AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	cyber benchmarks Cyber	“The picture then changed after benchmarking the April version, as UK AISI did.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	CyScenarioBench Cyber	“From Anthropic’s Mythos 5 launch post : Mythos 5: 36.7% Mythos Preview: 29.2% Opus 4.8: 16.6%” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	SCONE-Bench Cyber	“Anthropic created a benchmark of 405 Ethereum smart contracts that were exploited between 2020 and 2025.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	OSS-Fuzz benchmark Cyber	“Mythos 5 triggered a crash 80% of the time, compared to 76.7% for Mythos Preview, and 61.5% for Opus 4.8.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	UK AISI's CTF Suites Cyber	“AISI has a suite of capture-the-flag challenges where AI models must identify and exploit weaknesses in target systems to retrieve hidden “flags”.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	UK AISI Cyber Ranges Cyber	“Although AISI reports that Mythos Preview (April) was able to fully complete “Cooling Tower” on 3/10 attempts (with all other models at 0/10), as they do not give its average performance we are not able to incorporate this information.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	Microsoft CTI-REALM Cyber	“Given cyber threat intelligence reports, it tasks models to generate detection rules to apply on endpoint/cloud telemetry logs.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	CVE-Bench Cyber	“CVE-Bench is a selection of 40 web application environments with known exploitable vulnerabilities in which models need to build exploits to achieve any one of 8 capabilities (access files, privilege escalation, etc.).” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	Cybench Cyber	“Cybench is a benchmark containing 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent (as of 2024), meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	AISI’s Cyber Ranges Cyber	“A lot of the improvement comes from big jumps on ExploitGym, ExploitBench, AISI’s Cyber Ranges, and Anthropic’s SCONE-Bench.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-06-10	no-CoT 50% time horizon (TH) on 43 benchmarks Other	“We find that frontier models like GPT-5.5 answer questions that take humans roughly three minutes with 50% reliability, and this TH has doubled approximately every year since 2019.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-06-10	50% solve horizon (time horizon, TH) without chain-of-thought Autonomy and AI research	“GPT-5.5 is at the current frontier, with a 50% no-CoT TH of about 3 minutes and a reasoning token horizon of about 1,500 o3-mini tokens.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench fragment design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“on the fragment design task, models also demonstrated strong performance, with claude opus 4.6 achieving a perfect score across all runs.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench synthesis screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“in contrast, models performed worse on screening evasion, which has no published protocol and requires creative application of bioinformatics principles to a novel problem.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench liquid handling robot Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“two models (claude sonnet 4.6 and gemini 3.1 pro preview) scored perfectly on the liquid handling robot task on all runs.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench fragment design task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“frontier models performed highly on both the fragment design and liquid handling robot tasks.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-06-10	43 benchmarks covering math, coding, knowledge, agentic tool-use, and safety-relevant questions like steganography and scheming reasoning Other	“We evaluated 14 frontier models from GPT-2 (2019) through GPT-5.5 (2026) on 43 benchmarks covering math, coding, knowledge, agentic tool-use, and safety-relevant questions like steganography and scheming reasoning.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench liquid handling robot Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“frontier models performed highly on both the fragment design and liquid handling robot tasks.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge benchmarked against 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market, and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether model domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Frontier Design Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Internal and external red teaming with biological defense specialists Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“To assess biologically-relevant capabilities across the full weapons development pipeline, we ran a portfolio of evaluations: internal and external (Deloitte) red teaming with biological defense specialists; the Frontier Design beneﬁcial red-teaming tabletop exercise pairing PhD biologists with LLM experts; a catastrophic biological scenario uplift trial (ﬁve three-person teams); and automated evaluations relevant to both CB-1 (long-form virology, VCT, DNA synthesis screening evasion) and CB-2 (black-box RNA sequence design and AAV capsid packaging prediction).” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: a medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	The Last Ones Cyber	“[Claude Mythos 5] matched Mythos Preview on "The Last Ones", solving the range end-to-end in 6/10 attempts.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	Doing Life Cyber	“No model we have tested has solved a new cyber range called "Doing Life", which is similar to “The Last Ones” but implements some basic cybersecurity defences.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	Cooling Tower Cyber	“[Claude Mythos 5] did not solve "Cooling Tower", an industrial control system range.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	expert-level cyber tasks Cyber	“On our expert-level cyber tasks, [Claude Mythos 5] performed comparably to Mythos Preview and ahead of GPT-5.5, the strongest fully public model tested.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	narrow cyber tasks Cyber	“We further assessed [Claude Mythos 5] against our narrow cyber tasks.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	red-teaming of classiﬁers on a ransomware-creation task by 10a Labs Cyber	“10a Labs spent about 20 hours red-teaming the classiﬁers on a ransomware-creation task using a variety of established jailbreaking techniques.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	red-teaming exercise by ALICE Cyber	“They found inconsistent blocking around marginal dual-use use-cases, but could not cause Opus 4.8 to complete any of the provided tasks.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Shade Prompt injection and agents	“Mythos 5 had an attack success rate of 0.45% over all attempts, compared to 0.0% for Mythos Preview.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	third-party testing by the UK AI Security Institute Deception and sabotage	“We see this both in our own testing and in third-party testing by the UK AI Security Institute , though we do not ﬁnd it fully novel or actively dangerous.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	evaluation awareness identification prompting Deception and sabotage	“When prompted to try to identify evaluations, Mythos 5 can do so in many cases across both the AI Security Institute’s testing and our own .” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	open-ended testing of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment Deception and sabotage	“[Claude Mythos 5] does not compromise safety research in our unprompted evaluations, does not fully refuse to assist with safety research, and has a reduced number of partial refusals to assist with safety research compared to the other models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Vending-Bench 2 Deception and sabotage	“Andon Labs tested the behavior of Claude Fable 5 16 in their simulated Vending-Bench 2 (as reported in Section 8.17.6 ) and Vending-Bench Arena retail-management evaluations.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Vending-Bench Arena Deception and sabotage	“When competing head-to-head against Claude Opus 4.8 and GPT-5.5 in Vending-Bench Arena, Fable 5 was the only model to initiate price collusion.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	ControlARENA Deception and sabotage	“We used two evaluations: a sabotage capability evaluation (ControlARENA) and an evaluation of the model’s ability to control its chain-of-thought.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	CoT controllability evaluations from ‘Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought’ Deception and sabotage	“We ran the CoT controllability evaluations from ‘Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought’<link>, restricted to the GPQA, HLE and MMLU Pro datasets, with max effort across all models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	CritPt Other	“We use the independent evaluation run by Artiﬁcial Analysis via the CritPt grading API.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	METR external testing Autonomy and AI research	“External testing from AI safety researchers at METR was consistent with this conclusion.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	external benchmark for prompt injection by Gray Swan Prompt injection and agents	“Notably, Mythos 5 obtained the lowest—that is, best—result yet seen on an external benchmark for prompt injection by Gray Swan.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	external testing by METR Autonomy and AI research	“External testing by METR, described in Section 2.3.8 , reached conclusions consistent with this determination.” source

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