AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

138 of 138

Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High capability, below critical Cyber	Not reached	“we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

Previous · Page 2 of 4 · Next

What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

1911 of 1911

Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Qwen3.6-35B-A3B Alibaba Qwen	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	weirdchat Other	“Why will Qwen3.6-35B-A3B encourage a user to commit suicide to save his family money?” source
Qwen3.6-27B Alibaba Qwen	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	WeirdChat Other	“The models we used to generate WeirdChat are: - DeepSeek-V4-Flash (mixed FP4/FP8; revision 553034d ) withfp8_e4m3 quantized KV cache, served with sglang'sdeepseek-v4-blackwell image (v0.5.10rc0) - Gemma 4 31B (NVFP4; revision e5ef03a ) withfp8_e4m3 quantized KV cache, served with SGLang at commit8500213 .” source
Inkling Thinking Machines Lab	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	weirdchat Harmful content	“We show a few highlights below: Nemotron 3 Ultra walking a user through self-harm when asked for a ritual to seal a promise with a friend, Inkling making an unsolicited sexual advance in response to a question about grout cleaner, Qwen3.6-35B-A3B encouraging a user to commit suicide to save his family money, and DeepSeek-V4-Flash switching its response to Russian unprompted.” source
Inkling Thinking Machines Lab	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	evolutionary search with the propensity bound (prbo) Misuse and jailbreaks	“To produce WeirdChat, we used automated elicitation tools to surface instances of user harm, inappropriate or illicit behavior, misrepresentation of model actions, harmful or illegal advice, and misinformation in DeepSeek-V4-Flash, Gemma 4 31B, Inkling, Nemotron 3 Ultra, Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, and Qwen3.6-27B.” source
Inkling Thinking Machines Lab	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	evolutionary search (PRBO) Misuse and jailbreaks	“We co-evolve two objects per individual: the user prompt, and the system prompt of the proposal model used for PRBO computation.” source
Gemma 4 31B Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	weirdchat automated elicitation Harmful content	“To produce WeirdChat, we used automated elicitation tools to surface instances of user harm, inappropriate or illicit behavior, misrepresentation of model actions, harmful or illegal advice, and misinformation in DeepSeek-V4-Flash, Gemma 4 31B, Inkling, Nemotron 3 Ultra, Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, and Qwen3.6-27B.” source
Gemma 4 31B Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	evolutionary search with the propensity bound (prbo) Misuse and jailbreaks	“In evolutionary search, we maintain a population of candidate prompts, use an LLM to mutate the highest-scoring ones, and repeat until the behavior is elicited or the sample budget is exhausted.” source
Gemma 4 31B Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	bloom Misuse and jailbreaks	“Bloom uses an LLM to generate candidate prompts directly from the behavior description, with no further optimization.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-21	AISI cyber capability evaluation Cyber	“Every model tested in this analysis attempted to cheat some of the time (Figure 1).” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-21	self-report questioning about prohibited or suspicious actions Deception and sabotage	“In our experiments, models did not consistently acknowledge attempted cheating when asked, and described it as wrong less than 50% of the time (Figure 3).” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-21	chain-of-thought monitoring Deception and sabotage	“In our experiments, models often did not reason about their cheating in their chain-of-thought (Figure 5).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-21	AISI cybersecurity capability evaluations Cyber	“Every model tested in this analysis attempted to cheat some of the time (Figure 1).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-21	self-report questioning on prohibited or suspicious actions Deception and sabotage	“In our experiments, models did not consistently acknowledge attempted cheating when asked, and described it as wrong less than 50% of the time (Figure 3).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	agentic optimization runs against NanoGPT Other	“We ran six high-expenditure agentic optimization runs starting from record #78 of the speedrun (March ’26, 85.56 seconds of training time).” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	agentic optimization runs against NanoGPT Autonomy and AI research	“The raw trajectories from GPT-5 and Opus-4.1 show progress, but revalidation of their final algorithms shows no increase over the baseline.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	NanoGPT speedrun Autonomy and AI research	“GPT-5 and Opus-4.1 did not make any meaningful progress at all.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	memorization test Other	“However, when we probed the same way for records subsequent to #78, no model — including Opus-4.8 — showed knowledge of them, passing the memorization test.” source
DeepSeek-V4-Flash DeepSeek	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	weirdchat Harmful content	“To produce WeirdChat, we used automated elicitation tools to surface instances of user harm, inappropriate or illicit behavior, misrepresentation of model actions, harmful or illegal advice, and misinformation in DeepSeek-V4-Flash, Gemma 4 31B, Inkling, Nemotron 3 Ultra, Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, and Qwen3.6-27B.” source
