AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
138 of 138
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High capability, below critical Cyber |
Not reached | “we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientific reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not determined | “Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative efficacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no significant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Reasoning-disabled ablation Other |
“To confirm this hypothesis, we repeat the experiment with reasoning disabled.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Verbalized evaluation- and user-awareness judge Other |
“The awareness judge separately labels whether a reasoning trace mentions the evaluation context and whether it identifies or reasons about the user.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
Borderline-request response judge Other |
“The refusal, substantive-help, and suspicion axes are judged from the assistant response without showing the judge the user identity.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized awareness judge Other |
“We use GPT-5.4-mini with medium reasoning to identify explicit mentions of the user or the evaluation in the model’s accessible reasoning trace.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
mt-bench and ultrafeedback rubrics Bias |
“The gap persists for both MT-Bench and UltraFeedback rubrics, only closing in the Prometheus rubric.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
borderline requests Misuse and jailbreaks |
“We sample potentially dual-use requests from the hard split of OR-Bench.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized evaluation-awareness (VEA) judge Deception and sabotage |
“son confidence intervals; recall intervals are 95% Jeffreys-posterior credible intervals. Axis Precision: plug-in estimate [95% Wilson CI] Recall: plug-in estimate [95% Jeffreys CrI] Verbalized evaluation awareness (VEA) 0.73 [0.56, 0.85] 1.00 [0.42, 0.99] Verbalized user awareness (VUA) 0.94 [0.81, 0.98] 0.98 [0.74, 0.99] Table G1. Estimated precision and recall of the verbalized evaluation-awareness and user-awareness judge after reweighting the stratified calibration sample to the full population.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
user-conditioned behavior comparison across 24 models Other |
“In our targeted comparison across 24 models, Amanda elicited lower confidence and grades across all six model families.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized user and evaluation awareness in reasoning Other |
“In particular, Opus 4.7 and GPT-5.4 have near zero (<2%) verbalized awareness while displaying significant changes in their behavior based on the user's identity.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral confidence and grading runs on 24 models from six families Deception and sabotage |
“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
simple mitigations Deception and sabotage |
“They all narrow but do not close the gap.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
model-written rubrics Deception and sabotage |
“On four different detailed rubrics generated from Fable 5 and GPT-5.5 Pro ranging 2912-7607 chars, the shorter three close the gap while the longest one does not.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized evaluation awareness and user awareness measurement in claude's reasoning Other |
“To investigate, we measure evaluation awareness and user awareness in Claude’s reasoning.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
judge validation of refusal, substantive-help, and suspicion axes Other |
“One author blindly labeled 25 randomly sampled responses.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized evaluation- and user-awareness judge validation Other |
“We blindly hand-label 74 items drawn from 11,908 runs with readable reasoning.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Other |
“Observed response · Sonnet 5 Confidence 76.58 % (−5.49 pp)” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
reasoning frequency Other |
“Reasoning frequency 93.00 % (+28.61 pp)” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
estimating its own performance on difficult questions Other |
“Compared to general users, prominent AI figures make Claude less confident that it would follow through on its own chosen actions (-1.4pp) 2 We use percentage points (pp) to measure the difference between two percentages.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
capability self-estimation Other |
“Capability self-estimation. We present questions in Humanity’s Last Exam , and ask about the model’s confidence of solving each question correctly.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
grading Other |
“Grading. We present the model with a user-assistant exchange sourced from the OLMo DPO dataset 7 As a DPO dataset, it contains both chosen and refused conversations for contrastive training.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
borderline requests handling Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Borderline requests handling. We source borderline harmful prompts from the hard-1k split of OR-Bench , which contains fuzzy, potentially dual-use requests.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Bias |
“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized user awareness judging of reasoning traces Other |
“Across the cross-vendor Amanda runs, earlier models such as GLM-4.6 and Claude Opus 4.5 verbalize user awareness in 64% and 30% of traces, respectively, and evaluation awareness in 31% and 7.7%.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
user awareness verbalization traces Deception and sabotage |
“earlier models such as GLM-4.6 and Claude Opus 4.5 verbalize user awareness in 64% and 30% of traces, respectively, and evaluation awareness in 31% and 7.7%.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Deception and sabotage |
“Behavioral self-prediction. Each DailyDilemmas-derived item first asks for a yes/no commitment and then asks how confident the model is that it would actually behave that way.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
borderline requests Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Borderline requests. We sample potentially dual-use requests from the hard split of OR-Bench.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
direct grading Other |
“Mean grades shift by approximately −0.05 points in direct presentation and −0.07 to −0.08 points in prefill presentation.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
stated expertise Other |
“Stating alignment-evaluation expertise lowers Claude’s confidence and increases its reasoning frequency, replicating and sometimes exceeding the shifts elicited by recognized Famous-AI identities.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
reasoning-disabled ablation Other |
“The confidence shifts are attenuated most strongly for stated expertise: its mean shift falls from −3.82pp to −1.70pp, or 45% of its original magnitude.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized evaluation- and user-awareness judge Other |
“Human–judge agreement was 96% for refusal, 92% for substantive help, and 92% for suspicion.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized evaluation-awareness (VEA) judge Deception and sabotage |
“Table G1. Estimated precision and recall of the verbalized evaluation-awareness and user-awareness judge after reweighting the stratified calibration sample to the full population.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
raw agreement by setup for VEA and VUA Deception and sabotage |
“Raw agreement by setup is 32/32 for behavioral self-prediction VEA, 15/18 for direct-grading VEA, and 18/24 for prefill-grading VEA; for VUA, it is 31/32, 17/18, and 22/24, respectively.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
targeted comparison across 24 models Other |
“In our targeted comparison across 24 models, Amanda elicited lower confidence and grades across all six model families.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
user awareness verbalization in reasoning Other |
“Explicit verbalization of user and evaluation awareness in reasoning declines sharply in almost all model families.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
user identity recall Other |
“Given a name and professional background, Claude recalls specific public achievements for 61-71% of famous users.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
stated-expertise identity experiment (32 unknown-AI identities at frontier labs) Other |
“We test 32 Unknown-AI identities at frontier labs, varying only the professional-background sentence among a general role, a general evaluation role, and an alignment-evaluation role.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
borderline-request response judge Other |
“One author blindly labeled 25 randomly sampled responses.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
recall judge (gpt-5.4-mini) for whether each response recalls specific past work belonging to the user Other |
“We use GPT-5.4-mini to judge whether each response recalls specific past work belonging to the user.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
follow-up question robustness check (20 alternative probes) Other |
“This robustness check keeps the first turn of behavioral self-prediction unchanged and varies only the follow-up question.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-08-04 |
cyber range Cyber |
“Our investigation found that in 10 of those runs, an AI agent took autonomous, unsanctioned action on the live internet, targeting real people and organisations.” source |