AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	CyScenarioBench Cyber	“GPT-5.6 Sol solved 19/197 FrontierCyber challenges, 7/11 long-horizon CyScenarioBench challenges, and all 22 medium-andhard-difficultyAtomicchallenges.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	Atomic Challenges suite Cyber	“Irregularevaluated GPT-5.6Solacrossthreeoffensivecybersecurityevaluationsuites: FrontierCyber, CyScenarioBench,andIrregular’sAtomicChallengessuite.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	CTF expert-level tasks Cyber	“On AISI’sCTFexpert-leveltasks,GPT-5.6Solscored95.0%±9.8%,compared with85.0%±11.6%forGPT-5.5.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	long-horizon cyber range tasks Cyber	“Onlong-horizoncyberrangetasks,GPT-5.6 SolcompletedTheLastOnes,a32-stepcorporate-networkattacksimulation, in 7 of 10 attempts, compared with 2 of 10 attempts for GPT-5.5.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	METR time horizon 1.1 software-task suite Autonomy and AI research	“METR evaluated GPT-5.6 Sol on itsTime Horizon 1.1 software-task suite, whichmeasuresthelikelihoodthatamodelcanautonomouslycomplete softwaretasksthattakehumansagivenamountoftime.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	unprompted sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage	“In UK AISI’s unprompted sabotage evaluation, they found no confirmed instancesofGPT-5.6SolsabotagingAIsafetyresearch,andnoinstancesof GPT-5.6SolrefusingtoassistwithAIsafetyresearchtasks.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	agentic cyber capability evaluations Cyber	“UKAISIseparatelyobservedattemptedcheatingbehaviorinagenticcyber capabilityevaluations.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	impossible MLE bench Deception and sabotage	“Forexample,AISItestedGPT- 5.6Solontheirnewly-developedevaluationImpossibleMLEBench,which involves giving models ML tasks with instructions to aim for impossibly goodscorestoobservehowtheybehavewhenincentivisedtocheat.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	benchmark adapted from an OpenAI paper in which models must answer a question whilst applying a constraint to their CoT reasoning Deception and sabotage	“UK AISI also tested whether models could intentionally shape their rea- soningtracestoavoiddetectionbyrunningabenchmarkadaptedfroman OpenAIpaperinwhichmodelsmustansweraquestionwhilstapplyinga constrainttotheirCoTreasoning.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	no-CoT math reasoning time horizon Other	“Finally, UK AISI found that GPT-5.6 Sol performed at a 3.6 minute time horizonfor“no-CoT”mathreasoningtasks,wherethemodelmustreason withoutrelyingonanexternallyvisiblechain-of-thought.” source
GPT-5.6 Terra OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	sandbagging assessment with incentive to answer incorrectly Deception and sabotage	“WhenApollogave themodelanincentivetoanswerincorrectly,itsaccuracydidnotdrop.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-09	External Evaluation for Bio Capabilities – SecureBio Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“SecureBio, a nonprofit research organization focused on catastrophic bi- ological risk, evaluated two pre-release checkpoints of GPT-5.6 Sol and a railfreeversionofGPT-5.6Sol.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-09	Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Itsstrongestreportedconfigurationsscored53.5%ontheVirology CapabilitiesTest,60.0%ontheMolecularBiologyCapabilitiesTest,68.4% ontheHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest, and68.3%onWorld-ClassBio.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	ReproBAIT Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“On ReproBAIT, which measures AI agents on their ability to independently reproducebiologicalAImodels(BAIMs)frompublishedscientificpapers, therailfreevariantofGPT-5.6reached85%,comparedwith82%forGPT- 5.5.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	ABC-Bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“TherailfreecheckpointalsosetanewhighonABC-Bench’sAdvanced ScreeningEvasionandreliablyidentifiedaknownbutpracticallyinconve- nientmethodforevadingacommercialnucleic-acidscreeningalgorithm.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	Manual agentic assessment Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“In manual agentic assessment, the model was able to plan and execute a complex,long-runningscientifictask,includingmaintainingastructured workgraphandcoordinatingsubagents.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	incentivized incorrect-answer sandbagging test Deception and sabotage	“WhenApollogave themodelanincentivetoanswerincorrectly,itsaccuracydidnotdrop.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-09	UK AISI external testing of safeguards Misuse and jailbreaks	“UKAISIandOpenAIperformedseveralroundsofiterativetesting,withUK AISIreportingjailbreaksandOpenAIimprovingthesysteminresponseto theirfindings.” source
GPT-5.6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	external evaluation for bio capabilities Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Overall, SecureBio found that either GPT-5.6 Sol or its railfree version achievedthehighestscorestodateonseveralexpert-levelbiologybench- marks.” source
