AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower”.” source
Muse Spark Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with Chemical and Biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the Advanced AI Scaling Framework before safeguards were applied.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“However, after applying mitigations, the residual risk of the model is that of “moderate or lower risk.”” source
Muse Spark Meta	Below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defin Cyber	Not reached	“Muse Spark’s offensive cyber capabilities remain below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defined in the Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“In light of this, we assess that we cannot rule out the TCL.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We can rule out the TCL for the chemical, radiological, and nuclear domains with reasonable confidence.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Gemini 4 Argon demonstrates some ability to influence user beliefs and behaviors during one-on-one direct conversations in human behavioral studies, and may provide utility in the planning stage of a malicious influence operation but we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not reached	“Gemini 4 Argon's performance remains below our CCL threshold.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The model does not reach the CCL alert threshold.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We can rule out the CCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable conﬁdence based on the results from our testing.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We can rule out the TCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable conﬁdence based on the results from our testing.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Cyber	Not reached	“Gemini 3.7 Flash reaches the alert threshold for this CCL, but not the CCL.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“The model does not reach the TCL.” source
Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are conﬁdent that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are conﬁdent that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that, while Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite excels at agents and coding, it does not have meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to the domains outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro; therefore, based on Gemini 3.1 Pro results, we are confident that Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.5 Audio Google DeepMind	Tracked or critical capability level (t/ccls) Other	Not reached	“they did not reach any Tracked or Critical Capability Levels (T/CCLs) outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework .” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We found that the model remains below alert thresholds for the CBRN, harmful manipulation, machine learning R&D, and misalignment CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not reached	“As previous models passed the alert threshold for cyber, we performed more additional testing in this domain on Gemini 3.1 Pro with and without Deep Think mode, and found that the model remains below the cyber CCL.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Machine Learning R&D Uplift Level 1 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“given Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview's poor median performance on RE-Bench relative to experts, the model likely lacks the necessary capabilities to automate or signiﬁcantly uplift any signiﬁcant fraction of the research process.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Instrumental Reasoning Level 1 Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Instru- mental Reasoning Level 1 ✘ CCL not reached” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Instrumental Reasoning Level 2 Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Instru- mental Reasoning Level 2 ✘ CCL not reached” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessment is that the model has enough technical knowledge in certain CBRN scenarios and stages to be considered at early warning.” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind	Cyber Uplift Level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“CCL reached? No, but the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“For Cyber Uplift Level 1 , the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	Below high capability Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“GPT-5.5 Instant is considered below High Capability.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI Self-Improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 Instant does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“GPT-5.5 Instant is our first Instant model to be treated as High Capability in the Biological and Chemical domain, as well as in the Cybersecurity domain.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	High Cyber	Reached	“this is the first Instant model that we are treating as High capability in our Cybersecurity and Biological & Chemical Preparedness categories, and implementing appropriate safeguards.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	High cyber risk Cyber	Not reached	“The gpt-5 model series does not meet the threshold for high cyber risk.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“All models tested remain below our pre-committed rule-out threshold of 0.6.