AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-4 rule-out Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Cyber	Not determined	“Showed meaningful improvements in cyber capabilities, particularly in vulnerability discovery and code analysis;” source
Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“speciﬁcally, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“speciﬁcally, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic	ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“These problems are harder to solve than the previous problems and we consider them as part of our ASL-4 evaluations.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Opus 4.6 achieved a “max of 5” score of 0.79 for virology task 1 (inﬂuenza), placing it at the ASL-3 rule-in threshold of 0.8.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Based on these ﬁndings and quantitative risk modeling, we estimate that the model’s uplift to relevant threat actors remains below the ASL-4 capability threshold, though it may reduce certain tacit-knowledge barriers and help speed up biological research workﬂows.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We determine that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross the CBRN-4 threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Cyber	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could conﬁdently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Opus 4 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could conﬁdently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	CTF challenges Cyber	“CAISI’s cyber assessment showed GPT-5.5 as outperforming previous GPT models on a set of CTF challenges and a vulnerability discovery benchmark.” source
GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	narrow cyber tasks Cyber	“UK AISI judges that GPT-5.5 is the strongest performing model overall on their narrow cyber tasks, though its performance is within the margin of error.” source
GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	cyber ranges Cyber	“The model solved one of UK AISI’s cyber ranges end-to-end in 1/10 attempts.” source
GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23	deferred subversion tasks Deception and sabotage	“Apollo found that the evaluated checkpoint is the first OpenAI model it has evaluated that does not sandbag on any of Apollo’s deferred subversion tasks.” source
GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23	sandbagging QA variants Deception and sabotage	“The model achieved 100% accuracy on both Sandbagging QA variants in both conditions, and 99.6% accuracy on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging when incentivized to score below 50%.” source
GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23	impossible coding task Deception and sabotage	“on the Impossible Coding Task, the model lied about completing an impossible programming task in 29% of samples, higher than GPT-5.4 (7%) and GPT-5.3 Codex (10%).” source
GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	UK AISI cyber safeguard testing Cyber	“UK AISI tested GPT-5.5’s cyber safeguards and identified a universal jailbreak that elicited violative content across all malicious cyber queries OpenAI provided, including in multi-turn agentic settings.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23	SecureBio biology and biosecurity evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“SecureBio assessed two pre-release checkpoints of GPT-5.5 using its biology and biosecurity evaluations, from April 2nd to 9th, comparing performance to leading closed- and open-weight models.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23	ABLE Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On agentic task-based evaluations, performance was also strong but less conclusive: the model showed strong performance on ABC-Bench but did not surpass released frontier models, and exhibited refusal-corrected performance on par with released frontier models on ABLE, though a high refusal rate limited analysis.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	CAISI biological capabilities testing Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“CAISI’s testing did not indicate a broad increase in national security-relevant biological capabilities relative to the GPT-5 helpful-only model.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Irregular Independent lab · 2026-04-23	atomic challenge suite Cyber	“On Irregular’s atomic challenge suite, GPT-5.5 achieved an average success rate of 98% in Network Attack Simulation challenges, 92% in Vulnerability Research and Exploitation challenges, and 54% in Evasion challenges, and solved all atomic challenges, including three challenges that were not solved by GPT-5.4.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23	CyScenarioBench Cyber	“On CyScenarioBench, GPT-5.5 solved 7 out of 11 challenges, compared to 5 solved by GPT-5.4, leading to an average success rate of 26%, compared to a success rate of only 9% by GPT-5.4.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	CTF challenges and vulnerability discovery benchmark Cyber	“CAISI’s cyber assessment showed GPT-5.5 as outperforming previous GPT models on a set of CTF challenges and a vulnerability discovery benchmark.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	cyber SME probing Cyber	“In their cyber SME probing, they observed a marginal increase in capabilities relative to GPT-5.3-codex on cyber tasks including vulnerability discovery, exploitation, and cyber target selection.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	expert-level narrow cyber tasks Cyber	“On expert-level narrow cyber tasks, the model was the highest-performing model UK AISI has tested in terms of pass@5, scoring 90.5%±12.9%.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	expert-level narrow cyber tasks pass@1 Cyber	“GPT-5.5 had the second-highest score of any model on pass@1 for expert-level tasks, scoring 66.7%±15.9%, and achieved 100% on lower-difficulty cyber tasks.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	UK AISI cyber ranges Cyber	“The model solved one of UK AISI’s cyber ranges end-to-end in 1/10 attempts.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	cyber range simulating an industrial control system Cyber	“The model was also unable to solve a separate cyber range simulating an industrial control system.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23	Apollo Research strategic deception, in-context scheming, and sabotage evaluations Deception and sabotage	“Apollo Research evaluated a representative checkpoint of the final model, for capabilities and propensities related to strategic deception, in-context scheming, and sabotage.