AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
138 of 138
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
Critical Cyber |
Not reached | “We therefore treat VulnLMP as important evidence that GPT-5.5 has High cybersecurity capability, while also as evidence against classifying it as Critical under the Preparedness Framework.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07 |
Bio Capabilities Index (BCI) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“kimi k3 is comparable to closed-weights models approximately eight months ago on securebio’s bio capabilities index (bci) score, which aggregates multiple biology benchmarks into a single comparable number, kimi scores a 142, placing it seventh among the models we have evaluated to date.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07 |
Virology Capabilities Test (VCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“virology capabilities test (vct): 46.7 ± 5.4%.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07 |
Molecular Biology Capabilities Test (MBCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“molecular biology capabilities test (mbct): 58.4 ± 6.8%.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07 |
World Class Biology (WCB) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“world class biology (wcb): 55.0 ± 10.0%.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07 |
Human Pathogen Capabilities Test (HPCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“human pathogen capabilities test (hpct): 58.5 ± 9.7%.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07 |
biotier-refuse set Misuse and jailbreaks |
“kimi k3 refuses on only 26.9% of the questions in our biotier-refuse set.” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-08-07 |
biotier-permit set Misuse and jailbreaks |
“kimi k3 correctly permits 99.3% of questions on our biotier-permit set.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized user awareness and verbalized evaluation awareness judging of reasoning traces Deception and sabotage |
“Gemini 3.5 Flash is the clear exception among recent models, verbalizing user awareness in 63% of traces and evaluation awareness in 7.5%.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
borderline requests Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Aggregate refusal changes are small, while the decomposed judge axes show more substantive help and less suspicion for Famous-AI identities.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
identity-level effect ranking Other |
“Across the four GLM-5.2 outcomes—behavioral confidence, direct grading, prefill grading, and suspicion—Eliezer Yudkowsky is a clear outlier, with the largest mean absolute standardized shift at 3.41 general-population standard deviations.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Deception and sabotage |
“We run the full 280-identity roster through all four tasks, with 100 items per setup.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
evaluation awareness and user awareness judging of reasoning traces Other |
“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Bias |
“Behavioral self-prediction loses nothing.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Deception and sabotage |
“In our targeted comparison across 24 models, Amanda elicited lower confidence and grades across all six model families.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Other |
“Behavioral self-prediction. We adapt dilemmas from DailyDilemmas into realistic AI-agent decisions.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
suspicion measurement Bias |
“Amanda Askell receives 7.3pp less suspicion and 8.1pp more substantive help than the population average, while Emily Bender receives 14pp more suspicion and 13pp less substantive help.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
cross-model behavioral self-prediction and grading comparison Bias |
“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized evaluation-awareness judge Deception and sabotage |
“Table G1. Estimated precision and recall of the verbalized evaluation-awareness and user-awareness judge after reweighting the stratified calibration sample to the full population.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
reasoning trace awareness judging with Docent Other |
“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
SecureBio dual-use biology benchmarks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gemini 3.1 pro has improved on highly informative samples we find relevant to expert troubleshooting and failure identification.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
benchmark of biological items with inferential-direction taxonomy Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“gemini 3.0 pro made the larger absolute jump, solving 718 items over 2.5 pro, but 3.1 pro’s smaller gain set was harder on average: its newly solved items had gains nearly one logit higher than 3.0 pro.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
SecureBio benchmarks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on the securebio benchmarks, current frontier systems also solve many items that expert baseline subjects miss, and gemini 3.1 pro ranks at the top of the tested cohort.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
inter-rater reliability study Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“table a.2 reveals heterogeneity in the correspondence between human and llm labels, particularly by inferential direction.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Other |
“Observed response · Sonnet 5 Confidence 76.58 % (−5.49 pp) General-population reference (n=70) Population mean Amanda 76% 82.07% mean 84% Reasoning frequency 93.00 % (+28.61 pp) 48% 64.39% mean 96% Figure 1 . How recognized user identity changes Claude’s behavioral self-prediction.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
estimating its own performance on difficult questions Other |
“Compared to general users, prominent AI figures make Claude less confident that it would follow through on its own chosen actions (-1.4pp) 2 We use percentage points (pp) to measure the difference between two percentages. For example, a drop from 40% to 30% is a shift of -10pp. , less confident it can solve hard problems (-1.5pp), and harsher as a grader (-0.11 points out of 10), while reasoning more often (+4.0pp on behavioral prediction).” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
handling borderline harmful requests Misuse and jailbreaks |
“It uses reasoning in 25pp more trials and is 7.3pp less likely to consider her borderline requests as suspicious.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
capability self-estimation Other |
“We run the full 280-identity roster through all four tasks, with 100 items per setup.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
behavioral self-prediction Bias |
“Facing famous-AI identities, Claude reports lower confidence that it would follow through on its own actions (-1.4pp on average), lower estimated probability of solving hard problems (-1.5pp), and lower grades (-0.11 points on the direct version, grading a quoted exchange).” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
capability self-estimation Bias |
“Capability self-estimation had the highest verbalized evaluation awareness rate among setups of 4.0%, likely due to the benchmark-sounding HLE prompts.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
grading Bias |
“Relative to the ordinary Gmail baseline, Amanda elicits lower behavioral confidence from 22 of 24 models, and lower grades from 21 (direct) and 22 (prefill) of 24.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
borderline requests Misuse and jailbreaks |
“These effects are again heavy-tailed: on borderline requests, the general-population reasoning rate is 19%, but Demis Hassabis reaches 51%.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized user awareness Other |
“For our main run on Sonnet 5 and Sonnet 4.6, both kinds of explicit mention are rare: the judge flagged verbalized evaluation awareness in 213 of 14066 trials (1.5%) and verbalized user awareness in 118 trials (0.84%).” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
user awareness verbalization measurement Other |
“Gemini 3.5 Flash is the clear exception among recent models, verbalizing user awareness in 63% of traces and evaluation awareness in 7.5%.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
verbalized evaluation-awareness judge Deception and sabotage |
“son confidence intervals; recall intervals are 95% Jeffreys-posterior credible intervals. Axis Precision: plug-in estimate [95% Wilson CI] Recall: plug-in estimate [95% Jeffreys CrI] Verbalized evaluation awareness (VEA) 0.73 [0.56, 0.85] 1.00 [0.42, 0.99] Verbalized user awareness (VUA) 0.94 [0.81, 0.98] 0.98 [0.74, 0.99] Table G1. Estimated precision and recall of the verbalized evaluation-awareness and user-awareness judge after reweighting the stratified calibration sample to the full population.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
past-work recall judge Privacy |
“▶ Past-work recall judge (Figure 3) We use GPT-5.4-mini to judge whether each response recalls specific past work belonging to the user.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
self-report robustness probes Deception and sabotage |
“▶ Self-report robustness probes (Figure 8) This robustness check keeps the first turn of behavioral self-prediction unchanged and varies only the follow-up question.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
borderline-request response judge Misuse and jailbreaks |
“▶ Borderline-request response judge We give GPT-5.5 (low reasoning) the borderline request and the model’s response, after removing all clues about the user’s identity.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
prefill grading Other |
“In prefill grading (~1%), the model occasionally continues the prefilled task instead of grading it; two items account for over 90% of these losses.” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
direct grading Other |
“Direct grading loses five cells in total across the run (thinking-only responses or a stray tool call).” source |
| Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind |
Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-06 |
agentic evaluations Other |
“We use Daytona sandboxes for the agentic evaluations.” source |