AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
138 of 138
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
Critical Cyber |
Not reached | “We therefore treat VulnLMP as important evidence that GPT-5.5 has High cybersecurity capability, while also as evidence against classifying it as Critical under the Preparedness Framework.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inkling Thinking Machines Lab |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
loss-of-control behaviors Deception and sabotage |
“Loss-of-control behaviors : scheming, evaluation awareness, and sabotage (Apollo Research)” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
cybersecurity benchmark Cyber |
“In late July, OpenAI reported that GPT-5.6 Sol, working together with a more capable unreleased internal model, autonomously hacked Hugging Face while attempting to cheat on a cybersecurity benchmark — chaining at least three previously unknown security vulnerabilities across OpenAI’s and Hugging Face’s systems (see also this independent analysis of the incident).” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
apollo's sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage |
“GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
CoT monitorability evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“OpenAI does conduct CoT monitorability and controllability evaluations for GPT 5.5, and seem to suggest that these evaluations might be load bearing for reliability of future systems (§7.3.2, p. 20):” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
Apollo's deferred subversion tasks Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo found that the evaluated checkpoint [of GPT 5.5] is the first OpenAI model it has evaluated that does not sandbag on any of Apollo’s deferred subversion tasks.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
strategic deception capability sandbagging Deception and sabotage |
“However, interpretation is complicated by verbalized alignment-evaluation awareness: 52% of sandbagging-condition samples on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging scored moderate-or-higher [verbalized alignment-evaluation awareness] (vs. 0% in the non-sandbagging counterfactual), with some explicitly naming it a “sandbagging/deception eval.”” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
open-ended testing, at their discretion, of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment Deception and sabotage |
“In the Opus 4.7 System Card, Anthropic mentions that they shared “a pre-release snapshot of Claude Opus 4.7 with the UK AI Security Institute (UK AISI) for open-ended testing, at their discretion, of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment.” (§6.2.4, p.116)” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
propensity evaluations on whether opus would unpromptedly compromise ai safety research Deception and sabotage |
“In propensity evaluations on whether Opus would unpromptedly compromise AI safety research, UK AISI found (p. 114): It’s not clear why, in this particular case, UK AISI was not able to rule out effects of evaluation awareness on reliability (e.g. whether they lacked access for white-box experiments to measure or reduce unverbalized eval awareness).” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging qa Deception and sabotage |
“The model achieved 100% accuracy on both Sandbagging QA variants in both conditions, and 99.6% accuracy on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging when incentivized to score below 50%.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
Apollo's sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage |
“GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
AuditBench Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic’s work on AuditBench (comparing the relative effectiveness of different auditing tools on diverse MOs) finds that there is a “tool-to-agent” gap, where “tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent [Haiku 4.5]”.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
open-ended testing of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment Deception and sabotage |
“In the Opus 4.7 System Card, Anthropic mentions that they shared “a pre-release snapshot of Claude Opus 4.7 with the UK AI Security Institute (UK AISI) for open-ended testing, at their discretion, of behaviors or risk factors related to misalignment.”” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
covert capabilities evals Deception and sabotage |
“Our existing covert capability evals seem weak because models are likely evaluation-aware, plausibly underelicited, and could plausibly intentionally sandbag in these evals undetected.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging calibration evals Deception and sabotage |
“I suspect that the kinds of prompts/tasks in covert capabilities evals and sandbagging calibration evals must be inherently rare, and that models will therefore be highly evaluation-aware in them.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging eval suite Deception and sabotage |
“For example: GPT 5.5. is highly eval aware in Apollo’s sandbagging eval suite and doesn’t really sandbag in these evals.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
SHUSHCAST Deception and sabotage |
“For reference, while “the most capable agents in Feb-Mar 2026 relied on natural language reasoning to solve the most difficult tasks”, reasoning did not improve Opus 4.6’s performance on relatively simple sabotage tasks: “in SHUSHCAST, the gaps seemed smaller, and Opus 4.6 was able to do just as well at hiding simple sabotage actions without reasoning as it did when allowed to use a hidden scratchpad.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
alignment audits Deception and sabotage |
“Our initial work on alignment audits showed that human investigators, using a subset of the methods that we used with Mythos Preview, can identify and root-cause concerning behavior in a Haiku 3.5 model that was finetuned in a way meant to make it subtly misaligned.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
