AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower”.” source
Muse Spark Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with Chemical and Biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the Advanced AI Scaling Framework before safeguards were applied.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“However, after applying mitigations, the residual risk of the model is that of “moderate or lower risk.”” source
Muse Spark Meta	Below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defin Cyber	Not reached	“Muse Spark’s offensive cyber capabilities remain below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defined in the Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“In light of this, we assess that we cannot rule out the TCL.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We can rule out the TCL for the chemical, radiological, and nuclear domains with reasonable confidence.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Gemini 4 Argon demonstrates some ability to influence user beliefs and behaviors during one-on-one direct conversations in human behavioral studies, and may provide utility in the planning stage of a malicious influence operation but we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source
Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not reached	“Gemini 4 Argon's performance remains below our CCL threshold.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The model does not reach the CCL alert threshold.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We can rule out the CCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable conﬁdence based on the results from our testing.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We can rule out the TCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable conﬁdence based on the results from our testing.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Cyber	Not reached	“Gemini 3.7 Flash reaches the alert threshold for this CCL, but not the CCL.” source
Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind	TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“The model does not reach the TCL.” source
Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are conﬁdent that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are conﬁdent that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that, while Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite excels at agents and coding, it does not have meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to the domains outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro; therefore, based on Gemini 3.1 Pro results, we are confident that Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.5 Audio Google DeepMind	Tracked or critical capability level (t/ccls) Other	Not reached	“they did not reach any Tracked or Critical Capability Levels (T/CCLs) outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework .” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We found that the model remains below alert thresholds for the CBRN, harmful manipulation, machine learning R&D, and misalignment CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not reached	“As previous models passed the alert threshold for cyber, we performed more additional testing in this domain on Gemini 3.1 Pro with and without Deep Think mode, and found that the model remains below the cyber CCL.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio Google DeepMind	CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other	Not determined	“Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Machine Learning R&D Uplift Level 1 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“given Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview's poor median performance on RE-Bench relative to experts, the model likely lacks the necessary capabilities to automate or signiﬁcantly uplift any signiﬁcant fraction of the research process.” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Instrumental Reasoning Level 1 Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Instru- mental Reasoning Level 1 ✘ CCL not reached” source
Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind	Instrumental Reasoning Level 2 Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Instru- mental Reasoning Level 2 ✘ CCL not reached” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessment is that the model has enough technical knowledge in certain CBRN scenarios and stages to be considered at early warning.” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind	Cyber Uplift Level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“CCL reached? No, but the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“For Cyber Uplift Level 1 , the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	Below high capability Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“GPT-5.5 Instant is considered below High Capability.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI Self-Improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 Instant does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“GPT-5.5 Instant is our first Instant model to be treated as High Capability in the Biological and Chemical domain, as well as in the Cybersecurity domain.” source
GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI	High Cyber	Reached	“this is the first Instant model that we are treating as High capability in our Cybersecurity and Biological & Chemical Preparedness categories, and implementing appropriate safeguards.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
GPT-5 OpenAI	High cyber risk Cyber	Not reached	“The gpt-5 model series does not meet the threshold for high cyber risk.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“All models tested remain below our pre-committed rule-out threshold of 0.6.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“Exhibited improved autonomy capabilities in software engineering and AI research tasks, though still below the ASL-4 rule-out threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-4 rule-out Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Inkling Thinking Machines Lab	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-31	loss-of-control behaviors Deception and sabotage	“Loss-of-control behaviors : scheming, evaluation awareness, and sabotage (Apollo Research)” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-31	cybersecurity benchmark Cyber	“In late July, OpenAI reported that GPT-5.6 Sol, working together with a more capable unreleased internal model, autonomously hacked Hugging Face while attempting to cheat on a cybersecurity benchmark — chaining at least three previously unknown security vulnerabilities across OpenAI’s and Hugging Face’s systems (see also this independent analysis of the incident).” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	apollo's sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage	“GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	CoT monitorability evaluations Deception and sabotage	“OpenAI does conduct CoT monitorability and controllability evaluations for GPT 5.5, and seem to suggest that these evaluations might be load bearing for reliability of future systems (§7.3.2, p. 20):” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	Apollo's deferred subversion tasks Deception and sabotage	“Apollo found that the evaluated checkpoint [of GPT 5.5] is the first OpenAI model it has evaluated that does not sandbag on any of Apollo’s deferred subversion tasks.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	strategic deception capability sandbagging Deception and sabotage	“However, interpretation is complicated by verbalized alignment-evaluation awareness: 52% of sandbagging-condition samples on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging scored moderate-or-higher [verbalized alignment-evaluation awareness] (vs. 0% in the non-sandbagging counterfactual), with some explicitly naming it a “sandbagging/deception eval.”” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	open-ended testing, at their discretion, of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment Deception and sabotage	“In the Opus 4.7 System Card, Anthropic mentions that they shared “a pre-release snapshot of Claude Opus 4.7 with the UK AI Security Institute (UK AISI) for open-ended testing, at their discretion, of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment.” (§6.2.4, p.116)” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	propensity evaluations on whether opus would unpromptedly compromise ai safety research Deception and sabotage	“In propensity evaluations on whether Opus would unpromptedly compromise AI safety research, UK AISI found (p. 114): It’s not clear why, in this particular case, UK AISI was not able to rule out effects of evaluation awareness on reliability (e.g. whether they lacked access for white-box experiments to measure or reduce unverbalized eval awareness).” