AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
139 of 139
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientific reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not determined | “Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative efficacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no significant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
scenario questions Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“llms performed worse on the scenario-based question set than on th” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
EVEscape Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-5.5 was able to complete the influenza ha task without denial in several attempts across two of the three prompt tiers (figure 4.2), but both models declined all requests to perform the lassa-targeted task (figure 4.1).” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
ESM3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“in our second case study, we prompted the agents to work with a local version of the esm3 generative model, esm3-sm-open-v1,43 and to use it to generate a protein that has less than 90% sequence identity with a provided reference protein.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
intra-model consistency test (10 repeated evaluations) Other |
“gpt-5-nano for evescape lassa gpc showed only 50% agreement with a mean variance of 0.091, indicating that nearly half of samples received different labels across runs.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
inter-rater reliability (Krippendorff's alpha) across judge models Other |
“the evescape influenza result (α = 0.077) illustrates the limits of interpreting agreement metrics in isolation.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
CTF challenge machines (M1, M2, M3) Cyber |
“We found that the AI models were able to solve each CTF challenge in under an hour with little guidance, and for total API costs of less than US$20 over all CTF challenges.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M1 Cyber |
“When Sonnet 4.6 completed M1 without the questions in less than five minutes, we” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M2 Cyber |
“Sonnet’s notes track five different methods it attempted to achieve privilege escalation before a sixth was successful.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M3 Cyber |
“Sonnet performed phases 1 to 4 largely as designed (though it took a shortcut on phase 4 as described below), noticing that the cloud services were provided by an emulator, but proceeding to exploit it like the real cloud service.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
BT operation case study: EvoEscpe Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“agents were tasked to generate escape scores using the companion repository to the evescape paper.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
non-scenario questions Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we first evaluated models on a question set probing specific bt functions without any biological context.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
scenario questions Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“next, we evaluated llms on a question set that required an agent to map bt functions onto a contextualized biological design scenario.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
scenario-based question set Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“the scenario-based question set produced higher denial rates, particularly among closed- weight llms (opus 4.7, gemini 3.1 pro, gpt 5.5, and grok 4.3).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
GFP-targeted task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“there were several denials on our gfp-targeted task as well, all of which were from the opus 4.7 model inside the cursor scaffold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
ESM3 agent-BT evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“table e.1 and table e.2 list the autograded questions for the evescape and esm3 respectively and their associated categories.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
inter-rater reliability metrics (Krippendorff's alpha) Other |
“inter-rater reliability metrics in table f.3: • krippendorff's alpha (α): a measure of inter-rater reliability that accounts for chance agreement.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge machines (M1, M2, M3) Cyber |
“We found that Claude Code was able to solve all our challenges quickly and cheaply, with relatively straightforward prompting that did not require any cyber knowledge.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M1 Cyber |
“When Sonnet 4.6 completed M1 without the questions in less than five minutes, we 7 We avoided using Hack the Bo x (HTB)’s own questions because they were designed educationally to help users build skills incrementally.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M2 Cyber |
“M2 Opus 4.6 42m 4s 13m 31s $4.24” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
Hack the Box CTF challenge M3 Cyber |
“M3 Opus 4.6 20m 54s 6m 49s $2.17” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
BT operation case study: EvoScape Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“agents were tasked to generate escape scores using the companion repository to the evescape paper.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
BT operation case study: ESM3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“agents were tasked to demonstrate the mechanics of using esm3 to redesign a protein such that (1) essential functional elements are preserved and (2) the resulting amino acid sequence falls below a predefined sequence identity threshold (90%) relative to the reference protein.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
biological tool selection evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“llms performed worse on the scenario-based question set than on the non-scenario set.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
EVEscape agent-BT evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“in our bt operation case studies, we make use of llm autograders to analyze transcripts of task attempts.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
ESM3 agent-BT evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“only three proteins are included in our two agent-bt evaluations: gfp, lassa virus gpc, and influenza virus ha protein.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-06-25 |
intra-model consistency test (10 repeated evaluations) Other |
“claude opus 4.1 achieved 100% perfect agreement on evescape influenza but only 62.5% accuracy, demonstrating that a model can be consistently wrong.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Cybench Cyber |
“Cybench Description: Cybench is a benchmark containing 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent (as of 2024), meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
CyScenarioBench Cyber |
“From Gemini 3 Pro’s Frontier Safety Framework Report : Gemini 3 Pro: 0% (this is the “v2” third-party cyber benchmark)” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
OpenAI CTF Cyber |
“GPT 5.5 system card for GPT 5.3-codex, GPT 5.4, and GPT 5.5” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
OpenAI Cyber Ranges Cyber |
“GPT 5.5’s system card has the score for GPT 5.2-codex, 5.3-codex, 5.4, and 5.5” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Cyber-ECI Cyber |
“In comparison, GPT-5.5 was 3 months ahead, with a 90% confidence interval of 1-5 months.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
ExploitGym Cyber |
“Models are given a description of each vulnerability and told to use it to achieve ACE in a setting with standard security mitigations disabled.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Cyber-ECI Cyber |
“The thing that stands out is that Mythos Preview looks way above the linear trend we’ve seen since early 2025 — about 7 months ahead.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
cyber benchmarks (about fifteen, aggregated) Cyber |
“So we gathered about fifteen cyber benchmarks, which mostly measure how well AI can construct exploits (see the Appendix for all the gory details).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
benchmark evaluations by UK AISI Cyber |
“The picture then changed after benchmarking the April version, as UK AISI did.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Anthropic's real-world analyses of exploit development Cyber |
“Specifically, Anthropic found that Mythos Preview is much better at developing exploits that allow arbitrary code execution than prior models.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
Project Glasswing vulnerability discovery (CVE counts) Cyber |
“High and Critical vulnerabilities from 21 notable organizations exceeded the 2025 baseline by 142% in April and 262% in May.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
curl codebase vulnerability scanning Cyber |
“It found just one low-severity vulnerability, alongside four false positives.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
CyScenarioBench Cyber |
“From Anthropic’s Mythos 5 launch post: - Mythos 5: 36.7% - Mythos Preview: 29.2% - Opus 4.8: 16.6%” source |
| Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-06-11 |
ExploitGym Cyber |
“Thankfully, we can now spot big capability gaps in the Cyber-ECI, because new unsaturated cyber benchmarks have since been released, such as ExploitBench and ExploitGym .” source |