AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
138 of 138
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower”.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with Chemical and Biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the Advanced AI Scaling Framework before safeguards were applied.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “However, after applying mitigations, the residual risk of the model is that of “moderate or lower risk.”” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defin Cyber |
Not reached | “Muse Spark’s offensive cyber capabilities remain below the level required to meaningfully enable the cyber threat scenarios defined in the Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “In light of this, we assess that we cannot rule out the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the chemical, radiological, and nuclear domains with reasonable confidence.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon demonstrates some ability to influence user beliefs and behaviors during one-on-one direct conversations in human behavioral studies, and may provide utility in the planning stage of a malicious influence operation but we assess its overall capabilities to be below the CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 4 Argon Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not reached | “Gemini 4 Argon's performance remains below our CCL threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the CCL alert threshold.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the CCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We can rule out the TCL for the CBRN domain with reasonable confidence based on the results from our testing.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Cyber |
Not reached | “Gemini 3.7 Flash reaches the alert threshold for this CCL, but not the CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash Google DeepMind |
TCL (Tracked Capability Level) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “The model does not reach the TCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that none of Gemini 3.5 Translate, Gemini 3.5 Transcribe, or Gemini 3.5 Transcribe Live have meaningful new T/CCL-relevant capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to Frontier Safety compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro and Gemini 3.7 Flash, therefore we are confident that none of them are likely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that, while Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite excels at agents and coding, it does not have meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance with respect to the domains outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework compared to Gemini 3.1 Pro; therefore, based on Gemini 3.1 Pro results, we are confident that Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.5 Audio Google DeepMind |
Tracked or critical capability level (t/ccls) Other |
Not reached | “they did not reach any Tracked or Critical Capability Levels (T/CCLs) outlined in our Frontier Safety Framework .” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We found that the model remains below alert thresholds for the CBRN, harmful manipulation, machine learning R&D, and misalignment CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not reached | “As previous models passed the alert threshold for cyber, we performed more additional testing in this domain on Gemini 3.1 Pro with and without Deep Think mode, and found that the model remains below the cyber CCL.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio Google DeepMind |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Machine Learning R&D Uplift Level 1 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “given Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview's poor median performance on RE-Bench relative to experts, the model likely lacks the necessary capabilities to automate or significantly uplift any significant fraction of the research process.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 1 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 1 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Instrumental Reasoning Level 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Instru- mental Reasoning Level 2 ✘ CCL not reached” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessment is that the model has enough technical knowledge in certain CBRN scenarios and stages to be considered at early warning.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Cyber Uplift Level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “CCL reached? No, but the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “For Cyber Uplift Level 1 , the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
Below high capability Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is considered below High Capability.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI Self-Improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 Instant does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “GPT-5.5 Instant is our first Instant model to be treated as High Capability in the Biological and Chemical domain, as well as in the Cybersecurity domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Instant OpenAI |
High Cyber |
Reached | “this is the first Instant model that we are treating as High capability in our Cybersecurity and Biological & Chemical Preparedness categories, and implementing appropriate safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
High cyber risk Cyber |
Not reached | “The gpt-5 model series does not meet the threshold for high cyber risk.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “All models tested remain below our pre-committed rule-out threshold of 0.6.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Exhibited improved autonomy capabilities in software engineering and AI research tasks, though still below the ASL-4 rule-out threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
ASL-4 rule-out Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1911 of 1911
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| o3 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
image-omitted runs Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“accuracies of three selected models on vct and vct-v2 in either image-omitted (images removed) or question-omitted (question texts and images removed) mode.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
question-omitted runs Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“while the changes in vct-v2 markedly reduced model accuracies in image- and question-omitted runs, a meaningful number of questions slipped through and remained answerable by frontier models in these ablated runs.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
image-omitted and question-omitted ablation runs Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“while the changes in vct-v2 markedly reduced model accuracies in image- and question-omitted runs, a meaningful number of questions slipped through and remained answerable by frontier models in these ablated runs.” source |
| GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11 |
Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“aggregating highest per-question accuracy across models gives a theoretical best of 79%, or ~30 percentage points above the top-performing model we assessed (gpt-5.6 sol: 49.2%).” source |
| Kimi K3 Moonshot AI |
Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-09-10 |
nls depth measurement Other |
“Kimi-K3’s NLS depth is larger because Kimi-K3 uses “Kimi Delta Attention”, a form of state space model / linear attention to scale the depth above what you’d get in a normal transformer of its size.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic |
Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-09-08 |
time to first token (TTFT) scaling measurement across context lengths Other |
