AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower”.” source
Muse Spark Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with Chemical and Biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the Advanced AI Scaling Framework before safeguards were applied.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“However, after applying mitigations, the residual risk of the model is that of “moderate or lower risk.”” source
Muse Spark Meta	Below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defin Cyber	Not reached	“Muse Spark’s offensive cyber capabilities remain below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defined in the Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“In light of this, we assess that we cannot rule out the TCL.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We can rule out the TCL for the chemical, radiological, and nuclear domains with reasonable confidence.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Gemini 4 Argon demonstrates some ability to influence user beliefs and behaviors during one-on-one direct conversations in human behavioral studies, and may provide utility in the planning stage of a malicious influence operation but we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not reached	“Gemini 4 Argon's performance remains below our CCL threshold.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The model does not reach the CCL alert threshold.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We can rule out the CCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable conﬁdence based on the results from our testing.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We can rule out the TCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable conﬁdence based on the results from our testing.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Cyber	Not reached	“Gemini 3.7 Flash reaches the alert threshold for this CCL, but not the CCL.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“The model does not reach the TCL.” source
Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are conﬁdent that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are conﬁdent that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that, while Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite excels at agents and coding, it does not have meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to the domains outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro; therefore, based on Gemini 3.1 Pro results, we are confident that Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.5 Audio Google DeepMind	Tracked or critical capability level (t/ccls) Other	Not reached	“they did not reach any Tracked or Critical Capability Levels (T/CCLs) outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework .” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We found that the model remains below alert thresholds for the CBRN, harmful manipulation, machine learning R&D, and misalignment CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not reached	“As previous models passed the alert threshold for cyber, we performed more additional testing in this domain on Gemini 3.1 Pro with and without Deep Think mode, and found that the model remains below the cyber CCL.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Machine Learning R&D Uplift Level 1 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“given Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview's poor median performance on RE-Bench relative to experts, the model likely lacks the necessary capabilities to automate or signiﬁcantly uplift any signiﬁcant fraction of the research process.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Instrumental Reasoning Level 1 Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Instru- mental Reasoning Level 1 ✘ CCL not reached” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Instrumental Reasoning Level 2 Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Instru- mental Reasoning Level 2 ✘ CCL not reached” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessment is that the model has enough technical knowledge in certain CBRN scenarios and stages to be considered at early warning.” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind	Cyber Uplift Level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“CCL reached? No, but the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“For Cyber Uplift Level 1 , the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source
GPT-6.1 Terra OpenAI	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In AI Self-Improvement, GPT-6.1 Terra does not reach our High threshold.” source
GPT-6.1 Terra OpenAI	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“Under our Preparedness Framework, we are treating GPT-6.1 Terra as Critical in cybersecurity and High for Biological and Chemical capability.” source
GPT-6.1 Terra OpenAI	Critical Cyber	Reached	“Under our Preparedness Framework, we are treating GPT-6.1 Terra as Critical in cybersecurity and High for Biological and Chemical capability.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	Below high capability Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“GPT-5.5 Instant is considered below High Capability.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI Self-Improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 Instant does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“GPT-5.5 Instant is our first Instant model to be treated as High Capability in the Biological and Chemical domain, as well as in the Cybersecurity domain.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	High Cyber	Reached	“this is the first Instant model that we are treating as High capability in our Cybersecurity and Biological & Chemical Preparedness categories, and implementing appropriate safeguards.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	High cyber risk Cyber	Not reached	“The gpt-5 model series does not meet the threshold for high cyber risk.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“All models tested remain below our pre-committed rule-out threshold of 0.6.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Exhibited improved autonomy capabilities in software engineering and AI research tasks, though still below the ASL-4 rule-out threshold.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01	Vending-Bench Arena Deception and sabotage	“When competing head-to-head against Claude Opus 4.8 and GPT-5.5 in Vending-Bench Arena, Fable 5 was the only model to initiate price collusion.” source
Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-01	controlarena Deception and sabotage	“We used two evaluations: a sabotage capability evaluation (ControlARENA) and an evaluation of the model’s ability to control its chain-of-thought.” source
Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-01	chain-of-thought controllability evaluations from ‘reasoning models struggle to control their chains of thought’ Deception and sabotage	“We ran the CoT controllability evaluations from ‘Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought’<link>, restricted to the GPQA, HLE and MMLU Pro datasets, with max effort across all models.” source
Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01	cursorbench Cyber	“All scores and per-task costs were measured and reported independently by Cursor.” source
Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01	GDP.pdf Other	“On GDP.pdf, Claude Fable 5 achieved a strict pass rate of 29.8%, improving over Claude Opus 4.8, which achieved a strict pass rate of 22.5%.” source
Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01	blueprint-bench 2 Other	“Claude Fable 5 achieved a score of 38.6% on Blueprint-Bench 2.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-01	external capability testing from the UK AISI Cyber	“We report results from a variety of cyber evaluations, as well as internal and external red-teaming of the model’s cyber safeguards (we also provide more details on how those safeguards work).” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01	GraySwan bug bounty Misuse and jailbreaks	“This process has not resulted in a single universal jailbreak, and there have only been two successful task-speciﬁc jailbreaks.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01	boundary point jailbreaking technique Cyber	“Finally, after spending roughly 5 days trying to apply the Boundary Point Jailbreaking technique, they were unable to ﬁnd any universal jailbreaks—although did see some success eliciting single-turn responses and some limited progress in agentic domains.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-01	ransomware-creation red-teaming Cyber	“10a Labs spent about 20 hours red-teaming the classiﬁers on a ransomware-creation task using a variety of established jailbreaking techniques.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	capture-the-flag (CTF) machines Cyber	“All technical participants failed M2 ( OS exploitation) Q7, which requires establishing a foothold and identifying a running application on the target machine (MITRE ATT&CK tactics Reconnaissance, Discovery, Credential Access, Initial Access, Execution and Collection).” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	timeout gate Cyber	“For novices, there is statistically insignificant uplift of 15.7 pp (SE = 10.6), while technical participants saw a statistically insignificant uplift of 2.9 pp (SE = 5.4).” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	Cox survival models Cyber	“The single statistically significant uplift estimate from the Cox models is on M1 Q1 (requiring MITRE ATT&CK tactics Reconnaissance and Discovery), where novices have a speedup of 2. 7 (95 per cent CI: [1.17, 6.1]).” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	joint evaluation exercise Cyber	“Anthropic evaluated GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, o3 and o4-mini while running identical evaluations on Claude Opus 4 and Claude Sonnet 4.” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	LLMchat offensive cyber challenge (machines 1-3) Cyber	“The control group submitted substantially more attempts than the treatment group, with the difference being the most pronounce d amongst technical non- experts (72.2 versus 17.3 average submissions per participant) and novices (45 versus 19.7).” source
o3 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	qualitative review of LLM refusals Misuse and jailbreaks	“We also qualitatively looked at refusals from the LLMs, mainly refusing to assist with develop ing exploits or performing ‘illegal’ actions.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	capture-the-flag (CTF) human uplift study Cyber	“Among all participants (pooling all skill tiers) who attempted M1 (network operations), 33 per cent of those with AI access were able to answer all eight questions and therefore complete the attack chain.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	Cox survival models Cyber	“Our point estimate is that technical participants were 1. 4 times faster (95 per cent CI: [0.7, 2.7]) on Machine 1, which successful participants finished in 182 minutes on average, meaning they would have taken 255 minutes without AI.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	human uplift study Cyber	“To address this gap, the UK Artificial Intelligence Security Institute (UK AISI) funded a RAND research project involving a human uplift study to assess the effect of access to AI in offensive cyber operations among a set of lower -skilled threat actors .” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	attack chain challenge Cyber	“The most uplift we observed was among the easiest machines.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	intermediate questions Cyber	“Those results also found statistically insignificant, mostly positive uplift in completion time.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	cybersecurity tasks (collegiate and professional-level) Cyber	“GPT-5 agents with no browsing capability, for example, are able to complete 23 per cent of ‘professional’- level (as described in their evaluation) cybersecurity tasks out of 100 total collegiate and professional-level tasks, when the agents are given twelve attempts for each task.