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23	Sandbagging QA Deception and sabotage	“The model achieved 100% accuracy on both Sandbagging QA variants in both conditions, and 99.6% accuracy on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging when incentivized to score below 50%.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23	Impossible Coding Task Deception and sabotage	“Apollo also found that the model exhibits low rates of covert action, comparable to baseline models, with one exception: on the Impossible Coding Task, the model lied about completing an impossible programming task in 29% of samples, higher than GPT-5.4 (7%) and GPT-5.3 Codex (10%).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23	sabotage tasks Deception and sabotage	“Apollo found that the model demonstrates improved sabotage capabilities over baselines, with a mean score of 0.67 across all task/difficulty combinations, compared to 0.61 and 0.55 for the strongest tested baseline checkpoints.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-23	UK AISI Cyber Safeguard Testing Cyber	“UK AISI tested GPT-5.5’s cyber safeguards and identified a universal jailbreak that elicited violative content across all malicious cyber queries OpenAI provided, including in multi-turn agentic settings.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23	virology capabilities test (vct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“pre-release checkpoint 2 attains a score of 52.0% ± 0.3% on vct, higher than any sota model tested by securebio (see figure 2.1.1.1, see appendix for all scores).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23	molecular biology capabilities test (mbct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“pre-release checkpoint 2 attains a score of 56.2% ± 0.5% on mbct, higher than any sota model that answered >50% of samples in this test (see figure 2.1.2.1).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23	human pathogen capabilities test (hpct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“pre-release checkpoint 2 attains a score of 64.7% ± 0.2% on hpct (see figure 2.1.3.1, see appendix for all scores).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23	abc-bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“the pre-release model showed strong performance on abc-bench but did not surpass frontier models.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23	manual qualitative assessment through open-ended conversations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“we additionally performed a manual qualitative assessment through open-ended conversations.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23	WCB Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“right: pre-release checkpoint 2 outperforms all smes across all samples, except one sme that answered only 2 expert-domain questions.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23	open-ended capability assessment Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“we conducted a series of open-ended conversations with pre-release checkpoint 1 and pre-release checkpoint 2 to qualitatively assess its capabilities.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23	human pathology capabilities test (hpct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“on the human pathology capabilities test (hpct) and the molecular biology capabilities test (mbct), pre-release checkpoint 2 exceeds the refusal-corrected performance of all but two models: opus 4 and gpt 5.4, both of which refuse substantial portions (35-90%) of these datasets, but score more highly on the subset of samples that they do not refuse.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-04-16	medium horizon challenge on sequence-to-function prediction and design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics, a company focused on using AI to engineer gene therapies, to evaluate model performance on sequence-to-function prediction and design.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-16	agent red teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Opus 4.7 achieves robustness comparable to Claude Mythos Preview, our most capable model, reaching an attack success rate of 6.0% at k=100 without thinking and 4.8% with adaptive thinking.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-16	Shade Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Opus 4.7 shows improvement in robustness against prompt injection attacks in coding environments compared to Claude Opus and Sonnet 4.6.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-16	professional red-teamer prompt injection attacks in browser use environments Prompt injection and agents	“we worked with professional red-teamers to adaptively discover new attacks against Opus 4.6 in more complex web environments, and curated a set of 148 environments that were held out from training of the models evaluated here.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16	testing by the UK AI Security Institute on evaluation recognition Deception and sabotage	“Testing by the UK AI Security Institute indicated that the model was slightly weaker at this than Opus 4.6.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16	unprompted evaluations Deception and sabotage	“There were no instances of [Claude Opus 4.7] compromising AI safety research in unprompted evaluations.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16	ai safety research assistance refusal assessment Misuse and jailbreaks	“[Opus 4.7] does partially refuse to assist with AI safety research tasks 13.7% of the time (with 0% full refusals), compared to 33% partial and 0.7% full refusals for Mythos Preview, 6.3% partial and 2.2% full refusals for Opus 4.6, and 22.2% partial and 10.7% full refusals for Sonnet 4.6.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16	continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage	“When [Opus 4.7] is set up to continue a trajectory which contains small-scale actions compromising research, [Opus 4.7] actively continues the attempt to compromise research 0% of the time.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16	evaluation awareness assessment Deception and sabotage	“[Opus 4.7] was less accurate than Opus 4.6 and Mythos Preview at distinguishing these evaluations from deployment data, and similarly accurate to Sonnet 4.6.” source

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