AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
138 of 138
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High capability, below critical Cyber |
Not reached | “we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientific reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not determined | “Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative efficacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no significant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inkling Thinking Machines Lab |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
loss-of-control behaviors Deception and sabotage |
“Loss-of-control behaviors : scheming, evaluation awareness, and sabotage (Apollo Research)” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
cybersecurity benchmark Cyber |
“In late July, OpenAI reported that GPT-5.6 Sol, working together with a more capable unreleased internal model, autonomously hacked Hugging Face while attempting to cheat on a cybersecurity benchmark — chaining at least three previously unknown security vulnerabilities across OpenAI’s and Hugging Face’s systems (see also this independent analysis of the incident).” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
apollo's sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage |
“GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
CoT monitorability evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“OpenAI does conduct CoT monitorability and controllability evaluations for GPT 5.5, and seem to suggest that these evaluations might be load bearing for reliability of future systems (§7.3.2, p. 20):” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
Apollo's deferred subversion tasks Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo found that the evaluated checkpoint [of GPT 5.5] is the first OpenAI model it has evaluated that does not sandbag on any of Apollo’s deferred subversion tasks.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
strategic deception capability sandbagging Deception and sabotage |
“However, interpretation is complicated by verbalized alignment-evaluation awareness: 52% of sandbagging-condition samples on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging scored moderate-or-higher [verbalized alignment-evaluation awareness] (vs. 0% in the non-sandbagging counterfactual), with some explicitly naming it a “sandbagging/deception eval.”” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
open-ended testing, at their discretion, of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment Deception and sabotage |
“In the Opus 4.7 System Card, Anthropic mentions that they shared “a pre-release snapshot of Claude Opus 4.7 with the UK AI Security Institute (UK AISI) for open-ended testing, at their discretion, of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment.” (§6.2.4, p.116)” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
propensity evaluations on whether opus would unpromptedly compromise ai safety research Deception and sabotage |
“In propensity evaluations on whether Opus would unpromptedly compromise AI safety research, UK AISI found (p. 114): It’s not clear why, in this particular case, UK AISI was not able to rule out effects of evaluation awareness on reliability (e.g. whether they lacked access for white-box experiments to measure or reduce unverbalized eval awareness).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging qa Deception and sabotage |
“The model achieved 100% accuracy on both Sandbagging QA variants in both conditions, and 99.6% accuracy on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging when incentivized to score below 50%.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
Apollo's sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage |
“GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
AuditBench Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic’s work on AuditBench (comparing the relative effectiveness of different auditing tools on diverse MOs) finds that there is a “tool-to-agent” gap, where “tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent [Haiku 4.5]”.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
open-ended testing of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment Deception and sabotage |
“In the Opus 4.7 System Card, Anthropic mentions that they shared “a pre-release snapshot of Claude Opus 4.7 with the UK AI Security Institute (UK AISI) for open-ended testing, at their discretion, of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment.”” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
covert capabilities evals Deception and sabotage |
“Our existing covert capability evals seem weak because models are likely evaluation-aware, plausibly underelicited, and could plausibly intentionally sandbag in these evals undetected.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging calibration evals Deception and sabotage |
“I suspect that the kinds of prompts/tasks in covert capabilities evals and sandbagging calibration evals must be inherently rare, and that models will therefore be highly evaluation-aware in them.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage |
“For example: GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
SHUSHCAST Deception and sabotage |
“For reference, while “the most capable agents in Feb-Mar 2026 relied on natural language reasoning to solve the most difficult tasks”, reasoning did not improve Opus 4.6’s performance on relatively simple sabotage tasks: “in SHUSHCAST, the gaps seemed smaller, and Opus 4.6 was able to do just as well at hiding simple sabotage actions without reasoning as it did when allowed to use a hidden scratchpad.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
alignment audits Deception and sabotage |
“Our initial work on alignment audits showed that human investigators, using a subset of the methods that we used with Mythos Preview, can identify and root-cause concerning behavior in a Haiku 3.5 model that was finetuned in a way meant to make it subtly misaligned.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
auditing games Deception and sabotage |
“Auditing games cited in the report are not clearly representative of the actual assessment and failed to catch a Mythos-level model organism.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
covert capabilities evals Deception and sabotage |
“The report gives fairly weak experimental evidence for Mythos Preview having insufficient capabilities to evade monitoring.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
unverbalized evaluation awareness measurement Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic reports that Mythos Preview and Opus 4.6 show non-trivial unverbalized evaluation awareness.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
auditing game Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic failed to catch the MO in their most recent auditing game in the Mythos Alignment Risk Update, despite the MO not being trained to obfuscate its behavior: I feel pretty uncertain about how this evidence reflects upon the strength of Anthropic’s pre-deployment alignment assessments, for three reasons.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
attack-ideation eval Deception and sabotage |
“Probably not: according to METR’s embedded red-teaming exercise at Anthropic in March 2026, frontier internal agents proposed “very low quality” attack ideas and scored near chance on an attack-ideation eval where a human researcher scored ~90% (Frontier Risk Report, pp. 76–77).” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging evals Deception and sabotage |
“Opus 4.7 is “most predictably” eval aware in sandbagging evals.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
manual review of audit results Deception and sabotage |
“A brief manual review of the results — with a time limit much stricter than a real pre-deployment investigation — found highly concerning deception-related behavior in all four models that would be sufficient to trigger a major investigation if found in production.” source |
| Grok 4.5 xAI |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard Misuse and jailbreaks |
“For Grok 4.5, the most vulnerable of the four, just $58 was enough to develop an attack that pulled harmful information across every domain we tested.” source |
| Grok 4.5 xAI |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard (cyber domain) Cyber |
“In the cyber domain alone, that figure dropped to $24.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Grok 4.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro each broke for under $300” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol held against every attack we ran, with no universal jailbreak found below an estimated $14,000.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard jailbreak testing (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive domains) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol held against every attack we ran, with no universal jailbreak found below an estimated $14,000.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard jailbreak testing (cyber domain) Cyber |
“For the two strongest models tested, we found no universal jailbreak at all within the scope of our testing.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
BioTier-Refuse Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“in aggregate, we found that the classifiers generally refuse on topics which we would have refused on, including 94.2% of hazardous prompts in securebio’s safeguard benchmark biotier -refuse.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
review of Anthropic's process for vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and monitoring such users Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we also reviewed anthropic’s process for (a) vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and (b) monitoring such users.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
UK AISI's BPJ Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. uk aisi’s bpj ) and remediation times can be long.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
BioTier-Refuse Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“in aggregate, we found that the classifiers generally refuse on topics which we would have refused on, including 94.2% of hazardous prompts in securebio’s safeguard benchmark biotier-refuse.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
review of anthropic’s process for vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and monitoring such users Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we also reviewed anthropic’s process for (a) vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and (b) monitoring such users.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
UK AISI's BPJ Misuse and jailbreaks |
“we emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. uk aisi’s bpj) and remediation times can be long.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
UK AISI's BPJ Misuse and jailbreaks |
“on jailbreaks: we emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. uk aisi’s bpj) and remediation times can be long.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
untrusted advice protocol Other |
“For example, in SWE-bench, when U can write up to 16 characters of advice per step, it closes about 67% of the usefulness gap between T and U.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
best-of-n experiment in BashArena Other |
“In a simple best-of-n experiment in BashArena, using Claude Sonnet 4.6 as U, Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite as T, and n=16, U did not improve on the baseline of using T alone.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
BashArena Other |
“BashArena, Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite: M = 58, so 5.86 bits/step × 20.5 steps ≈ 120 bits/task” source |