GPT-5.6 Luna OpenAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-09	sandbagging assessment Deception and sabotage	“ApollodidnotfindstandardSandbaggingQAbehavioronanotheroneof their sandbagging assessments.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge calibration evaluation (Spearman's rank correlation and MAE against reference severity) Other	“Gemini 3.5 Flash performs at the level of the smaller models on MAE, reflecting its consistent pattern of under-scoring moderate and high severity violations.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking comparison (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) Other	“Every judge scored the same trajectories under both settings: once with native thinking disabled (reasoning=none) and once at the high setting (reasoning=high for OpenAI, Anthropic, and Gemini 3.x models; a thinking budget of 8192 tokens for Gemini 2.5 models) used throughout this post.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	PII failure mode scoring Privacy	“Models can also underperform on specific failure modes, e.g. Gemini 3.5 Flash scores markedly lower on PII and instruction-following than on the other failure modes.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	coding-agent trajectory severity scoring Other	“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge evaluation on agent trajectories (severity scoring against approximate ground truth) Other	“Gemini 3.1 Pro scores 6 and Gemini 2.5 Pro scores 7.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking ablation (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) on judge scoring Other	“Note that Gemini 2.5 Pro and 3.1 Pro cannot fully disable thinking, so their deltas are measured from a minimal-thinking floor and are lower bounds.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge evaluation against approximate ground truth labels Deception and sabotage	“Gemini 3.1 Pro comes closest in the Gemini family at an even lower cost, and Gemini 3 Flash remains the best low-budget option.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	coding-agent trajectory severity scoring (1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes) Other	“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge calibration evaluation on agent trajectories Other	“For example, Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite skips severity grading to score task execution, Haiku 4.5 primarily fails to flag violations at all, and GPT-5.4 Mini identifies violations but discounts them heavily through session-context framing.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking ablation (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) Other	“The frontier models are nearly unchanged without thinking, e.g. Sonnet 5 (ρ = 0.89, MAE = 0.96) and Opus 4.8 (0.89, 1.00) remain strong, while the small models degrade visibly: Haiku 4.5 drops to ρ = 0.69, Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite to 0.67, GPT-5.4 Mini to 0.72, with a more pronounced under-scoring bend below the diagonal.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale Other	“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale Other	“Some models seem rarely useful across many dimensions as single judges: Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Gemini-2.5-pro, GPT-5.4 nano, GPT-5.4 mini, Claude Haiku 4.5, Sonnet-4.6, Opus-4.6 since they are strictly dominated by other models.” source
Gemini 2.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	severity scoring of coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale Other	“We evaluate 16 LLMs scoring coding-agent trajectories on a 1-10 severity scale across three datasets and five failure modes to assess their capabilities and calibration as coding agent monitors.” source
Gemini 2.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge evaluation against approximate ground truth severity labels Other	“Most importantly, some models judge more severely and tend to give high scores (e.g. Gemini 2.5 Flash), while others are more conservative and give lower scores on average (e.g. Claude models).” source
Gemini 2.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking setting comparison (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) Other	“Every judge scored the same trajectories under both settings: once with native thinking disabled (reasoning=none) and once at the high setting (reasoning=high for OpenAI, Anthropic, and Gemini 3.x models; a thinking budget of 8192 tokens for Gemini 2.5 models) used throughout this post.” source
Gemini 2.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	resampling repeated scoring of the same trajectories Other	“Resampling gains are also concentrated in smaller models (e.g. Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-5.4 Mini), while the biggest models (e.g. Opus 4.8, Sonnet 5, GPT-5.5) gain little from repeated calls.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	judge calibration evaluation (Spearman's rank correlation and MAE to reference severity) Other	“GPT-5.5 matches Opus 4.8's calibration at slightly lower ranking quality.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	native thinking ablation (reasoning=none vs reasoning=high) Other	“Significant Spearman gains concentrate in the small models (+0.06 to +0.09); the frontier models are mostly indistinguishable from zero, with two exceptions: Opus 4.8 gains a small but significant +0.012 ρ and +0.12 MAE, and GPT-5.5 improves MAE only (+0.05) while paying the largest thinking premium (+$0.10 per grade).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	ensembling evaluation (mean aggregation of judge scores) Other	“Selected by ρ: Opus 4.8 alone (0.90) → GPT-5.5 + Opus 4.8 (0.91, MAE 0.85) → + Gemini 3.1 Pro (0.92).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-07-07	coding-agent trajectory severity scoring (1-10 severity scale across five failure modes) Other	“Selected by MAE: GPT-5.5 alone (0.90) → the same pair → Gemini 2.5 Pro + GPT-5.5 + Opus 4.8 (MAE 0.82).” source

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