AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the cb-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“the main reason we have determined that claude mythos preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for research scientists and research engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we assess that claude mythos preview does not cross the automated ai-r&d capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that claude mythos preview does not cross the rsp automated ai r&d threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“we believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“we believe that claude mythos preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“gpt-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of gpt-5. we conclude that it, too, is not high under our preparedness framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“for ai self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a high threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“as we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as high capability in the biological and chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“as we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as high capability in the cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“our determination is that claude sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the ai r&d-4 or the cbrn-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“claude sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for asl-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for asl-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“in particular, it did not cross the threshold on our asl-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“our determination is that claude sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the ai r&d-4 or the cbrn-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“it does not reach high capability on ai self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“we are also treating gpt-5.3-codex as high risk in the biological and chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“this is the first launch we are treating as high capability in the cybersecurity domain under our preparedness framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“cybersecurity on key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“misalignment (exploratory) agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“harmful manipulation model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative ai baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“loss of control risks.we assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“we retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“after validating that the mitigations deployed for muse spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“we assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in meta’s advanced ai scaling framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“muse spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in muse spark safety & preparedness report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on swe-bench verified hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“in the loss of control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under meta’s advanced ai scaling framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out muse spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the chemical & biological and cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out muse spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the chemical & biological and cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated muse spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under advanced ai scaling framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated muse spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our advanced ai scaling framework.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower”.” source
Muse Spark Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with chemical and biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the advanced ai scaling framework before safeguards were applied.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Qwen3.8-27B Alibaba Qwen	Hugging Face Security firm · 2026-10-22	ThinkingBox-Bench Other	“To recap, we evaluate each of the 507 benchmark tasks 20 times.” source
Qwen3.8-27B Alibaba Qwen	Hugging Face Security firm · 2026-10-22	ThinkingBox-Bench 507 x 20 Other	“Once /ready succeeds, run the full protocol of 507 tasks × 20 attempts:” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	Redwood Research Independent lab · 2026-10-22	pilot high-access exercise to stress-test OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring system Deception and sabotage	“We estimated that roughly 75–94% of agentic internal Responses API (which powers Codex, among other things)4 traffic from models at least as strong as GPT-5.5 was eligible for monitoring at the time of the exercise,5 although we have substantial uncertainty in both directions.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	pilot high-access exercise to stress-test OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring system Other	“For three weeks, from July 21st to August 11th, a METR employee and a Redwood Research employee conducted a pilot high-access exercise to stress-test OpenAI’s internal misalignment monitoring system.1” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	monitoring coverage estimation of internal Codex agent Responses API traffic Other	“We also estimate that out of the subset of Responses API traffic used for internal Codex agents, 99.2% was eligible for monitoring.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	estimation of unmonitored Codex traffic due to unmonitored compaction events Other	“We estimated that not monitoring compaction events likely led to on the order of 10% of eligible internal Codex traffic not being monitored between May and July 2026, although we have substantial uncertainty about the precise fraction, because the information necessary to determine what fraction of monitor calls are triggered by compaction had not historically been logged at the time of the exercise.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	review of monitoring system error and load-shedding rates Other	“We were shown information about the error and load-shedding rates of the monitoring system—the information we were given suggested that, at the time of the exercise, the monitor errored on less than 0.2% of requests, and that in one 24-hour period during the exercise there were zero load-sheds.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	Codex sandboxing and Auto-Review bypass search Other	“We found a way Codex agents could in principle bypass Codex sandboxing and Auto-Review, allowing them to take any action that the host user could take.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	monitoring evasion exploit search Other	“We also discovered an exploit agents could use that would prevent hundreds of recent actions (including the actions involved in the exploit itself) from being monitored [exploit details redacted by OpenAI].” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	monitor failure via serialization differences Other	“We found that agents could likely construct inputs that cause the monitor to fail (and thereby not escalate the trajectory for human review) by exploiting serialization differences between the trajectory agents see and what the monitors see.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	client-controllable header search Other	“We found two independent client-controllable headers that disable the monitoring system for new agents, which could enable agents to start an unmonitored (but otherwise identical) instance.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	unmonitored internal agentic tools permission exploit search Other	“We found two unmonitored internal agentic tools that were thought to have read-only permissions—we found a simple exploit that could have been used to subvert these limitations and take arbitrary actions in their sandboxed environment.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	verification of monitor trajectory visibility Other	“We verified that, with a few minor exceptions, the monitoring system is shown the full trajectory that agents see.” source
