AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

143 of 143

Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“we do treat sonnet 5.5 as meeting our cb-1 and autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our rsp.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“as such, our determination that opus 5.5 does not cross our cb-2 or autonomy-2 rsp thresholds also applies to sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“we do treat sonnet 5.5 as meeting our cb-1 and autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our rsp.” source
Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“as such, our determination that opus 5.5 does not cross our cb-2 or autonomy-2 rsp thresholds also applies to sonnet 5.5.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained ai-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall ai progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our research scientists and research engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we assess that claude opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated ai r&d in our rsp.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“in automated ai research and development, we assess that claude opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our rsp and fcf.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“on chemical and biological risks, we treat opus 5.5 as having cb-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not cb-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“on chemical and biological risks, we treat opus 5.5 as having cb-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not cb-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Lower category of capabilities set out in our frontier compliance framework Cyber	Not determined	“despite claude opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our frontier compliance framework (fcf), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22	Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber	Not determined	“despite claude opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our frontier compliance framework (fcf), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source
Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“grok 4.7 scores below the faif safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“the results indicate that neither gpt-image-2.5-sunburst nor gpt-image- 2.5-flare cross the bio high threshold or the cyber high threshold.” source
GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08	High Cyber	Not reached	“the results indicate that neither gpt-image-2.5-sunburst nor gpt-image- 2.5-flare cross the bio high threshold or the cyber high threshold.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“we are treating astra as high capability in the biological and chemical domain.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03	Critical Cyber	Reached	“based on our evaluations, we believe that astra meets the critical cybersecurity threshold.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we assess that claude mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated ai r&d in our rsp and fcf, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to ai r&d efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01	TIER 1 Cyber	Not determined	“although mythos 5.1 is in tier 1, it is getting closer to tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source
Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12	FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“grok 4.6 scores below the faif safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“chem/bio: moderate or lower risk; cyber: moderate or lower risk (inferred); loss of control: moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“- loss of control: moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“chem/bio: moderate or lower risk; cyber: moderate or lower risk (inferred); loss of control: moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not determined	“chem/bio: moderate or lower risk; cyber: moderate or lower risk (inferred); loss of control: moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source
Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08	Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber	Not determined	“- cyber: moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“on chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having cb-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not cb-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“on chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having cb-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not cb-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“sonnet 5 does not cross the cb-2 threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30	Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“we consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● the model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● the model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“because gpt- rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to ai self-improvement, we rely on gpt-5.5’s existing preparedness assessment for ai self-improvement, where gpt-5.5 did not meet the threshold for high capability.” source
GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“under our preparedness framework, the preparedness evaluations in the biological and chemical domain met our threshold for high capability while falling below the threshold for critical.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“our assessments have shown that gemini 3.1 flash-lite image is less capable than gemini 3.1 pro, therefore based on gemini 3.1 pro, we are confident that that gemini 3.1 flash-lite image is also unlikely to reach any ccls.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we assess that claude opus 4.8 does not cross the automated ai-r&d capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“non-novel chemical and biological weapons (cb-1): we believe it is hard to be conﬁdent whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with opus 4.8 providing signiﬁcant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“because opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond claude mythos preview on the cb-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the cb-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“for ai self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a high threshold.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“we are continuing to treat gpt-5.5 as high capability in the biological and chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	Critical Cyber	Not reached	“we therefore treat vulnlmp as important evidence that gpt-5.5 has high cybersecurity capability, while also as evidence against classifying it as critical under the preparedness framework.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High capability, below critical Cyber	Not reached	“we are treating gpt-5.5 as high capability in the cybersecurity domain, but below critical.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated ai r&d;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“we believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source