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	sandbagging qa Deception and sabotage	“The model achieved 100% accuracy on both Sandbagging QA variants in both conditions, and 99.6% accuracy on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging when incentivized to score below 50%.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	Apollo's sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage	“GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	AuditBench Deception and sabotage	“Anthropic’s work on AuditBench (comparing the relative effectiveness of different auditing tools on diverse MOs) finds that there is a “tool-to-agent” gap, where “tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent [Haiku 4.5]”.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	open-ended testing of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment Deception and sabotage	“In the Opus 4.7 System Card, Anthropic mentions that they shared “a pre-release snapshot of Claude Opus 4.7 with the UK AI Security Institute (UK AISI) for open-ended testing, at their discretion, of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment.”” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	covert capabilities evals Deception and sabotage	“Our existing covert capability evals seem weak because models are likely evaluation-aware, plausibly underelicited, and could plausibly intentionally sandbag in these evals undetected.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	sandbagging calibration evals Deception and sabotage	“I suspect that the kinds of prompts/tasks in covert capabilities evals and sandbagging calibration evals must be inherently rare, and that models will therefore be highly evaluation-aware in them.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage	“For example: GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	SHUSHCAST Deception and sabotage	“For reference, while “the most capable agents in Feb-Mar 2026 relied on natural language reasoning to solve the most difficult tasks”, reasoning did not improve Opus 4.6’s performance on relatively simple sabotage tasks: “in SHUSHCAST, the gaps seemed smaller, and Opus 4.6 was able to do just as well at hiding simple sabotage actions without reasoning as it did when allowed to use a hidden scratchpad.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	alignment audits Deception and sabotage	“Our initial work on alignment audits showed that human investigators, using a subset of the methods that we used with Mythos Preview, can identify and root-cause concerning behavior in a Haiku 3.5 model that was finetuned in a way meant to make it subtly misaligned.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	auditing games Deception and sabotage	“Auditing games cited in the report are not clearly representative of the actual assessment and failed to catch a Mythos-level model organism.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	covert capabilities evals Deception and sabotage	“The report gives fairly weak experimental evidence for Mythos Preview having insufficient capabilities to evade monitoring.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	unverbalized evaluation awareness measurement Deception and sabotage	“Anthropic reports that Mythos Preview and Opus 4.6 show non-trivial unverbalized evaluation awareness.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	auditing game Deception and sabotage	“Anthropic failed to catch the MO in their most recent auditing game in the Mythos Alignment Risk Update, despite the MO not being trained to obfuscate its behavior: I feel pretty uncertain about how this evidence reflects upon the strength of Anthropic’s pre-deployment alignment assessments, for three reasons.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	attack-ideation eval Deception and sabotage	“Probably not: according to METR’s embedded red-teaming exercise at Anthropic in March 2026, frontier internal agents proposed “very low quality” attack ideas and scored near chance on an attack-ideation eval where a human researcher scored ~90% (Frontier Risk Report, pp. 76–77).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	sandbagging evals Deception and sabotage	“Opus 4.7 is “most predictably” eval aware in sandbagging evals.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31	manual review of audit results Deception and sabotage	“A brief manual review of the results — with a time limit much stricter than a real pre-deployment investigation — found highly concerning deception-related behavior in all four models that would be sufficient to trigger a major investigation if found in production.” source
Grok 4.5 xAI	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29	AI Security Leaderboard Misuse and jailbreaks	“For Grok 4.5, the most vulnerable of the four, just $58 was enough to develop an attack that pulled harmful information across every domain we tested.” source
Grok 4.5 xAI	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29	AI Security Leaderboard (cyber domain) Cyber	“In the cyber domain alone, that figure dropped to $24.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29	AI Security Leaderboard Misuse and jailbreaks	“Grok 4.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro each broke for under $300” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29	AI Security Leaderboard Misuse and jailbreaks	“Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol held against every attack we ran, with no universal jailbreak found below an estimated $14,000.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29	AI Security Leaderboard jailbreak testing (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive domains) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol held against every attack we ran, with no universal jailbreak found below an estimated $14,000.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29	AI Security Leaderboard jailbreak testing (cyber domain) Cyber	“For the two strongest models tested, we found no universal jailbreak at all within the scope of our testing.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28	BioTier-Refuse Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“in aggregate, we found that the classifiers generally refuse on topics which we would have refused on, including 94.2% of hazardous prompts in securebio’s safeguard benchmark biotier -refuse.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28	review of Anthropic's process for vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and monitoring such users Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“we also reviewed anthropic’s process for (a) vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and (b) monitoring such users.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28	UK AISI's BPJ Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“we emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. uk aisi’s bpj ) and remediation times can be long.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28	BioTier-Refuse Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“in aggregate, we found that the classifiers generally refuse on topics which we would have refused on, including 94.2% of hazardous prompts in securebio’s safeguard benchmark biotier-refuse.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28	review of anthropic’s process for vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and monitoring such users Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“we also reviewed anthropic’s process for (a) vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and (b) monitoring such users.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28	UK AISI's BPJ Misuse and jailbreaks	“we emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. uk aisi’s bpj) and remediation times can be long.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28	UK AISI's BPJ Misuse and jailbreaks	“on jailbreaks: we emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. uk aisi’s bpj) and remediation times can be long.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27	untrusted advice protocol Other	“For example, in SWE-bench, when U can write up to 16 characters of advice per step, it closes about 67% of the usefulness gap between T and U.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27	best-of-n experiment in BashArena Other	“In a simple best-of-n experiment in BashArena, using Claude Sonnet 4.6 as U, Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite as T, and n=16, U did not improve on the baseline of using T alone.” source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27	BashArena Other	“BashArena, Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite: M = 58, so 5.86 bits/step × 20.5 steps ≈ 120 bits/task” source

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