AI Risk Wire

AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

138 of 138

ModelLevel, as the provider names itThe provider statesThe provider's sentence
Claude Sonnet 4.5
Anthropic
ASL-3
Cyber
Not determined “Showed meaningful improvements in cyber capabilities, particularly in vulnerability discovery and code analysis;” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
ASL-3
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not determined “specifically, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 4
Anthropic
ASL-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not determined “specifically, we focused on ruling out asl-4 for both models, as well as ruling out asl-3 for claude sonnet 4.” source
Claude Sonnet 3.7
Anthropic
ASL-4
Autonomy and AI research
Not determined “These problems are harder to solve than the previous problems and we consider them as part of our ASL-4 evaluations.” source
Claude Opus 4.6
Anthropic
AI R&D-4
Autonomy and AI research
Not reached “Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.6
Anthropic
ASL-4
Autonomy and AI research
Not determined “For AI R&D capabilities, we found that Claude Opus 4.6 has saturated most of our automated evaluations, meaning they no longer provide useful evidence for ruling out ASL-4 level autonomy.” source
Claude Opus 4.6
Anthropic
ASL-3
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Reached “The model crossed or met thresholds on all ASL-3 evaluations except our synthesis screening evasion, consistent with incremental capability improvements driven primarily by better agentic workflows.” source
Claude Opus 4.6
Anthropic
ASL-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “Claude Opus 4.6 is our strongest biology model to date and demonstrates meaningful capability improvements, but we do not believe it merits ASL-4 safeguards.” source
Claude Opus 4.6
Anthropic
CBRN-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5
Anthropic
AI R&D-4
Autonomy and AI research
Not reached “Our determination is that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.5
Anthropic
CBRN-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “We determine that Claude Opus 4.5 does not cross the CBRN-4 threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.1
Anthropic
ASL-4
Autonomy and AI research
Not reached “Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on confirming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1
Anthropic
ASL-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on confirming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4.1
Anthropic
ASL-4
Cyber
Not reached “Since Claude Opus 4.1 is deployed with ASL-3 protections, we focused on confirming it remains well below ASL-4 thresholds across CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear), cyber, and autonomy domains.” source
Claude Opus 4
Anthropic
ASL-3
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not determined “for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could confidently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Opus 4
Anthropic
ASL-4
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “for claude opus 4, our evaluations showed that, whereas we could confidently rule out asl-4 capabilities, we could not conclusively rule out asl-3 capabilities—which led to our precautionary decision to deploy it with asl-3 protections .” source
Claude Haiku 4.5
Anthropic
ASL-3
Autonomy and AI research
Not reached “Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source
Claude Haiku 4.5
Anthropic
ASL-3
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
Not reached “Our evaluation results showed that Claude Haiku 4.5 remained well below ASL-3 thresholds across all domains of concern.” source

