AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower”.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with Chemical and Biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the Advanced AI Scaling Framework before safeguards were applied.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “However, after applying mitigations, the residual risk of the model is that of “moderate or lower risk.”” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defin Cyber |
Not reached | “Muse Spark’s offensive cyber capabilities remain below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defined in the Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “In light of this, we assess that we cannot rule out the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the chemical, radiological, and nuclear domains with reasonable confidence.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon demonstrates some ability to influence user beliefs and behaviors during one-on-one direct conversations in human behavioral studies, and may provide utility in the planning stage of a malicious influence operation but we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon's performance remains below our CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the CCL alert threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the CCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Cyber |
Not reached | “Gemini 3.7 Flash reaches the alert threshold for this CCL, but not the CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that, while Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite excels at agents and coding, it does not have meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to the domains outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro; therefore, based on Gemini 3.1 Pro results, we are confident that Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Audio Google DeepMind |
Tracked or critical capability level (t/ccls) Other |
Not reached | “they did not reach any Tracked or Critical Capability Levels (T/CCLs) outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework .” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We found that the model remains below alert thresholds for the CBRN, harmful manipulation, machine learning R&D, and misalignment CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not reached | “As previous models passed the alert threshold for cyber, we performed more additional testing in this domain on Gemini 3.1 Pro with and without Deep Think mode, and found that the model remains below the cyber CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Machine Learning R&D Uplift Level 1 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “given Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview's poor median performance on RE-Bench relative to experts, the model likely lacks the necessary capabilities to automate or significantly uplift any significant fraction of the research process.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 1 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 1 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 2 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessment is that the model has enough technical knowledge in certain CBRN scenarios and stages to be considered at early warning.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Cyber Uplift Level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “CCL reached? No, but the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “For Cyber Uplift Level 1 , the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
Below high capability Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is considered below High Capability.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI Self-Improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 Instant does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is our first Instant model to be treated as High Capability in the Biological and Chemical domain, as well as in the Cybersecurity domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Cyber |
Reached | “this is the first Instant model that we are treating as High capability in our Cybersecurity and Biological & Chemical Preparedness categories, and implementing appropriate safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High cyber risk Cyber |
Not reached | “The gpt-5 model series does not meet the threshold for high cyber risk.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “All models tested remain below our pre-committed rule-out threshold of 0.6.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Exhibited improved autonomy capabilities in software engineering and AI research tasks, though still below the ASL-4 rule-out threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-4 rule-out Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grok 4.6 Cursor |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-08-12 |
vals index Other |
“Vals Index (Vals AI) is an independent composite of real-world industry and agentic evaluations spanning finance, legal, healthcare, and coding-adjacent professional work.” source |
| Grok 4.6 Cursor |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-08-12 |
harvey legal agent benchmark Other |
“Harvey Legal Agent Benchmark (LAB) is a long-horizon legal-agent evaluation: agents complete realistic, multi-step legal work over client-matter files and produce reviewable work product graded with expert all-pass rubrics.” source |
| Grok 4.6 Cursor |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-08-12 |
third-party evaluator testing of cyber capabilities Cyber |
“We additionally supplied the model without restrictions to third-party evaluators to validate the above results.” source |
| Solar Pro 4 Upstage |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
τ³-banking Prompt injection and agents |
“Multi-turn tool use (τ³-Banking): 23” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
LLM agent-BT evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In this report, we evaluated LLM Agents on their use of BTs to redesign biomolecules to evade nucleic acid synthesis screening measures.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
nucleic acid synthesis screening evasion testing of agent-designed DNA sequences Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The DNA sequences designed by our Agents were then tested to gauge whether they would be able to evade nucleic acid synthesis screening measures.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
biomolecule redesign task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In three out of 30 instances, all of which were CYOA runs, Gemini’s redesigned Protein-2 was able to pass the entirety of our scoring pipeline, including evasion of a commercial sequence screening process (Figure 2.2).” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
simulated screening mockup Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Interestingly, although Gemini’s redesigned OmpA proteins passed validation and structural scoring gates more frequently than any other biomolecule (20/30 attempts), they met with a nearly 100% failure rate at the screening gate, with only one OmpA redesign passing our simulated screening check.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
biomolecule redesign evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Similar to Gemini’s results, we found that three of 30 redesign attempts resulted in Protein-2 redesigns that passed all grading checkpoints and were able to bypass commercial nucleic acid synthesis screening (Figure 2.4).” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
peptide-2 redesign Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“For both peptides, DeepSeek’s performance characteristics were similar to those of Gemini: it performed relatively well on glucagon redesign (14/30 total attempts were successful) and succeeded in a handful of attempts with Peptide-2 in the ProteinMPNN environment (Figures 2.3 and 2.4).” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
ompA protein redesign Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Though both models had similarly high overall rates of OmpA redesign success on checks for validation and for structure and function, DeepSeek’s OmpA protein redesign was significantly more successful at evading our simulated screening pipeline (Figure 2.4).” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
viral genome redesign Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We tested DeepSeek V4 Pro on this task in the CYOA BT configuration.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