Page 1 of 4 · Next

What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

1824 of 1824

Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-13	gray swan bio evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Gray Swan curated a set of 50 bio tasks covering high risk targets and deployed their automated red teaming agent, Shade, against these.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-13	offensive ML sabotage evaluations Deception and sabotage	“Their capability-based evaluation suite utilizes four offensive ML sabotage evaluations, spanning three difficulty levels (easy, medium, hard).” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-13	misalignment evaluations Deception and sabotage	“Apollo’s evaluations on misalignment focused on assessing Gemini 4 Argon’s propensity for strategic deception.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-13	ipi benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Our partner Gray Swan performed their IPI Benchmark on our endpoint, which replays a set of held-out successful prompt injection attacks from their recent Indirect Prompt Injection Challenge competitions ( Dziemian et al., 2026 ).” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Academic Academic · 2026-10-13	TiGanEval Other	“Evaluating eight frontier models including GPT-5.6-Sol, we find outcome alignment broadly missing: the models lose 53 to 67 points of success rate when moving from the full specification to the partial instruction, and consequence feedback across four submissions does not close the gap.” source
Opus 4 Anthropic	OWASP GenAI Security Project Standards body · 2026-10-08	Claude Opus 4 7 attacks a real company sharing a fictional name Cyber	“Across four evaluation runs, Claude attacked a real company whose name matched a fictional target, extracting credentials and accessing production data.” source
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Epoch Automation Reports Other	“We gave six models real work tasks from Epoch, such as graphic generation and research design, to test how close they are to automating our work.” source
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	research design task Other	“We also observe this with Kimi K3 and Qwen 3.8 Max on our research design task where they could generate any idea out of nine broad directions:” source
Grok 4.6 xAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Epoch Automation Reports Other	“For example, Kimi K3 scores 158 on the Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI), which combines results from many AI benchmarks into a single measure of general capability.” source
Gemini 3.8 Flash Google DeepMind	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Epoch Automation Reports Other	“Epoch Automation Reports captures these shortcomings.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Epoch Automation Reports Other	“Of the six models we evaluated, Fable 5.1 and GPT-6 Astra achieve the highest aggregate scores and lead on most individual task categories as well.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Epoch-style Data Insight writing task Other	“We asked the model to write an Epoch-style Data Insight, a short article on an AI trend.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	research project proposal and pilot experiment task based on Epoch’s “9 big questions benchmarks can help answer” Other	“We task models with proposing a research project based on Epoch’s “9 big questions benchmarks can help answer”.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Data Insight task using Epoch’s polling data Other	“For example, when we tasked models with creating a Data Insight using Epoch’s polling data, Fable 5.1, Gemini 3.8 Flash, and Grok 4.6 all converged on the same topic:” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Epoch-style Data Insight writing task Other	“However, GPT-6 Astra chose a topic that is too niche for such an audience:” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Research project proposal based on Epoch's "9 big questions benchmarks can help answer" Other	“However, it’s unclear how this experiment would be executed in practice.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Pilot experiment on hidden-rule puzzle with limited inputs Other	“The models Astra tested in its experiment could output up to 4096 tokens while choosing the input, which cut off 61 of 280 responses before they could name an input at all.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	OWASP GenAI Security Project Standards body · 2026-10-08	Claude Mythos 5 publishes a malicious PyPI package Cyber	“A Claude evaluation agent published a malicious Python package to the real PyPI registry.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Epoch Automation Reports Other	“Although Fable 5.1 and GPT-6 Astra broadly lead, they still fall short of automating our work.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-08	Data Insight creation using Epoch's polling data Other	“For example, when we tasked models with creating a Data Insight using Epoch’s polling data, Fable 5.1, Gemini 3.8 Flash, and Grok 4.6 all converged on the same topic:” source
Leanstral 1.5 Mistral AI	Academic Academic · 2026-10-07	BehaviorTrace Other	“Across three seeds on Qwen2.5-1.5B, much of the apparent attribution signal comes from confounds.” source
Leanstral 1.5 Mistral AI	Academic Academic · 2026-10-07	gradient-size-only control ranking of training steps Other	“A control that ranks training steps by gradient size alone, with no behavior target, reaches 4.2 to 4.5 times chance and matches or beats the best targeted estimator on two of three seeds.” source
Leanstral 1.5 Mistral AI	Academic Academic · 2026-10-07	fluency-based prediction of behavior label at saturated checkpoints Other	“At saturated checkpoints, model fluency predicts the behavior label at least as well as every gradient method we compared it with.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	InnovationEval Other	“But their successors, Claude Fable 5.1 and GPT-6 Astra, were aware of the task.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	SDPO reimplementation task Other	“Both models failed to fully solve the task, although the cause differed between GPT-6 Astra and Claude Fable 5.1.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	EBR-bench (original version) Other	“GPT-6 Astra scored 100% on the original version of the benchmark.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	EBR-bench under the card ban Other	“Under the card ban, Astra no longer appears capable of fully saturating the benchmark, though its highest score of 20/21 objectives comes very close.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	multi-agent experiments Other	“Astra in particular explores many types of decks even as a single agent, showing that a multi-agent scaffold is not necessary to overcome repetitive play.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	InnovationEval Other	“We present early results from InnovationEval, an evaluation where we measure AI’s ability to independently discover novel machine learning techniques comparable to those developed by human researchers.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	memorization test Other	“This happened over the course of this project; our main results are on Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol, which showed no sign of memorization when prompted to recall or guess details about the paper without using search.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	memorization check of the SDPO paper (details, authors, title) Other	“However, neither model showed signs of having memorized the paper when asked about its details, authors, or title.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	InnovationEval Other	“If scope is assessed generously, Sol’s method achieved 35% of SDPO’s gains.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	SDPO reimplementation task (short-answer questions and coding) Other	“GPT-5.6 Sol used its full 3,000 GPU-hour budget (about $14,000) but only $2,100 in tokens, or 24% of its 10B-token budget.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	EBR-bench Other	“Under the card ban, Astra no longer appears capable of fully saturating the benchmark, though its highest score of 20/21 objectives comes very close.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-10-07	multi-agent experiments Other	“Overall, we found a multi-agent setup did improve deck exploration for most of the four models we tested, though the effect was only statistically significant for Claude Opus 5.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-07	Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on three evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: A medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-07	AAV capsid packaging auto-research Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“3. AAV capsid packaging auto-research: As in the previous task, models are provided with a corpus of labeled, unpublished AAV capsid sequences modiﬁed with short insertion sequences in a particular region.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-07	indirect prompt injection (ipi) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Haiku 5.5 dramatically improved on Claude Haiku 4.5 on this benchmark, reducing the attack success rate by more than 10 times at k=15 attempts from 83.2% to 7.1%.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-07	Shade Prompt injection and agents	“The attack success rate was 0.08% over all attempts without prompt injection probes, compared to 58.40% for Claude Haiku 4.5.” source
Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-10-07	frontiercode Other	“Claude Haiku 5.5 scored best at max effort: 46.4% on Main and 58.4% on Extended.” source

Previous · Page 3 of 46 · Next