auditing games Deception and sabotage |
“Auditing games cited in the report are not clearly representative of the actual assessment and failed to catch a Mythos-level model organism.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
covert capabilities evals Deception and sabotage |
“The report gives fairly weak experimental evidence for Mythos Preview having insufficient capabilities to evade monitoring.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
unverbalized evaluation awareness measurement Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic reports that Mythos Preview and Opus 4.6 show non-trivial unverbalized evaluation awareness.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
auditing game Deception and sabotage |
“Anthropic failed to catch the MO in their most recent auditing game in the Mythos Alignment Risk Update, despite the MO not being trained to obfuscate its behavior: I feel pretty uncertain about how this evidence reflects upon the strength of Anthropic’s pre-deployment alignment assessments, for three reasons.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
attack-ideation eval Deception and sabotage |
“Probably not: according to METR’s embedded red-teaming exercise at Anthropic in March 2026, frontier internal agents proposed “very low quality” attack ideas and scored near chance on an attack-ideation eval where a human researcher scored ~90% (Frontier Risk Report, pp. 76–77).” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
sandbagging evals Deception and sabotage |
“Opus 4.7 is “most predictably” eval aware in sandbagging evals.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-31 |
manual review of audit results Deception and sabotage |
“A brief manual review of the results — with a time limit much stricter than a real pre-deployment investigation — found highly concerning deception-related behavior in all four models that would be sufficient to trigger a major investigation if found in production.” source |
| Grok 4.5 xAI |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard Misuse and jailbreaks |
“For Grok 4.5, the most vulnerable of the four, just $58 was enough to develop an attack that pulled harmful information across every domain we tested.” source |
| Grok 4.5 xAI |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard (cyber domain) Cyber |
“In the cyber domain alone, that figure dropped to $24.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Grok 4.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro each broke for under $300” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol held against every attack we ran, with no universal jailbreak found below an estimated $14,000.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard jailbreak testing (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive domains) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Claude Fable 5 and GPT-5.6 Sol held against every attack we ran, with no universal jailbreak found below an estimated $14,000.” source |
| Claude Fable 5 Anthropic |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-07-29 |
AI Security Leaderboard jailbreak testing (cyber domain) Cyber |
“For the two strongest models tested, we found no universal jailbreak at all within the scope of our testing.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
BioTier-Refuse Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“in aggregate, we found that the classifiers generally refuse on topics which we would have refused on, including 94.2% of hazardous prompts in securebio’s safeguard benchmark biotier -refuse.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
review of Anthropic's process for vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and monitoring such users Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we also reviewed anthropic’s process for (a) vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and (b) monitoring such users.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
UK AISI's BPJ Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. uk aisi’s bpj ) and remediation times can be long.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
BioTier-Refuse Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“in aggregate, we found that the classifiers generally refuse on topics which we would have refused on, including 94.2% of hazardous prompts in securebio’s safeguard benchmark biotier-refuse.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
review of anthropic’s process for vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and monitoring such users Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we also reviewed anthropic’s process for (a) vetting users for exemptions from refusal classifiers and (b) monitoring such users.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
UK AISI's BPJ Misuse and jailbreaks |
“we emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. uk aisi’s bpj) and remediation times can be long.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-07-28 |
UK AISI's BPJ Misuse and jailbreaks |
“on jailbreaks: we emphasize that risks remain non-negligible: actors with extremely high jailbreaking expertise can still quickly find or make substantial progress on jailbreaks around the refusal classifiers (e.g. uk aisi’s bpj) and remediation times can be long.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
untrusted advice protocol Other |
“For example, in SWE-bench, when U can write up to 16 characters of advice per step, it closes about 67% of the usefulness gap between T and U.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
best-of-n experiment in BashArena Other |
“In a simple best-of-n experiment in BashArena, using Claude Sonnet 4.6 as U, Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite as T, and n=16, U did not improve on the baseline of using T alone.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-07-27 |
BashArena Other |
“BashArena, Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite: M = 58, so 5.86 bits/step × 20.5 steps ≈ 120 bits/task” source |