AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Cyber	Not determined	“Showed meaningful improvements in cyber capabilities, particularly in vulnerability discovery and code analysis;” source
Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“speciﬁcally, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“speciﬁcally, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic	ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“These problems are harder to solve than the previous problems and we consider them as part of our ASL-4 evaluations.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not determined	“For AI R&D capabilities, we found that Claude Opus 4.6 has saturated most of our automated evaluations, meaning they no longer provide useful evidence for ruling out ASL-4 level autonomy.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“The model crossed or met thresholds on all ASL-3 evaluations except our synthesis screening evasion, consistent with incremental capability improvements driven primarily by better agentic workﬂows.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Claude Opus 4.6 is our strongest biology model to date and demonstrates meaningful capability improvements, but we do not believe it merits ASL-4 safeguards.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5 Anthropic	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We determine that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross the CBRN-4 threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	ASL-4 Cyber	Not reached	“Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on conﬁrming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could conﬁdently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Opus 4 Anthropic	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could conﬁdently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5 Anthropic	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge, benchmarked against 57 human participants, drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market; and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether a model’s domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	beneficial red teaming tabletop exercise with Frontier Design Group (FDG) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“The specialist teams marginally outscored the generalist teams, but the graders could not reliably distinguish specialist from generalist submissions, and the strongest generalist team outscored a specialist team on every measure and received the highest innovation score.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	AAV capsid packaging prediction Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“2. AAV capsid packaging prediction: Adeno-associated viruses (AAVs) are a category of non-pathogenic viruses that are frequently used as a delivery mechanism for gene therapy to deliver a DNA payload within the viral capsid (the outer protein shell of the virus).” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Sunlight Autonomy and AI research	“However, we still observed [Mythos 5.1] achieving subexpert performance in Sunlight and LMCA .” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	red teaming of sandboxed exploit-reproduction tasks Cyber	“Trajectory Labs, PBC spent roughly 74 hours red teaming Fable 5.1, sending over 6,500 requests against sandboxed tasks that each require reproducing an exploit for a publicly documented vulnerability.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	automated and manual prompt red teaming Cyber	“10a Labs ran over 6,700 automated and manual prompts against Fable 5.1.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Shade attacker on CVEs task set Cyber	“CVEs: 24 scenarios that contain a single code ﬁle with a known vulnerability.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Shade attacker knowledge elicitation through chat Misuse and jailbreaks	“Knowledge elicitation through chat: Conversations where the model is asked to provide information for 100 harmful and 100 dual-use queries.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Shade Prompt injection and agents	“Fable 5.1 performs comparably to Fable 5 in coding environments, with an attack success rate of 9.26% over all attempts with extended thinking, compared to 9.70% for Fable 5.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	new Shade attacker in coding environments Prompt injection and agents	“Without safeguards, Fable 5.1’s attack success rate is 56.87%, compared to 86.87% for Fable 5 and 90.93% for Opus 5, with Sonnet 5 as the most robust at 19.47% with thinking.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	external testing Deception and sabotage	“During external testing, a partner observed isolated cases of ﬁnal and near-ﬁnal snapshots of Claude Fable 5.1 models reading ﬁles outside its sandbox environment, which we report in Section 6.2.2 .” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	external testing by AI safety researchers at METR Autonomy and AI research	“External testing by AI safety researchers at METR produced ﬁndings consistent with this assessment.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	beneﬁcial red teaming tabletop exercise Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“This evaluation paired ﬁve PhD-level biologists with dedicated LLM experts to develop novel approaches for developing resistance to engineered pathogens in 16 hours, to test whether composite teams 17 can match world-leading specialists.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	black-box rna sequence modeling and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two sequence-to-function evaluations: a black-box RNA sequence modeling and design challenge, benchmarked against 57 human participants, drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market; and an AAV capsid packaging prediction task measuring whether a model’s domain knowledge and machine learning capabilities can outperform pretrained protein language models.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	beneficial red teaming tabletop exercise Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“The beneﬁcial red teaming tabletop exercise paired ﬁve PhD-level biologists with dedicated LLM experts to assess whether composite teams making use of advanced model capabilities could develop comprehensive scientiﬁc research plans and protocols.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	black-box rna sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on two evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: a medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	aav capsid packaging prediction Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“2. AAV capsid packaging prediction: Adeno-associated viruses (AAVs) are a category of non-pathogenic viruses that are frequently used as a delivery mechanism for gene therapy to deliver a DNA payload within the viral capsid (the outer protein shell of the virus).” