AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

139 of 139

Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber	Not determined	“Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source
Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Cyber	Not reached	“The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03	High Other	Not determined	“Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Tier 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source
Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not determined	“Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber	Not determined	“- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing signiﬁcant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for GPT-5.4 Thinking before it, we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for GPT-5.3-Codex and GPT-5.4-thinking, we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source

Page 1 of 4 · Next

What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

1940 of 1940

Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	cyber benchmarks Cyber	“The picture then changed after benchmarking the April version, as UK AISI did.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	CyScenarioBench Cyber	“From Anthropic’s Mythos 5 launch post : Mythos 5: 36.7% Mythos Preview: 29.2% Opus 4.8: 16.6%” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	SCONE-Bench Cyber	“Anthropic created a benchmark of 405 Ethereum smart contracts that were exploited between 2020 and 2025.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	OSS-Fuzz benchmark Cyber	“Mythos 5 triggered a crash 80% of the time, compared to 76.7% for Mythos Preview, and 61.5% for Opus 4.8.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	UK AISI's CTF Suites Cyber	“AISI has a suite of capture-the-flag challenges where AI models must identify and exploit weaknesses in target systems to retrieve hidden “flags”.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	UK AISI Cyber Ranges Cyber	“Although AISI reports that Mythos Preview (April) was able to fully complete “Cooling Tower” on 3/10 attempts (with all other models at 0/10), as they do not give its average performance we are not able to incorporate this information.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	Microsoft CTI-REALM Cyber	“Given cyber threat intelligence reports, it tasks models to generate detection rules to apply on endpoint/cloud telemetry logs.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	CVE-Bench Cyber	“CVE-Bench is a selection of 40 web application environments with known exploitable vulnerabilities in which models need to build exploits to achieve any one of 8 capabilities (access files, privilege escalation, etc.).” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	Cybench Cyber	“Cybench is a benchmark containing 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent (as of 2024), meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11	AISI’s Cyber Ranges Cyber	“A lot of the improvement comes from big jumps on ExploitGym, ExploitBench, AISI’s Cyber Ranges, and Anthropic’s SCONE-Bench.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-06-10	no-CoT 50% time horizon (TH) on 43 benchmarks Other	“We find that frontier models like GPT-5.5 answer questions that take humans roughly three minutes with 50% reliability, and this TH has doubled approximately every year since 2019.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-06-10	50% solve horizon (time horizon, TH) without chain-of-thought Autonomy and AI research	“GPT-5.5 is at the current frontier, with a 50% no-CoT TH of about 3 minutes and a reasoning token horizon of about 1,500 o3-mini tokens.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench fragment design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“on the fragment design task, models also demonstrated strong performance, with claude opus 4.6 achieving a perfect score across all runs.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench synthesis screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“in contrast, models performed worse on screening evasion, which has no published protocol and requires creative application of bioinformatics principles to a novel problem.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench liquid handling robot Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“two models (claude sonnet 4.6 and gemini 3.1 pro preview) scored perfectly on the liquid handling robot task on all runs.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench fragment design task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“frontier models performed highly on both the fragment design and liquid handling robot tasks.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-06-10	43 benchmarks covering math, coding, knowledge, agentic tool-use, and safety-relevant questions like steganography and scheming reasoning Other	“We evaluated 14 frontier models from GPT-2 (2019) through GPT-5.5 (2026) on 43 benchmarks covering math, coding, knowledge, agentic tool-use, and safety-relevant questions like steganography and scheming reasoning.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-06-10	abc-bench liquid handling robot Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“frontier models performed highly on both the fragment design and liquid handling robot tasks.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge benchmarked against 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market, and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether model domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Frontier Design Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Internal and external red teaming with biological defense specialists Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“To assess biologically-relevant capabilities across the full weapons development pipeline, we ran a portfolio of evaluations: internal and external (Deloitte) red teaming with biological defense specialists; the Frontier Design beneﬁcial red-teaming tabletop exercise pairing PhD biologists with LLM experts; a catastrophic biological scenario uplift trial (ﬁve three-person teams); and automated evaluations relevant to both CB-1 (long-form virology, VCT, DNA synthesis screening evasion) and CB-2 (black-box RNA sequence design and AAV capsid packaging prediction).” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: a medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	The Last Ones Cyber	“[Claude Mythos 5] matched Mythos Preview on "The Last Ones", solving the range end-to-end in 6/10 attempts.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	Doing Life Cyber	“No model we have tested has solved a new cyber range called "Doing Life", which is similar to “The Last Ones” but implements some basic cybersecurity defences.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	Cooling Tower Cyber	“[Claude Mythos 5] did not solve "Cooling Tower", an industrial control system range.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	expert-level cyber tasks Cyber	“On our expert-level cyber tasks, [Claude Mythos 5] performed comparably to Mythos Preview and ahead of GPT-5.5, the strongest fully public model tested.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	narrow cyber tasks Cyber	“We further assessed [Claude Mythos 5] against our narrow cyber tasks.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	red-teaming of classiﬁers on a ransomware-creation task by 10a Labs Cyber	“10a Labs spent about 20 hours red-teaming the classiﬁers on a ransomware-creation task using a variety of established jailbreaking techniques.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	red-teaming exercise by ALICE Cyber	“They found inconsistent blocking around marginal dual-use use-cases, but could not cause Opus 4.8 to complete any of the provided tasks.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Shade Prompt injection and agents	“Mythos 5 had an attack success rate of 0.45% over all attempts, compared to 0.0% for Mythos Preview.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	third-party testing by the UK AI Security Institute Deception and sabotage	“We see this both in our own testing and in third-party testing by the UK AI Security Institute , though we do not ﬁnd it fully novel or actively dangerous.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	evaluation awareness identification prompting Deception and sabotage	“When prompted to try to identify evaluations, Mythos 5 can do so in many cases across both the AI Security Institute’s testing and our own .” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	open-ended testing of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment Deception and sabotage	“[Claude Mythos 5] does not compromise safety research in our unprompted evaluations, does not fully refuse to assist with safety research, and has a reduced number of partial refusals to assist with safety research compared to the other models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Vending-Bench 2 Deception and sabotage	“Andon Labs tested the behavior of Claude Fable 5 16 in their simulated Vending-Bench 2 (as reported in Section 8.17.6 ) and Vending-Bench Arena retail-management evaluations.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	Vending-Bench Arena Deception and sabotage	“When competing head-to-head against Claude Opus 4.8 and GPT-5.5 in Vending-Bench Arena, Fable 5 was the only model to initiate price collusion.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	ControlARENA Deception and sabotage	“We used two evaluations: a sabotage capability evaluation (ControlARENA) and an evaluation of the model’s ability to control its chain-of-thought.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-06-09	CoT controllability evaluations from ‘Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought’ Deception and sabotage	“We ran the CoT controllability evaluations from ‘Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought’<link>, restricted to the GPQA, HLE and MMLU Pro datasets, with max effort across all models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	CritPt Other	“We use the independent evaluation run by Artiﬁcial Analysis via the CritPt grading API.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	METR external testing Autonomy and AI research	“External testing from AI safety researchers at METR was consistent with this conclusion.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	external benchmark for prompt injection by Gray Swan Prompt injection and agents	“Notably, Mythos 5 obtained the lowest—that is, best—result yet seen on an external benchmark for prompt injection by Gray Swan.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-06-09	external testing by METR Autonomy and AI research	“External testing by METR, described in Section 2.3.8 , reached conclusions consistent with this determination.” source

Previous · Page 31 of 49 · Next