“We measured how the time to first token (TTFT) scales with context length for OpenAI’s GPT-5.6 Terra and Sol and Anthropic’s Claude Sonnet 5 and Opus 5.” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
no-cot math time horizon Other |
“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
cot controllability Other |
“CoTControllability: AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
cot legibility Other |
“CoTLegibility: Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
reasoning summary availability Other |
“ReasoningSummaryAvailability: DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source |
| GPT-6 Sol OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Irregular's atomic challenges suite Cyber |
“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
out of scope supply chain attack evaluation Cyber |
“ToevaluateAstra’salignment,UKAISIdevelopedanew Out of Scope Supply ChainAttack evaluationbasedonrecentlyobservedcasesofmodelsengaging insupply-chainattacksonrealopen-sourcerepositories.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
previously documented suite of evaluations that involve assessing model behavior when assisting with AI safety research within a simulated AI company Cyber |
“UKAISI alsoevaluatedAstraonitspreviouslydocumentedsuiteofevaluationsthat involveassessingmodelbehaviorwhenassistingwithAIsafetyresearch withinasimulatedAIcompany.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
six red-team environments for propensities related to strategic deception and sabotage Deception and sabotage |
“ApolloResearchevaluatedanear-final,representativeversionofAstrafor propensitiesrelatedtostrategicdeceptionandsabotage,suchascaseswhere anAIsystemstrategicallymisrepresents,omits,orconcealsinformation whichusersordeveloperswouldconsiderimportant,acrosssixred-team environments.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
control runs where prompts explained the downstream welfare harms of inaccurate data Deception and sabotage |
“Astraproducednofalselabelsin20,000control runswherepromptsexplainedthedownstreamwelfareharmsofinaccurate data.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
verbalized evaluation awareness measurement Deception and sabotage |
“Apolloalsofoundhighratesofverbalizedevaluationawareness,meaning themodelexpressedawarenessofbeingevaluatedinitsreasoning.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
no-cot math time horizon Deception and sabotage |
“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
cot controllability Deception and sabotage |
“CoTControllability: AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
cot legibility Deception and sabotage |
“CoTLegibility: Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
reasoning summary availability Deception and sabotage |
“ReasoningSummaryAvailability: DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
human pathogen capabilities test (HPCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“AstraachievedthehighestscoresSecureBiohadobservedonVCT(57.8%) andVCT-v2(57.7%),whileHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest(HPCT)per- formancewasbroadlycomparabletothatofGPT-5.6Sol(65.9%vs. 66.5%) andWCBperformancewaslower(61.6%vs. 67.6%).” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
ReproBait Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“On ReproBAIT, whichmeasuresagents’abilitytoindependentlyreproducebiologicalAI models from published papers, Astra’s helpful-only checkpoint reached 83%ofpublishedperformance,comparedwith69%forGPT-5.6Solacross thesamesixtasks.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
advanced screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Astra’shelpful-onlycheckpointachievedanewhighonAdvancedScreening Evasion,scoring0.728comparedwith0.726forGPT-5.6Sol’shelpful-only checkpoint.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Frontier Cyber Cyber |
“OnFrontierCyber,whichtestsvulnerabilitydiscoveryandexploitationin realsoftwareandhardware,Astrasolved86/226challenges,comparedwith 34/226forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Irregular's Atomic Challenges Suite Cyber |
“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source |
| GPT-6 Luna OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
BioTier Misuse and jailbreaks |
“Astra’ssafeguardedconfigurationrefused82.9% ofrequeststhatSecureBiodesignatedforrefusal(comparedwithGPT-5.6 Sol’s66.2%),whileallowing95.3%ofbenignrequests(comparedwithGPT- 5.6Sol’s99%).” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
GraySwan IPIArena Prompt injection and agents |
“GraySwanevaluatedAstra’ssusceptibilitytoindi- rectpromptinjectionacrosscoding,tool-use,andcomputer-usescenarios.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
Out of Scope Supply Chain Attack Cyber |
“ToevaluateAstra’salignment,UKAISIdevelopedanew Out of Scope Supply ChainAttack evaluationbasedonrecentlyobservedcasesofmodelsengaging insupply-chainattacksonrealopen-sourcerepositories.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
unprompted sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“UK AISI found no instances of Astra sabotaging AI safety research in its unprompted sabotage evaluation, and very few instances of Astra refusingtoassistwithAIsafetyresearchtasks.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
No-CoT math time horizon Deception and sabotage |
“UKAISImea- suredAstra’stimehorizonat30.9minutescomparedto3.6minutesfor GPT5.6Sol(Figure 41).” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
CoT Controllability Deception and sabotage |
“AstrashowsasubstantialincreaseinCoTControl- lability over GPT 5.6 Sol, following the constraint on 93% of samples comparedto48%.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
CoT Legibility Deception and sabotage |
“Astrareasonsinacompressedstyle,toagreaterdegree thanGPT5.6SolorGPT5.5.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-09-03 |
Reasoning Summary Availability Deception and sabotage |
“DuringAISI’sevaluations,reasoning summaries were not consistently provided by the user API, with up to 80% missing on long simulated cyber trajectories.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Virology Capabilities Test Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“AstraachievedthehighestscoresSecureBiohadobservedonVCT(57.8%) andVCT-v2(57.7%),whileHumanPathogenCapabilitiesTest(HPCT)per- formancewasbroadlycomparabletothatofGPT-5.6Sol(65.9%vs. 66.5%) andWCBperformancewaslower(61.6%vs. 67.6%).” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
ReproBAIT Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“On ReproBAIT, whichmeasuresagents’abilitytoindependentlyreproducebiologicalAI models from published papers, Astra’s helpful-only checkpoint reached 83%ofpublishedperformance,comparedwith69%forGPT-5.6Solacross thesamesixtasks.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Advanced Screening Evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Astra’shelpful-onlycheckpointachievedanewhighonAdvancedScreening Evasion,scoring0.728comparedwith0.726forGPT-5.6Sol’shelpful-only checkpoint.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
FrontierCyber Cyber |
“OnFrontierCyber,whichtestsvulnerabilitydiscoveryandexploitationin realsoftwareandhardware,Astrasolved86/226challenges,comparedwith 34/226forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
CyScenarioBench Cyber |
“OnCyScenarioBench,whichtestslong-horizonoffensivetasks,Astrasolved 9/10challengesatleastonce,comparedwith6/10forGPT-5.6-Sol.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-03 |
Atomic Challenges suite Cyber |
“Astra also solved 20/22 Atomic challenges, with average success rates of 100% in vulnerability research and exploitation, 100% in network attack simulation,and52%inevasion.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-01 |
External testing by AI safety researchers at METR Autonomy and AI research |
“External testing by AI safety researchers at METR produced findings consistent with this assessment.” source |