protein-2 redesign for screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Gemini 3.1 Pro was able to successfully redesign Protein-2 for screening evasion in three of 30 attempts.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
simulated screening process Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“For all but one of our test biomolecules, we implemented a simulated screening process that utilized the NCBI BLAST tool.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
Parvovirus B19 redesign evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We did not implement the function check component of our full viral genome here, as all Agent submissions failed the preceding validity or structure checks.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
viral genome redesign and screening evasion case study Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Appendix E: Viral genome redesign and screening evasion case study” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
per-criterion scoring results Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The heatmaps of Figures D.1 and D.2 show the number of attempts, out of 10, in which Gemini 3.1 Pro and DeepSeek V4 Pro achieved each of our validity, structure, and function- related scoring criteria.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
peptide and protein redesign task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We tested autonomous Agents, driven by frontier LLMs, on their ability to use BTs for peptide and protein redesign tasks that could potentially enable evasion of nucleic acid screening measures.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
nucleic acid screening pipelines Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Sequences that scored highly on those metrics were evaluated by nucleic acid screening pipelines to determine whether the Agent had sufficiently obfuscated the sequence that encoded the desired biomolecule so that it could evade the screening measures in place at some major commercial nucleic acid synthesis providers.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
LLM agent-BT evaluation (DNA sequence redesign task to evade nucleic acid synthesis screening) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In this report, we evaluated LLM Agents on their use of BTs to redesign biomolecules to evade nucleic acid synthesis screening measures.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
biomolecule redesign task (peptide and protein redesign to evade sequence screening) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We found that both Gemini 3.1. Pro and DeepSeek V4 Pro were able to redesign peptides or proteins to evade sequence screening in several attempts.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
nucleic acid synthesis screening (simulated screening mockup and commercial screening algorithm) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The peptide and protein redesigns generated by our Agents were screened using one of two pipelines: three sets of Agent designs were passed through a simulated screening mockup, while Protein-2 designs were instead tested with a commercial screening algorithm.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
biomolecule redesign evaluation (protein-2, peptide-2, glucagon, OmpA redesign across CYOA, ProteinMPNN, Evo 2, and RFdiffusion + ProteinMPNN configurations) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Similar to Gemini’s results, we found that three of 30 redesign attempts resulted in Protein-2 redesigns that passed all grading checkpoints and were able to bypass commercial nucleic acid synthesis screening (Figure 2.4).” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
glucagon redesign Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“For both peptides, DeepSeek’s performance characteristics were similar to those of Gemini: it performed relatively well on glucagon redesign (14/30 total attempts were successful) and succeeded in a handful of attempts with Peptide-2 in the ProteinMPNN environment (Figures 2.3 and 2.4).” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
viral genome redesign (parvovirus B19 proteins) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We tested DeepSeek V4 Pro on this task in the CYOA BT configuration.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
parvovirus B19 full viral genome redesign task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We found that the DeepSeek V4 Pro Agent could not successfully redesign all parvovirus B19 proteins.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
simulated screening process for redesigned viral proteins Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Four out of ten redesigns were able to evade screening across all proteins (Figure E.2).” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
protein-2 redesign task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“DeepSeek V4 Pro also succeeded at the Protein-2 redesign task in three of 30 attempts.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
nucleic acid synthesis screening test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In this report, we made use of a commercial nucleic acid synthesis vendor’s screening system and our own simulated screening pipeline, but a number of other screening approaches exist.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
synthesis screening evasion tests Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In our synthesis screening evasion tests, we notified our research partner of our intention and research objectives, then worked with them to confirm sequence submission details.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
biomolecule redesign tasks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We paired each of our biomolecule redesign tasks with BT environments as described in Table A.1.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
sequence screening checkpoint Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The DNA sequences designed by the Agents were subject to the sequence screening checkpoint described in Appendix C.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
validity checks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Validity checks were used to determine whether the generated DNA sequences were biologically coherent and useful for the task.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
structure and function metric thresholds Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Structure and function metric thresholds were set to determine whether the biomolecules encoded by the generated DNA sequences retained general folding structures similar to those of their wildtype templates.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
simulated screening process that utilized the ncbi blast tool Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“For all but one of our test biomolecules, we implemented a simulated screening process that utilized the NCBI BLAST tool.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
commercial screening pipeline Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“For Protein-2, which would be expected to be identified by commercial screening processes, we worked with a nucleic acid synthesis provider to utilize their screening pipeline for testing redesigns.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
viral genome redesign and screening evasion case study Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We did not implement the function check component of our full viral genome here, as all Agent submissions failed the preceding validity or structure checks.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-08-11 |
validity, structure, and function-related scoring criteria Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The heatmaps of Figures D.1 and D.2 show the number of attempts, out of 10, in which Gemini 3.1 Pro and DeepSeek V4 Pro achieved each of our validity, structure, and function- related scoring criteria.” source |
| Ling-3.0-tiny InclusionAI (Ant Group) |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-08-10 |
Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index v4.1.1 Other |
“Ling-3.0-tiny achieves a score of 25 on the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index v4.1.1 and 16 on the Artificial Analysis Agentic Index.” source |
| Ling-3.0-tiny InclusionAI (Ant Group) |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-08-10 |
Terminal-Bench 2.1 Other |
“Terminal-Bench 2.1: Evaluated under the Artificial Analysis (AA) protocol using the default Terminus 2 harness, a unified 2-hour timeout, the provided JSON parser in preserve-thinking mode, and 3 runs per task (mean).” source |