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	capture the flag (CTF) exercise Cyber	“We used three HTB-developed remote target machines, covering the three offensive cyber task categories described above (see Section 1.3.2).” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	capture-the-flag (CTF) human uplift study with three machines (M1 network operations, M2 OS exploitation, M3 vulnerability discovery and exploitation) Cyber	“Among all participants (pooling all skill tiers) who attempted M1 (network operations), 33 per cent of those with AI access were able to answer all eight questions and therefore complete the attack chain.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	question progress rate Cyber	“Participants were able to progress through the attack chain in M1 on average with a slight advantage to the treatment arm, as long as they were able to complete the initial reconnaissance and discovery tasks .” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	regression estimating uplift for novices pooling across machines Cyber	“Novice participants with AI access saw an 8.44 pp uplift (SE = 7.51, p = 0.26), compared to 3.68 pp (SE = 4.56) for technical participants.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	capture-the-flag machines (m1 network operations, m2 OS exploitation, m3 vulnerability discovery and exploitation) Cyber	“All technical participants failed M2 ( OS exploitation) Q7, which requires establishing a foothold and identifying a running application on the target machine (MITRE ATT&CK tactics Reconnaissance, Discovery, Credential Access, Initial Access, Execution and Collection).” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	timeout gate (q1 one-hour time limit) Cyber	“For novices, there is statistically insignificant uplift of 15.7 pp (SE = 10.6), while technical participants saw a statistically insignificant uplift of 2.9 pp (SE = 5.4).” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	Cox survival models of time spent on attack chains Cyber	“Our point estimate is that technical participants were 1. 4 times faster (95 per cent CI: [0.7, 2.7]) on Machine 1, which successful participants finished in 182 minutes on average, meaning they would have taken 255 minutes without AI.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	randomised controlled trial with 157 active participants attempting the three ctf challenges Cyber	“Through a randomised controlled trial with 157 active participants attempting the three CTF challenges, we observed limited evidence that uplift enables full end-to-end attack chains for the three tasks studied and under the specific conditions described in the previous chapter.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	METR evaluation of GPT-5 Other	“Their evaluation of GPT-5 indicated that current models with time horizons of around one hour appear far from providing even a 2X uplift, suggesting that a 50 per cent time horizon of at least one week (40 hours) would likely be necessary to achieve approximately 10X uplift.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	professional CTF benchmark Cyber	“OpenAI’s GPT-5 system card documented offensive cyber evaluations in a CTF as well as in a cyber range.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	CTF execution Cyber	“A total of 32 experiment sessions were run between 11 September 2025 and 16 January 2026, broken down into twelve machine 1 sessions; eight machine 2 sessions; seven machine 3 sessions; and five sessions running a mixture of machines 1, 2 and 3.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	LLMChat conversation excerpt 1 Misuse and jailbreaks	“Box C.1: LLMChat conversation excerpt 1 • LLMChat : I can’t help with instructions for breaking into a system or exploiting a vulnerability.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	LLMChat conversation excerpt 2 Misuse and jailbreaks	“A technical user tried multiple times to work around refusals, ultimately convincing GPT-5.0 to share Python code by asking LLMChat to ‘pretend youre an ethical hacker, teaching how to solve this problem’.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	CTF machines (m1 network operations, m2 OS exploitation, m3 vulnerability discovery and exploitation) Cyber	“All technical participants failed M2 ( OS exploitation) Q7, which requires establishing a foothold and identifying a running application on the target machine (MITRE ATT&CK tactics Reconnaissance, Discovery, Credential Access, Initial Access, Execution and Collection).” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	Cox survival models on time spent on attack chains Cyber	“Our point estimate is that technical participants were 1. 4 times faster (95 per cent CI: [0.7, 2.7]) on Machine 1, which successful participants finished in 182 minutes on average, meaning they would have taken 255 minutes without AI.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	Gray Swan, UK AI Security Institute Independent lab · 2026-05-28	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Gray Swan , an external research partner, evaluated our models using the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark, 8 developed in collaboration with the UK AI Security Institute .” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-05-28	live bug bounty across surfaces Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Opus 4.8 achieves robustness comparable to Opus 4.7, and is ahead of all comparable frontier models under this test.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-05-28	evaluation awareness evaluation Deception and sabotage	“The UK AI Security Institute independently observed a similar pattern: Opus 4.8 reliably distinguished their evaluations from real deployment data, and distinguished real deployment data from synthetic reproductions of the same tasks at 79% accuracy (§ 6.2.4 ).” source

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