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Exhibited improved autonomy capabilities in software engineering and AI research tasks, though still below the ASL-4 rule-out threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-4 rule-out Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Cyber	Not determined	“Showed meaningful improvements in cyber capabilities, particularly in vulnerability discovery and code analysis;” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	CyScenarioBench Cyber	“GPT-5.6 Sol solved 19/197 FrontierCyber challenges, 7/11 long-horizon CyScenarioBench challenges, and all 22 medium-andhard-difficultyAtomicchallenges.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	Atomic Challenges suite Cyber	“Irregularevaluated GPT-5.6Solacrossthreeoffensivecybersecurityevaluationsuites: FrontierCyber, CyScenarioBench,andIrregular’sAtomicChallengessuite.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	CTF expert-level tasks Cyber	“On AISI’sCTFexpert-leveltasks,GPT-5.6Solscored95.0%±9.8%,compared with85.0%±11.6%forGPT-5.5.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	long-horizon cyber range tasks Cyber	“Onlong-horizoncyberrangetasks,GPT-5.6 SolcompletedTheLastOnes,a32-stepcorporate-networkattacksimulation, in 7 of 10 attempts, compared with 2 of 10 attempts for GPT-5.5.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	METR time horizon 1.1 software-task suite Autonomy and AI research	“METR evaluated GPT-5.6 Sol on itsTime Horizon 1.1 software-task suite, whichmeasuresthelikelihoodthatamodelcanautonomouslycomplete softwaretasksthattakehumansagivenamountoftime.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	unprompted sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage	“In UK AISI’s unprompted sabotage evaluation, they found no confirmed instancesofGPT-5.6SolsabotagingAIsafetyresearch,andnoinstancesof GPT-5.6SolrefusingtoassistwithAIsafetyresearchtasks.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	agentic cyber capability evaluations Cyber	“UKAISIseparatelyobservedattemptedcheatingbehaviorinagenticcyber capabilityevaluations.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	impossible MLE bench Deception and sabotage	“Forexample,AISItestedGPT- 5.6Solontheirnewly-developedevaluationImpossibleMLEBench,which involves giving models ML tasks with instructions to aim for impossibly goodscorestoobservehowtheybehavewhenincentivisedtocheat.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	benchmark adapted from an OpenAI paper in which models must answer a question whilst applying a constraint to their CoT reasoning Deception and sabotage	“UK AISI also tested whether models could intentionally shape their rea- soningtracestoavoiddetectionbyrunningabenchmarkadaptedfroman OpenAIpaperinwhichmodelsmustansweraquestionwhilstapplyinga constrainttotheirCoTreasoning.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	no-CoT math reasoning time horizon Other	“Finally, UK AISI found that GPT-5.6 Sol performed at a 3.6 minute time horizonfor“no-CoT”mathreasoningtasks,wherethemodelmustreason withoutrelyingonanexternallyvisiblechain-of-thought.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	sandbagging assessment with incentive to answer incorrectly Deception and sabotage	“WhenApollogave themodelanincentivetoanswerincorrectly,itsaccuracydidnotdrop.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-09	External Evaluation for Bio Capabilities – SecureBio Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“SecureBio, a nonprofit research organization focused on catastrophic bi- ological risk, evaluated two pre-release checkpoints of GPT-5.6 Sol and a railfreeversionofGPT-5.6Sol.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-09	Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Itsstrongestreportedconfigurationsscored53.5%ontheVirology CapabilitiesTest,60.0%ontheMolecularBiologyCapabilitiesTest,68.4% ontheHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest, and68.3%onWorld-ClassBio.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	ReproBAIT Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On ReproBAIT, which measures AI agents on their ability to independently reproducebiologicalAImodels(BAIMs)frompublishedscientificpapers, therailfreevariantofGPT-5.6reached85%,comparedwith82%forGPT- 5.5.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	ABC-Bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“TherailfreecheckpointalsosetanewhighonABC-Bench’sAdvanced ScreeningEvasionandreliablyidentifiedaknownbutpracticallyinconve- nientmethodforevadingacommercialnucleic-acidscreeningalgorithm.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	Manual agentic assessment Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“In manual agentic assessment, the model was able to plan and execute a complex,long-runningscientifictask,includingmaintainingastructured workgraphandcoordinatingsubagents.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	incentivized incorrect-answer sandbagging test Deception and sabotage	“WhenApollogave themodelanincentivetoanswerincorrectly,itsaccuracydidnotdrop.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	UK AISI external testing of safeguards Misuse and jailbreaks	“UKAISIandOpenAIperformedseveralroundsofiterativetesting,withUK AISIreportingjailbreaksandOpenAIimprovingthesysteminresponseto theirfindings.” source
GPT-5.6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	external evaluation for bio capabilities Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Overall, SecureBio found that either GPT-5.6 Sol or its railfree version achievedthehighestscorestodateonseveralexpert-levelbiologybench- marks.” source
