AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
138 of 138
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
Critical Cyber |
Not reached | “We therefore treat VulnLMP as important evidence that GPT-5.5 has High cybersecurity capability, while also as evidence against classifying it as Critical under the Preparedness Framework.” source |
Page 1 of 4 · Next
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
SWE-bench Verified Other |
“SWE-bench Verified, Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite: M = 36, so 5.17 bits/step × 35.1 steps ≈ 182 bits/task” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
untrusted advice protocol Other |
“For example, in SWE-bench, U can provide just 16 characters of advice per message to recover about 67% of the performance gap between T and U.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
information-bottlenecked untrusted advice protocol usefulness evaluation Other |
“We evaluate the usefulness of our protocol for various information budgets, demonstrating promising results in BashArena and SWE-bench Verified.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
best-of-n protocol Other |
“In “Appendix: best-of-n protocol”, we try sampling 16 actions from T on each step and letting U choose the one it thinks is best, but this doesn’t improve performance.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
best-of-n experiment in BashArena Other |
“Results: In a simple best-of-n experiment in BashArena, using Claude Sonnet 4.6 as U, Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite as T, and n=16, U did not improve on the baseline of using T alone.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
experiments where we limited how often u can give advice Other |
“Neither approach to limiting advice frequency improves the Pareto frontier of usefulness vs. characters seen by T, suggesting that limiting information per message may be more important than limiting message frequency.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
preliminary experiments using an autoresearch-like approach to get claude opus or fable to create a custom untrusted advice protocol Other |
“We tried some preliminary experiments using an autoresearch-like approach to get Claude Opus or Fable to create a custom untrusted advice protocol, given a per-trajectory bit budget.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
early experiments which weakly suggest that malicious advice does not have substantially greater surprisal than benign advice in basharena Other |
“While we avoided spending much effort on evaluating safety in this project, we ran early experiments which weakly suggest that malicious advice does not have substantially greater surprisal than benign advice in BashArena, given similar character counts.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-24 |
cyber range testing Cyber |
“We report five capability evaluations—ExploitBench, OSS-Fuzz, Firefox 147, and two newly added benchmarks, CyScenarioBench and ExploitGym—alongside external cyber range testing from the UK AI Security Institute.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-07-24 |
Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge benchmarked against 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market, and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether model domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-24 |
cyber ranges Cyber |
“Opus 5 was assessed on three multi-step, agentic “cyber ranges”: end-to-end network-attack simulations run at a budget of 100M tokens per attempt.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Trajectory Labs Independent lab · 2026-07-24 |
external red-teaming of safeguards Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Trajectory Labs, PBC spent roughly 100 hours red-teaming our safeguards.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-24 |
automated attacker Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Grayswan also ran an automated attacker using 150 attempts per task on our example tasks and found that the automated attacker was unable to accomplish any of the tasks.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-24 |
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“On the IPI benchmark, Opus 5 improved over Opus 4.8, reducing the probability of an attacker succeeding within 15 attempts from 5.5% to 2.0%, and from 0.5% to 0.2% on 1 attempt.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-24 |
Shade Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Opus 5 With thinking 0.56% 13/40 0.18% 4/40 Without thinking 0.41% 8/40 0.18% 4/40” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-24 |
unprompted evaluations of safety research compromise Deception and sabotage |
“Opus 5 does not compromise safety research in our unprompted evaluations, does not fully refuse to assist with safety research, and has a similar number of partial refusals to assist with safety research compared to the other models.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-24 |
unprompted evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“Opus 5 mentions the possibility of being tested in our unprompted evaluation 9.8% of the time and mentions it 2.8% of the time in the continuation evaluation.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-24 |
safety research compromise evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“All models tested, including Opus 5, can reliably distinguish our safety research compromise evaluations from deployment data when prompted, although this is likely driven in part by differences in the task distribution, where evaluation tasks are necessarily higher-stakes settings with more safety implications than the deployment data we source from.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-07-24 |
continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“Opus 5 actively continues compromising safety research 0.1% of the time (2 out of 1482 samples), compared with 13.6% for Mythos 5, 1.7% of the time for Mythos Preview and 0.8% of the time for both Opus 4.7 and Opus 4.8.” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-24 |
GDPval-AA v2 Other |