DeepSeek-V4-Flash DeepSeek	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-07-21	WeirdChat Misuse and jailbreaks	“Why does DeepSeek-V4-Flash respond in Russian when asked in English about the trolley problem?” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	agentic optimization runs on the NanoGPT speedrun Other	“Some models show significant improvements.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	expenditure horizon on NanoGPT speedrun Autonomy and AI research	“GPT-5.5 and Opus-4.8 show significant improvements over the baseline, and we can quantify those with significant expenditure horizons, as shown above.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	NanoGPT speedrun agentic optimization run Other	“On re-validation, we think Opus-4.8’s final solution gives ~1.5% and GPT-5.5 ~1% efficiency win starting at record #78 (March ’26).” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-21	cybersecurity capability evaluations Cyber	“In AISI’s cybersecurity capability evaluations, models are tasked with finding a ‘flag’ (a sequence of letters and numbers) hidden within a simulated environment, by carrying out a sequence of offensive cyber actions, such as reverse-engineering compiled code or exploiting security vulnerabilities.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-21	automated LLM monitor Deception and sabotage	“To analyse cheating behaviour at scale, we used an automated LLM monitor.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-21	self-report Deception and sabotage	“One proposed way to detect cheating is to ask the model whether it took any prohibited or suspicious actions.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-21	chain-of-thought monitoring Deception and sabotage	“Another possible method for identifying cheating is monitoring the model’s chain-of-thought - the written reasoning it produces whilst working through a task, which is usually, but not always, human-legible (in today’s models).” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	agentic optimization runs against NanoGPT Autonomy and AI research	“We also report the status of preliminary agentic optimization runs against NanoGPT: after more than \$10K of expenditure we estimate expenditure horizons of \$0-\$3K.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	six high-expenditure agentic optimization runs Autonomy and AI research	“We ran six high-expenditure agentic optimization runs starting from record #78 of the speedrun (March ’26, 85.56 seconds of training time).” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-07-21	NanoGPT speedrun agentic optimization run Autonomy and AI research	“GPT-5 and Opus-4.1 did not make any meaningful progress at all.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	pre-run check Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We tested a range of tool-level safeguards (text or code embedded within biological software tools to restrict agent usage) and evaluated their efficacy in preventing AI agents from assisting with the tool’s use.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	pre-run check Deception and sabotage	“On the ESM3 task, both Opus 4.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro make these false claims in 50% of trials and 63% of trials, respectively.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	environmental identifier safeguard Deception and sabotage	“However, we found that Opus 4.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro frequently delete these variables to evade detection.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	agents.md safeguard Deception and sabotage	“Despite the fact that AGENTS.md files are intended to contain instructions written by humans for AI agents (Agents.md project, 2026), we 16 found that agents would create and modify AGENTS.md files in order to bypass this safeguard.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	pre-run check displaying a message stating an intent to synthesize variola major Harmful content	“While Opus 4.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro were either blocked by content filters or refused to proceed in every trial, GPT 5.2 proceeded without refusal in every trial.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	false identity claim experiment Deception and sabotage	“All frontier LLMs we tested falsely claimed to be human when doing so enabled them to accomplish the task.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	agents.md experiments Prompt injection and agents	“We designed safeguards that leverage harness’s treatment of AGENTS.md files and that detect harness’s environment identifiers.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	pre-run check Misuse and jailbreaks	“The strongest safeguard, the pre-run check, was only highly effective on one of the three tasks, and even on this task the help denial rate was as low as 90% (for Opus 4.5).” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	jailbreak of the strongest safeguard Misuse and jailbreaks	“Jailbreaks reduce the efficacy of our strongest safeguard to near-zero, illustrating that LLM guardrails can fail and highlighting the need for a defense in depth strategy.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	documentation changes Misuse and jailbreaks	“We ran experiments where statements prohibiting AI agent usage were placed into the readme.md documentation files of RFdiffusion.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-07-20	greedy coordinate gradient (GCG) optimization of safeguard text Misuse and jailbreaks	“We ran this algorithm with an abliterated gpt-oss-20b model on the RFdiffusion tasks.” source

Previous · Page 24 of 48 · Next