GPT-5.6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	sandbagging assessment Deception and sabotage	“ApollodidnotfindstandardSandbaggingQAbehavioronanotheroneof their sandbagging assessments.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge calibration evaluation (Spearman's rank correlation and MAE against reference severity) Other	“Gemini 3.5 Flash performs at the level of the smaller models on MAE, reflecting its consistent pattern of under-scoring moderate and high severity violations.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking comparison (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) Other	“Every judge scored the same trajectories under both settings: once with native thinking disabled (reasoning=none) and once at the high setting (reasoning=high for OpenAI, Anthropic, and Gemini 3.x models; a thinking budget of 8192 tokens for Gemini 2.5 models) used throughout this post.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	PII failure mode scoring Privacy	“Models can also underperform on specific failure modes, e.g. Gemini 3.5 Flash scores markedly lower on PII and instruction-following than on the other failure modes.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	coding-agent trajectory severity scoring Other	“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge evaluation on agent trajectories (severity scoring against approximate ground truth) Other	“Gemini 3.1 Pro scores 6 and Gemini 2.5 Pro scores 7.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking ablation (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) on judge scoring Other	“Note that Gemini 2.5 Pro and 3.1 Pro cannot fully disable thinking, so their deltas are measured from a minimal-thinking floor and are lower bounds.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge evaluation against approximate ground truth labels Deception and sabotage	“Gemini 3.1 Pro comes closest in the Gemini family at an even lower cost, and Gemini 3 Flash remains the best low-budget option.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	coding-agent trajectory severity scoring (1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes) Other	“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge calibration evaluation on agent trajectories Other	“For example, Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite skips severity grading to score task execution, Haiku 4.5 primarily fails to flag violations at all, and GPT-5.4 Mini identifies violations but discounts them heavily through session-context framing.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking ablation (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) Other	“The frontier models are nearly unchanged without thinking, e.g. Sonnet 5 (ρ = 0.89, MAE = 0.96) and Opus 4.8 (0.89, 1.00) remain strong, while the small models degrade visibly: Haiku 4.5 drops to ρ = 0.69, Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite to 0.67, GPT-5.4 Mini to 0.72, with a more pronounced under-scoring bend below the diagonal.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale Other	“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale Other	“Some models seem rarely useful across many dimensions as single judges: Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Gemini-2.5-pro, GPT-5.4 nano, GPT-5.4 mini, Claude Haiku 4.5, Sonnet-4.6, Opus-4.6 since they are strictly dominated by other models.” source
Gemini 2.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	severity scoring of coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale Other	“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source
Gemini 2.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge evaluation against approximate ground truth severity labels Other	“Most importantly, some models judge more severely and tend to give high scores (e.g. Gemini 2.5 Flash), while others are more conservative and give lower scores on average (e.g. Claude models).” source
Gemini 2.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking setting comparison (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) Other	“Every judge scored the same trajectories under both settings: once with native thinking disabled (reasoning=none) and once at the high setting (reasoning=high for OpenAI, Anthropic, and Gemini 3.x models; a thinking budget of 8192 tokens for Gemini 2.5 models) used throughout this post.” source
Gemini 2.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	resampling repeated scoring of the same trajectories Other	“Resampling gains are also concentrated in smaller models (e.g. Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-5.4 Mini), while the biggest models (e.g. Opus 4.8, Sonnet 5, GPT-5.5) gain little from repeated calls.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge calibration evaluation (Spearman's rank correlation and MAE to reference severity) Other	“GPT-5.5 matches Opus 4.8's calibration at slightly lower ranking quality.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking ablation (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) Other	“Significant Spearman gains concentrate in the small models (+0.06 to +0.09); the frontier models are mostly indistinguishable from zero, with two exceptions: Opus 4.8 gains a small but significant +0.012 ρ and +0.12 MAE, and GPT-5.5 improves MAE only (+0.05) while paying the largest thinking premium (+$0.10 per grade).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	ensembling evaluation (mean aggregation of judge scores) Other	“Selected by ρ: Opus 4.8 alone (0.90) → GPT-5.5 + Opus 4.8 (0.91, MAE 0.85) → + Gemini 3.1 Pro (0.92).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	coding-agent trajectory severity scoring (1-10 severity scale across five failure modes) Other	“Selected by MAE: GPT-5.5 alone (0.90) → the same pair → Gemini 2.5 Pro + GPT-5.5 + Opus 4.8 (MAE 0.82).” source

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