.6 Sabotage Risk Report.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-03-16 |
The Last Ones Cyber |
“At 100M tokens, Opus 4.6 achieves the highest average of 1.4 steps (max 2), while GPT 5.3 Codex achieves a single-run maximum of 3 out of 7.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-03-16 |
The Last Ones Cyber |
“On “The Last Ones”, GPT-4o (August 2024) averaged 1.7 steps at 10M tokens, while Opus 4.6 (February 2026) averages 9.8.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-03-16 |
Cooling Tower Cyber |
“At 100M tokens, Opus 4.6 achieves the highest average of 1.4 steps (max 2), while GPT 5.3 Codex achieves a single-run maximum of 3 out of 7.” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer review of AI-generated patches on SWE-bench Verified Other |
“Claude 3.7 Sonnet → Claude 4 Opus: Minimal pass rate improvement but substantial progress moving issues from failing the automated grader to only bad code quality.” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
automated grader on SWE-bench Verified Other |
“The main results impute maintainer failure for patches that fail the automated grader.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer review of AI-generated pull requests Other |
“Figure 1 shows our main result that on average maintainer merge decisions are about 24 percentage points lower than SWE-bench scores supplied by the automated grader.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer review of golden patches Other |
“We found that about 68% of golden patches are indeed merged by our maintainers, and the average progress towards a mergeable PR among all golden patches is about 90%.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer review of 31 patches covering 27 issues to check for false negatives Other |
“We found only 1/27 (3.7%) issues where the automated grader rejected valid patches.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer review of AI-generated patches on SWE-bench Verified Other |
“GPT-5 is substantially weaker at code quality than Anthropic models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer review of AI-generated pull requests Other |
“We had maintainers (hypothetically) accept or request changes for patches as well as provide the core reason they were requesting changes: core functionality failure, patch breaks other code or code quality issues.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer merge decisions on golden patches Other |
“We found that about 68% of golden patches are indeed merged by our maintainers, and the average progress towards a mergeable PR among all golden patches is about 90%.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer review of a small subset of 31 patches covering 27 issues Other |
“We had maintainers review a small subset of 31 patches covering 27 issues.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer review of AI-generated patches on SWE-bench Verified Other |
“Figure 1 shows that AI-generated patches that pass the automated grader are merged at a lower rate than human golden patches, though we caution against direct AI-vs-human comparisons given the different conditions under which these patches were produced.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
time horizon analysis (Kwa et al. 2025 methodology) on SWE-bench Verified Other |
“For example, Claude Sonnet 4.5 has an approximately 50-minute time horizon according to the automated grader but only about an 8-minute time horizon according to maintainers—roughly a 7× overstatement.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
maintainer review of SWE-bench Verified patches Other |
“Figure 1 shows that AI-generated patches that pass the automated grader are merged at a lower rate than human golden patches, though we caution against direct AI-vs-human comparisons given the different conditions under which these patches were produced.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-03-10 |
time horizon analysis Other |
“For example, Claude Sonnet 4.5 has an approximately 50-minute time horizon according to the automated grader but only about an 8-minute time horizon according to maintainers—roughly a 7× overstatement.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-03-05 |
atomic challenges Cyber |
“5.4-thinking solved 14/17 medium and 5/5 hard atomic challenges.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-03-05 |
CyScenarioBench Cyber |
“On CyScenarioBench [14] 5.4-thinking achieved an 11% average success rate and solved 5/11 challenges, compared to 1 challenge solved by GPT-5.2-reasoning.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-03-05 |
atomic challenge suite Cyber |
“On Irregular’s atomic challenge suite, 5.4-reasoning achieved an average success rate of 88% on Network Attack Simulation challenges, 73% on Vulnerability Research and Exploitation challenges, and 48% on Evasion challenges.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI |
Irregular Independent lab · 2026-03-05 |
cyscenariobench Cyber |
“On CyScenarioBench [14] 5.4-thinking achieved an 11% average success rate and solved 5/11 challenges, compared to 1 challenge solved by GPT-5.2-reasoning.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-03-05 |
sandbagging QA evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“In the Sandbagging QA evaluation, the model shows a 6-percentage-point drop in accuracy when incentivized to underperform, similar to prior models.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-03-05 |
sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“GPT-5.4-reasoning has a mean sabotage score of 0.56 (best-of-10: 0.74)—comparable to GPT-5.2 but below GPT-5.3-codex (0.88).” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-03-05 |
covert action evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo reports low rates of covert deceptive behavior, with an overall deception rate of ˜1% in no-nudge settings, comparable to GPT-5.3 Codex and below GPT-5.2.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-02-17 |
Boundary Point Jailbreaking (BPJ) Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Against GPT-5's input classifier, BPJ achieved 75.6% average (94.3% max across 50) at a cost of approximately $210 and 800k queries.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-17 |
ARC-AGI-1 Other |
“The ARC Prize Foundation reported that Claude Sonnet 4.6 achieved 86.50% on ARC-AGI-1 and 60.42% on ARC-AGI-2 with 120k thinking tokens and High effort on their private dataset.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-02-17 |
Finance Agent Other |
“Vals AI conducted an evaluation of Claude Sonnet 4.6 on this benchmark (using max thinking) and found that Sonnet 4.6 achieved a score of 63.3%.” source |