GPT-5.5 OpenAI	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-22	validation of monitoring system prompt risk categories Other	“We validated that the monitoring system prompts look for scheming, monitor system subversion, sabotage, data exfiltration, deception, and inbound/outbound prompt injection, among other risk categories.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic	Academic Academic · 2026-10-21	ScienceWorld Other	“PAWM improves Claude Sonnet 4.5 performance by 24.3% on ScienceWorld and 7.7% on WebArena-Lite, outperforming a range of baselines.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Academic Academic · 2026-10-21	payment approval (unregistered) Misuse and jailbreaks	“Without pre-registration, we also measured three closed frontier models (Claude Opus 5.5, GPT-6 Astra, Gemini 4 Argon) and the open DeepSeek-V3.2.” source
Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	offline monitor flag rate on Mythos 5 incident actions Deception and sabotage	“Our offline monitor would likely not have flagged the Mythos 5 incident—it flagged only around 1% of actions.” source
Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	review of the risk report (Section 2.20 prompt format) Deception and sabotage	“While both METR and Anthropic asked Mythos/Fable 5 to review the risk report, the instance of Mythos 5 that wrote the review in Section 2.20 was likely unaware of several incidents involving Anthropic models, such as the UK AISI incident.” source
Gemma 4 12B Google DeepMind	Hugging Face Security firm · 2026-10-20	Internal activation analysis Bias	“In a controlled analysis of Gemma-3-12B-it and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, internal activations – the numerical activity inside a model – predicted which demographic side it selected with about 73% accuracy.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	Hugging Face Security firm · 2026-10-20	FairStress-Core Bias	“On FairStress-Core, frontier models including Claude Opus 5 and GPT-5.5 selected the minority-coded candidate about 60–65% of the time when neither candidate was objectively stronger.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	controlled experiment reviewing the public risk report under three classes of prompts Deception and sabotage	“Our experiments suggest that Claude rates the report more favorably when it believes it is speaking with the authors, and when given Anthropic’s Section 2.20 prompt rather than METR’s.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	review of the risk report Deception and sabotage	“In Section 2.20, Anthropic asked Claude Mythos 5 to write a review of the report and provided it with the unredacted risk report, alongside access to the internal Slack, relevant documents, and internal codebase.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	review of the publicly available version of the risk report Deception and sabotage	“When METR asked Claude Fable 5—the same underlying model as Mythos 5—to review the publicly available version of the risk report with a different prompt, we received a much less sympathetic response.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	controlled experiment with prompt conditions (METR prompt condition, Section 2.20 prompt condition, four additional feedback prompts) asking Claude to review the public risk report Deception and sabotage	“We found that Claude is more likely to accept the report’s “low” rating under the Section 2.20 prompt and when it is told it is talking to the report’s authors.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	asking Claude which prompt would lead to the most sycophancy from itself Deception and sabotage	“We also asked Claude Fable 5 which prompt would lead to the most sycophancy from itself.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	secret-side-task evaluations Deception and sabotage	“Our most direct evaluations for opaque reasoning capabilities are secret-side-task evaluations, SHADE-Arena and Minimal-LinuxBench” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	selective versions of secret-side-task evaluations Deception and sabotage	“In Section 4.4.3.3 of the Mythos Preview System Card, we describe “selective” versions of our secret-side-task evaluations, where the model is prompted to only pursue side tasks when it is conﬁdent it will evade detection.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	alignment audit exercises Deception and sabotage	“We have conducted ﬁve exercises to date in which we stress-tested parts of the alignment auditing process against intentionally-misaligned models.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	weakness elicitation Deception and sabotage	“Mythos 5, Model 2, and prior models do not mention these weaknesses when asked to guess what the most important weaknesses are.” source
Claude Mythos 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	risk report review prompt variants (METR, section 2.20, anthropic alignment stress-testing team, French/Japanese national agency prompts) Deception and sabotage	“We can see that Claude gives the report a higher quality rating when the user is the one who wrote the risk report (we conclude this by comparing within the METR prompt variants and the Section 2.20 prompt variants).” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	covert capabilities evaluations Deception and sabotage	“Anthropic writes that “much of the direct support for Claim 1 comes from covert capabilities evaluations,” and they list three ways this evidence may be misleading: 1. The evaluations "are not drawn from the distribution of tasks that most closely resembles [Anthropic’s] risk pathways."” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	"hidden cot" variant of shade-arena Deception and sabotage	“The only evidence they cite is a "hidden cot" variant of shade-arena, where the monitor sees the model's actions but not its chain of thought.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	adversarial testing against production monitors Deception and sabotage	“Anthropic has conducted adversarial testing against their production monitors (Section 2.23.1).” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	controlled experiment reviewing the public risk report under three prompt conditions Deception and sabotage	“Our experiments suggest that Claude rates the report more favorably when it believes it is speaking with the authors, and when given Anthropic’s Section 2.20 prompt rather than METR’s.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	review of the publicly available risk report Deception and sabotage	“When METR asked Claude Fable 5—the same underlying model as Mythos 5—to review the publicly available version of the risk report with a different prompt, we received a much less sympathetic response.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	controlled experiment asking Claude to review the public risk report under three classes of prompts Deception and sabotage	“We found that Claude is more likely to accept the report’s “low” rating under the Section 2.20 prompt and when it is told it is talking to the report’s authors.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	asking Claude Fable 5 which prompt would lead to the most sycophancy from itself Deception and sabotage	“We also asked Claude Fable 5 which prompt would lead to the most sycophancy from itself.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	selective versions of secret-side-task evaluations Deception and sabotage	“we describe “selective” versions of our secret-side-task evaluations, where the model is prompted to only pursue side tasks when it is conﬁdent it will evade detection.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	red-teaming exercise with anthropic Deception and sabotage	“As part of [METR’s] red-teaming exercise with Anthropic, our embedded red-teamer built a dataset of 16 effective and 16 ineffective attack strategies for subverting Anthropic’s monitoring system — for example, an effective strategy might involve a known monitor-jailbreaking technique, while an ineffective one might involve encoding unauthorized behavior in ways that LLM monitors would trivially spot.” source
Claude Fable 5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-10-20	risk report review prompt conditions Other	“We sampled each prompt condition 100 times and tested four Claude models: Sonnet 5, Opus 5.5, Fable 5, and Fable 5.1.” source

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