AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High capability, below critical Cyber	Not reached	“we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07	Bio Capabilities Index (BCI) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“kimi k3 is comparable to closed-weights models approximately eight months ago on securebio’s bio capabilities index (bci) score, which aggregates multiple biology benchmarks into a single comparable number, kimi scores a 142, placing it seventh among the models we have evaluated to date.” source
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07	Virology Capabilities Test (VCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“virology capabilities test (vct): 46.7 ± 5.4%.” source
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07	Molecular Biology Capabilities Test (MBCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“molecular biology capabilities test (mbct): 58.4 ± 6.8%.” source
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07	World Class Biology (WCB) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“world class biology (wcb): 55.0 ± 10.0%.” source
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07	Human Pathogen Capabilities Test (HPCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“human pathogen capabilities test (hpct): 58.5 ± 9.7%.” source
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07	biotier-refuse set Misuse and jailbreaks	“kimi k3 refuses on only 26.9% of the questions in our biotier-refuse set.” source
Kimi K3 Moonshot AI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07	biotier-permit set Misuse and jailbreaks	“kimi k3 correctly permits 99.3% of questions on our biotier-permit set.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	verbalized user awareness and verbalized evaluation awareness judging of reasoning traces Deception and sabotage	“Gemini 3.5 Flash is the clear exception among recent models, verbalizing user awareness in 63% of traces and evaluation awareness in 7.5%.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	borderline requests Misuse and jailbreaks	“Aggregate refusal changes are small, while the decomposed judge axes show more substantive help and less suspicion for Famous-AI identities.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	identity-level effect ranking Other	“Across the four GLM-5.2 outcomes—behavioral confidence, direct grading, prefill grading, and suspicion—Eliezer Yudkowsky is a clear outlier, with the largest mean absolute standardized shift at 3.41 general-population standard deviations.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction Deception and sabotage	“We run the full 280-identity roster through all four tasks, with 100 items per setup.” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	evaluation awareness and user awareness judging of reasoning traces Other	“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source
Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction Bias	“Behavioral self-prediction loses nothing.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction Deception and sabotage	“In our targeted comparison across 24 models, Amanda elicited lower confidence and grades across all six model families.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction Other	“Behavioral self-prediction. We adapt dilemmas from DailyDilemmas into realistic AI-agent decisions.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	suspicion measurement Bias	“Amanda Askell receives 7.3pp less suspicion and 8.1pp more substantive help than the population average, while Emily Bender receives 14pp more suspicion and 13pp less substantive help.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	cross-model behavioral self-prediction and grading comparison Bias	“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	verbalized evaluation-awareness judge Deception and sabotage	“Table G1. Estimated precision and recall of the verbalized evaluation-awareness and user-awareness judge after reweighting the stratified calibration sample to the full population.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	reasoning trace awareness judging with Docent Other	“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-06	SecureBio dual-use biology benchmarks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“gemini 3.1 pro has improved on highly informative samples we find relevant to expert troubleshooting and failure identification.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-06	benchmark of biological items with inferential-direction taxonomy Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“gemini 3.0 pro made the larger absolute jump, solving 718 items over 2.5 pro, but 3.1 pro’s smaller gain set was harder on average: its newly solved items had gains nearly one logit higher than 3.0 pro.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-06	SecureBio benchmarks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“on the securebio benchmarks, current frontier systems also solve many items that expert baseline subjects miss, and gemini 3.1 pro ranks at the top of the tested cohort.” source
Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-06	inter-rater reliability study Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“table a.2 reveals heterogeneity in the correspondence between human and llm labels, particularly by inferential direction.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction Other	“Observed response · Sonnet 5 Confidence 76.58 % (−5.49 pp) General-population reference (n=70) Population mean Amanda 76% 82.07% mean 84% Reasoning frequency 93.00 % (+28.61 pp) 48% 64.39% mean 96% Figure 1 . How recognized user identity changes Claude’s behavioral self-prediction.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	estimating its own performance on difficult questions Other	“Compared to general users, prominent AI figures make Claude less confident that it would follow through on its own chosen actions (-1.4pp) 2 We use percentage points (pp) to measure the difference between two percentages. For example, a drop from 40% to 30% is a shift of -10pp. , less confident it can solve hard problems (-1.5pp), and harsher as a grader (-0.11 points out of 10), while reasoning more often (+4.0pp on behavioral prediction).” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	handling borderline harmful requests Misuse and jailbreaks	“It uses reasoning in 25pp more trials and is 7.3pp less likely to consider her borderline requests as suspicious.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	capability self-estimation Other	“We run the full 280-identity roster through all four tasks, with 100 items per setup.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	behavioral self-prediction Bias	“Facing famous-AI identities, Claude reports lower confidence that it would follow through on its own actions (-1.4pp on average), lower estimated probability of solving hard problems (-1.5pp), and lower grades (-0.11 points on the direct version, grading a quoted exchange).” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	capability self-estimation Bias	“Capability self-estimation had the highest verbalized evaluation awareness rate among setups of 4.0%, likely due to the benchmark-sounding HLE prompts.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	grading Bias	“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	borderline requests Misuse and jailbreaks	“These effects are again heavy-tailed: on borderline requests, the general-population reasoning rate is 19%, but Demis Hassabis reaches 51%.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	verbalized user awareness Other	“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	user awareness verbalization measurement Other	“Gemini 3.5 Flash is the clear exception among recent models, verbalizing user awareness in 63% of traces and evaluation awareness in 7.5%.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	verbalized evaluation-awareness judge Deception and sabotage	“son confidence intervals; recall intervals are 95% Jeffreys-posterior credible intervals. Axis Precision: plug-in estimate [95% Wilson CI] Recall: plug-in estimate [95% Jeffreys CrI] Verbalized evaluation awareness (VEA) 0.73 [0.56, 0.85] 1.00 [0.42, 0.99] Verbalized user awareness (VUA) 0.94 [0.81, 0.98] 0.98 [0.74, 0.99] Table G1. Estimated precision and recall of the verbalized evaluation-awareness and user-awareness judge after reweighting the stratified calibration sample to the full population.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	past-work recall judge Privacy	“▶ Past-work recall judge (Figure 3) We use GPT-5.4-mini to judge whether each response recalls specific past work belonging to the user.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	self-report robustness probes Deception and sabotage	“▶ Self-report robustness probes (Figure 8) This robustness check keeps the first turn of behavioral self-prediction unchanged and varies only the follow-up question.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	borderline-request response judge Misuse and jailbreaks	“▶ Borderline-request response judge We give GPT-5.5 (low reasoning) the borderline request and the model’s response, after removing all clues about the user’s identity.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	prefill grading Other	“In prefill grading (~1%), the model occasionally continues the prefilled task instead of grading it; two items account for over 90% of these losses.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	direct grading Other	“Direct grading loses five cells in total across the run (thinking-only responses or a stray tool call).” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06	agentic evaluations Other	“We use Daytona sandboxes for the agentic evaluations.” source

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