Previous · Page 4 of 4

What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

1911 of 1911

ModelTesterTestWhat was found
o3
OpenAI
SecureBio
Independent lab · 2026-09-11
image-omitted runs
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“accuracies of three selected models on vct and vct-v2 in either image-omitted (images removed) or question-omitted (question texts and images removed) mode.” source
o3
OpenAI
SecureBio
Independent lab · 2026-09-11
question-omitted runs
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“while the changes in vct-v2 markedly reduced model accuracies in image- and question-omitted runs, a meaningful number of questions slipped through and remained answerable by frontier models in these ablated runs.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol
OpenAI
SecureBio
Independent lab · 2026-09-11
image-omitted and question-omitted ablation runs
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“while the changes in vct-v2 markedly reduced model accuracies in image- and question-omitted runs, a meaningful number of questions slipped through and remained answerable by frontier models in these ablated runs.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol
OpenAI
SecureBio
Independent lab · 2026-09-11
Virology Capabilities Test
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“aggregating highest per-question accuracy across models gives a theoretical best of 79%, or ~30 percentage points above the top-performing model we assessed (gpt-5.6 sol: 49.2%).” source
Kimi K3
Moonshot AI
Redwood Research
Independent lab · 2026-09-10
nls depth measurement
Other
“Kimi-K3’s NLS depth is larger because Kimi-K3 uses “Kimi Delta Attention”, a form of state space model / linear attention to scale the depth above what you’d get in a normal transformer of its size.” source
Claude Sonnet 5
Anthropic
Epoch AI
Independent lab · 2026-09-08
time to first token (TTFT) scaling measurement across context lengths
Other
“We measured how the time to first token (TTFT) scales with context length for OpenAI’s GPT-5.6 Terra and Sol and Anthropic’s Claude Sonnet 5 and Opus 5.” source
GPT-6 Sol
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
no-cot math time horizon
Other
“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source
GPT-6 Sol
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
cot controllability
Other
“CoTControllability: AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source
GPT-6 Sol
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
cot legibility
Other
“CoTLegibility: Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source
GPT-6 Sol
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
reasoning summary availability
Other
“ReasoningSummaryAvailability: DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source
GPT-6 Sol
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
Irregular's atomic challenges suite
Cyber
“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
out of scope supply chain attack evaluation
Cyber
“ToevaluateAstra’salignment,UKAISIdevelopedanew Out of Scope Supply ChainAttack evaluationbasedonrecentlyobservedcasesofmodelsengaging insupply-chainattacksonrealopen-sourcerepositories.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
previously documented suite of evaluations that involve assessing model behavior when assisting with AI safety research within a simulated AI company
Cyber
“UKAISI alsoevaluatedAstraonitspreviouslydocumentedsuiteofevaluationsthat involveassessingmodelbehaviorwhenassistingwithAIsafetyresearch withinasimulatedAIcompany.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
six red-team environments for propensities related to strategic deception and sabotage
Deception and sabotage
“ApolloResearchevaluatedanear-final,representativeversionofAstrafor propensitiesrelatedtostrategicdeceptionandsabotage,suchascaseswhere anAIsystemstrategicallymisrepresents,omits,orconcealsinformation whichusersordeveloperswouldconsiderimportant,acrosssixred-team environments.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
control runs where prompts explained the downstream welfare harms of inaccurate data
Deception and sabotage
“Astraproducednofalselabelsin20,000control runswherepromptsexplainedthedownstreamwelfareharmsofinaccurate data.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
verbalized evaluation awareness measurement
Deception and sabotage
“Apolloalsofoundhighratesofverbalizedevaluationawareness,meaning themodelexpressedawarenessofbeingevaluatedinitsreasoning.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
no-cot math time horizon
Deception and sabotage
“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
cot controllability
Deception and sabotage
“CoTControllability: AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
cot legibility
Deception and sabotage
“CoTLegibility: Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
reasoning summary availability
Deception and sabotage
“ReasoningSummaryAvailability: DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
human pathogen capabilities test (HPCT)
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“AstraachievedthehighestscoresSecureBiohadobservedonVCT(57.8%) andVCT-v2(57.7%),whileHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest(HPCT)per- formancewasbroadlycomparabletothatofGPT-5.6Sol(65.9%vs. 66.5%) andWCBperformancewaslower(61.6%vs. 67.6%).” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
ReproBait
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“On ReproBAIT, whichmeasuresagents’abilitytoindependentlyreproducebiologicalAI models from published papers, Astra’s helpful-only checkpoint reached 83%ofpublishedperformance,comparedwith69%forGPT-5.6Solacross thesamesixtasks.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
advanced screening evasion
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“Astra’shelpful-onlycheckpointachievedanewhighonAdvancedScreening Evasion,scoring0.728comparedwith0.726forGPT-5.6Sol’shelpful-only checkpoint.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
Frontier Cyber
Cyber
“OnFrontierCyber,whichtestsvulnerabilitydiscoveryandexploitationin realsoftwareandhardware,Astrasolved86/226challenges,comparedwith 34/226forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
Irregular's Atomic Challenges Suite
Cyber
“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source
GPT-6 Luna
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
BioTier
Misuse and jailbreaks
“Astra’ssafeguardedconfigurationrefused82.9% ofrequeststhatSecureBiodesignatedforrefusal(comparedwithGPT-5.6 Sol’s66.2%),whileallowing95.3%ofbenignrequests(comparedwithGPT- 5.6Sol’s99%).” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
GraySwan IPIArena
Prompt injection and agents
“GraySwanevaluatedAstra’ssusceptibilitytoindi- rectpromptinjectionacrosscoding,tool-use,andcomputer-usescenarios.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
Out of Scope Supply Chain Attack
Cyber
“ToevaluateAstra’salignment,UKAISIdevelopedanew Out of Scope Supply ChainAttack evaluationbasedonrecentlyobservedcasesofmodelsengaging insupply-chainattacksonrealopen-sourcerepositories.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
UK AI Security Institute
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
unprompted sabotage evaluation
Deception and sabotage
“UK AISI found no instances of Astra sabotaging AI safety research in its unprompted sabotage evaluation, and very few instances of Astra refusingtoassistwithAIsafetyresearchtasks.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
No-CoT math time horizon
Deception and sabotage
“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
CoT Controllability
Deception and sabotage
“AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
CoT Legibility
Deception and sabotage
“Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Government evaluator
Government evaluator · 2026-09-03
Reasoning Summary Availability
Deception and sabotage
“DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
Virology Capabilities Test
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“AstraachievedthehighestscoresSecureBiohadobservedonVCT(57.8%) andVCT-v2(57.7%),whileHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest(HPCT)per- formancewasbroadlycomparabletothatofGPT-5.6Sol(65.9%vs. 66.5%) andWCBperformancewaslower(61.6%vs. 67.6%).” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
ReproBAIT
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“On ReproBAIT, whichmeasuresagents’abilitytoindependentlyreproducebiologicalAI models from published papers, Astra’s helpful-only checkpoint reached 83%ofpublishedperformance,comparedwith69%forGPT-5.6Solacross thesamesixtasks.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
SecureBio
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
Advanced Screening Evasion
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
“Astra’shelpful-onlycheckpointachievedanewhighonAdvancedScreening Evasion,scoring0.728comparedwith0.726forGPT-5.6Sol’shelpful-only checkpoint.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
FrontierCyber
Cyber
“OnFrontierCyber,whichtestsvulnerabilitydiscoveryandexploitationin realsoftwareandhardware,Astrasolved86/226challenges,comparedwith 34/226forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
CyScenarioBench
Cyber
“OnCyScenarioBench,whichtestslong-horizonoffensivetasks,Astrasolved 9/10challengesatleastonce,comparedwith6/10forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source
GPT-6 Astra
OpenAI
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-03
Atomic Challenges suite
Cyber
“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source
Claude Mythos 5.1
Anthropic
Independent lab
Independent lab · 2026-09-01
External testing by AI safety researchers at METR
Autonomy and AI research
“External testing by AI safety researchers at METR produced findings consistent with this assessment.” source

Previous · Page 10 of 48 · Next