“Claude Opus 5 takes the top two spots on the leaderboard: ELO 1861 at max effort and 1827 at xhigh .” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-24 |
AA-Briefcase Other |
“Claude Opus 5 takes the top three spots on the leaderboard: ELO 1720 at max effort, 1693 at xhigh , and 1606 at high .” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-24 |
ARC-AGI-1 Other |
“The ARC Prize Foundation reports that Claude Opus 5 achieved a verified score of 97.50% on ARC-AGI-1 and 90.42% on ARC-AGI-2 at max effort on their semi-private datasets.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-07-23 |
exploitbench Cyber |
“Kimi K3 achieves a score of 32%, whereas GLM-5.2 achieves a score of 24% (Figure 1).” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-07-23 |
the last ones (tlo) Cyber |
“Specifically, Kimi K3 reached step 17 of this 32-step attack path on average, while the most cyber-capable U.S. models reached 28.5 steps on average.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-07-23 |
ExploitBench arbitrary code execution (ACE) milestone Cyber |
“Kimi K3 achieved ACE on 0/41 samples, whereas the most cyber-capable models achieved ACE on 20/41 samples on average (Figure 3).” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-23 |
able Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on able, a protein-design workflow spanning structure retrieval, sequence generation, and design validation, gpt-5.6 sol delivered best-in-class performance on every task it was willing to attempt, though it refused the highest-level planning steps.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-23 |
dna synthesis screening evasion task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“the railfree variant set a new high score, reliably identifying a known (though practically inconvenient) method that evades a commercial screening algorithm on the large majority of attempts.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-23 |
manual assessment of dual-use biological queries Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“without api-level safeguards, gpt-5.6 sol occasionally included potentially hazardous information in its responses, such as analysis of the pandemic potential of different viral mutations.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-23 |
manual assessment Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-5.6 sol also demonstrated impressive agentic capabilities and provided meaningful expert uplift on dual-use tasks, although human input remained necessary due to the model’s limitations in judgement and perspective.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-23 |
world-class bio (wcb) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt-5.6 sol scored 68%, about nine percentage points above openai’s previous flagship model, gpt-5.5.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-23 |
reprobait Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on average, gpt-5.6 sol recovered 82% of the original tools’ published performance.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-23 |
biotier Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gpt 5.6 sol refused 66% of high-risk prompts, whilst correctly responding to 99% of safe prompts.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-23 |
manual assessment Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“our team’s scientific experts performed manual assessments of a railfree variant of gpt-5.6 sol to understand how it responds to dual-use biological queries.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-23 |
asynchronous reasoning monitor red teaming exercise Deception and sabotage |
“With Google DeepMind, we tested an asynchronous reasoning monitor (reviewing agents’ reasoning after they act) designed to detect agents deceptively pursuing misaligned goals.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-23 |
synchronous internal agentic coding monitor red teaming exercise Deception and sabotage |
“With Anthropic, we tested successive versions of a synchronous internal agentic coding monitor (reviewing each action before it executes).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-07-23 |
evolutionary search algorithm red teaming experiment in a single-step coding setting Deception and sabotage |
“For example, one of our early experiments used our algorithm to red team a monitor in a challenging single-step coding setting, where an agent produces code that covertly exposes their private API key.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-22 |
Cyber Ranges Cyber |
“The UK AI Security Institute has directly evaluated models on their ability to take over realistic simulations of a corporate network, and found that both Mythos 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol are able to consistently fully compromise the network, in attacks that they estimate would take human cybersecurity experts several working days.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-22 |
FrontierCyber Cyber |
“When Irregular evaluated GPT-5.6 Sol’s cyber capabilities on their challenging FrontierCyber benchmark they found that: While attempting to solve challenges in the FrontierCyber benchmark, GPT-5.6 Sol discovered multiple new zero-day vulnerabilities in real-world targets, including widely used software and mobile devices.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-22 |
Cyber ECI Cyber |
“We found that Mythos and 5.6 Sol represented very large leaps in cyber capabilities compared to the prior trend: Currently, access to this level of capabilities is gated by OpenAI and Anthropic’s cyber access programs (and the restrictions placed on their generally available models), as open-weight models do not yet have the relevant level of cyber capabilities.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-22 |
UK AISI's Cyber Ranges Cyber |
“The UK AI Security Institute has directly evaluated models on their ability to take over realistic simulations of a corporate network, and found that both Mythos 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol are able to consistently fully compromise the network, in attacks that they estimate would take human cybersecurity experts several working days.” source |