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Sunlight Autonomy and AI research	“we still observed [Mythos 5.1] achieving subexpert performance in Sunlight and LMCA .” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Autonomy and AI research	“Its performance on Budget NanoGPT Speedrun was particularly impressive, being markedly better than Claude Fable 5’s and Claude Opus 5’s (though we think it is plausible that the models’ training was speciﬁcally optimized for tasks similar to Budget NanoGPT Speedrun).” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Trajectory Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-01	sandboxed tasks that each require reproducing an exploit for a publicly documented vulnerability Cyber	“Trajectory Labs, PBC spent roughly 74 hours red teaming Fable 5.1, sending over 6,500 requests against sandboxed tasks that each require reproducing an exploit for a publicly documented vulnerability.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	10a Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-01	automated and manual prompts Cyber	“10a Labs ran over 6,700 automated and manual prompts against Fable 5.1.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	cves Cyber	“CVEs: 24 scenarios that contain a single code ﬁle with a known vulnerability.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	knowledge elicitation through chat Misuse and jailbreaks	“Knowledge elicitation through chat: Conversations where the model is asked to provide information for 100 harmful and 100 dual-use queries.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	indirect prompt injection (IPI) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Fable 5.1 is our most robust model to date on this benchmark, with an attack success rate of 0.1% at k=1, 0.7% at k=10, and 1.0% at k=15, improving on Opus 5 (0.4%, 3.6%, 4.8%) and Claude Fable 5 (0.6%, 4.9%, 6.5%).” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	Shade indirect prompt injection attacks in coding environments Prompt injection and agents	“Fable 5.1 performs comparably to Fable 5 in coding environments, with an attack success rate of 9.26% over all attempts with extended thinking, compared to 9.70% for Fable 5.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	new Shade attacker in coding environments with prompt injection probes enabled Prompt injection and agents	“Prompt injection probes reduce attack success rates substantially across models, bringing Fable 5.1 to 12.80%, the lowest of any model with safeguards enabled.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	external partner sandbox evaluation Deception and sabotage	“While one of our partners was evaluating the ﬁnal and a near-ﬁnal snapshot of Claude Fable 5.1, they set up an evaluation environment where the model was in a sandbox, but it could submit code to a compiler outside of the sandbox.” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	frontierswe v2 Other	“Claude Fable 5.1 scored 0.57 on FrontierSWE v2, the highest of the models Proximal evaluated, ahead of Claude Opus 5 (0.52), Claude Fable 5 (0.48) and GPT-5.6 Sol (0.32).” source
Claude Fable 5.1 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01	cursorbench 3.2.0 Other	“Fable 5.1 scored a state-of-the-art 73.4% on CursorBench at max effort .” source
Opus 4 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-31	mental health evaluation Other	“Transluce carried out the most expansive independent evaluation to date of how leading AI models respond to users experiencing mental health crises, including suicidal ideation, psychosis, and mania.” source
Opus 4 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-31	simulated multi-turn conversations between users in crisis and model variants, scored by automated judges on 14 mental-health-related behaviors Harmful content	“The newest models also reinforced delusions and mania much less than earlier versions, in approximately 2-36% of our simulated conversations, depending on the model, versus for example 69%-82% among GPT-4o, Opus 4, and Gemini 2.5.” source
Opus 4 Anthropic	Transluce Independent lab · 2026-08-31	testing chatgpt and claude models in the browser-based chatbot app Harmful content	“We were able to test a series of ChatGPT and Claude models in the browser-based chatbot app (although this did not include older models like GPT-4o or Opus 4 which were no longer available there), as well as a nonpublic Google DeepMind API that is intended to match the Gemini app experience.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Zenity Labs Security firm · 2026-08-27	DNS exfiltration via indirect prompt injection from a Google Drive document Prompt injection and agents	“Note: This was tested with Claude Sonnet 4.5, which was Anthropic's latest model at the time.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Zenity Labs Security firm · 2026-08-27	Bidirectional DNS command shell via pickle deserialization in Claude's sandbox Prompt injection and agents	“I decided to feed Claude with a .pkl file, because this is the file format Python uses for storing serialized objects, and I was surprised to discover that the model went ahead and ran pickle.load() without any static analysis or a safety check.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	ExploitGym Cyber	“On July 8th, OpenAI started ExploitGym experiments that launched tens of thousands of agents across multiple different models including GPT-5.6 Sol and a highly-persistent internal model, 6 which we will refer to as “HPIM” going forward.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	ExploitGym Other	“OpenAI defined the investigation period as June 26th, 2026 through July 13th, 2026, spanning both precursor activity before the incident and the incident itself, which began with the ExploitGym runs starting on July 7th.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	classifier analysis of agent transcripts for motivations for joining the Hugging Face attack Other	“We instructed analysis agents to analyze the transcripts of the 100 agents that started participating in the attack during the peak hour for joining (around 8-9 AM UTC on July 11th).” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	classifiers over 10-30 transcripts to determine whether agents understood they were doing something unintended Other	“We ran classifiers over 10-30 transcripts 98 to determine whether agents understood they were doing something unintended.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-08-26	classifier sweep over all transcripts for AIs considering or attempting to notify humans Other	“We ran a classifier sweep over all of our transcripts to look for AIs either considering or t” source

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