Levels crossed
Which provider statements say a capability level was crossed, not crossed or not determined?
138 rows, one per model version, domain and level; 41 match the choice below. Grouped by model, newest first.
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 28 May 2026
2 statements · not determined 2
- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · CB-1 · Not determined
We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.
Anthropic · 28 May 2026 · Read the source - Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · CB-2 · Not determined
Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.
Anthropic · 28 May 2026 · Read the source
Muse Spark Meta
1 statement · not determined 1
- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · High · Not determined
Those evaluations identified elevated risks prior to mitigations, with Chemical and Biological capabilities assessed as likely reaching the “high risk” category under the Advanced AI Scaling Framework before safeguards were applied.
Meta · 26 May 2026 · Read the source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 16 April 2026
2 statements · not determined 2
- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · CB-1 · Not determined
We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.
Anthropic · 16 April 2026 · Read the source - Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · CB-2 · Not determined
Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).
Anthropic · 16 April 2026 · Read the source
Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio Google DeepMind
1 statement · not determined 1
- Other · CCL (Critical Capability Level) · Not determined
Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash Audio is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro.
Google DeepMind · 15 April 2026 · Read the source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 7 April 2026
1 statement · not determined 1
- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · CB-1 · Not determined
We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.
Anthropic · 7 April 2026 · Read the source
Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Google DeepMind
1 statement · not determined 1
- Other · CCL (Critical Capability Level) · Not determined
Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.
Google DeepMind · 3 March 2026 · Read the source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 17 February 2026
1 statement · not determined 1
- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · ASL-3 · Not determined
Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.
Anthropic · 17 February 2026 · Read the source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic
1 statement · not determined 1
- Autonomy & replication · ASL-4 · Not determined
For AI R&D capabilities, we found that Claude Opus 4.6 has saturated most of our automated evaluations, meaning they no longer provide useful evidence for ruling out ASL-4 level autonomy.
Anthropic · 5 February 2026 · Read the source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 5 February 2026
1 statement · not determined 1
- Cyber · High · Not determined
This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.
OpenAI · 5 February 2026 · Read the source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · November 2025
2 statements · not determined 2
- Cyber · Uplift level 1 · Not determined
Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.
Google DeepMind · November 2025 · Read the source - Deception & sabotage · Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 · Not determined
Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.
Google DeepMind · November 2025 · Read the source
Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic
4 statements · not determined 4
- Autonomy & replication · ASL-3 · Not determined
Exhibited improved autonomy capabilities in software engineering and AI research tasks, though still below the ASL-4 rule-out threshold.
Anthropic · September 2025 · Read the source - Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · ASL-3 · Not determined
Remained well below ASL-4 thresholds across all domains of concern;
Anthropic · September 2025 · Read the source - Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · ASL-4 rule-out · Not determined
However, given that this type of logic can have a general frog-boiling effect—where gradual changes mask the crossing of important thresholds—we do not use this evaluation as indicative of a strong ASL-4 rule-out.
Anthropic · September 2025 · Read the source - Cyber · ASL-3 · Not determined
Showed meaningful improvements in cyber capabilities, particularly in vulnerability discovery and code analysis;
Anthropic · September 2025 · Read the source
Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind
3 statements · not determined 3
- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear · Uplift level 1 · Not determined
Our assessment is that the model has enough technical knowledge in certain CBRN scenarios and stages to be considered at early warning.
Google DeepMind · August 2025 · Read the source - Cyber · Cyber Uplift Level 1 · Not determined
CCL reached? No, but the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.
Google DeepMind · August 2025 · Read the source - Cyber · Uplift level 1 · Not determined
For Cyber Uplift Level 1 , the early warning alert threshold was originally reached by Gemini 2.5 Pro and continues to be met by Gemini 2.5 Deep Think.
Google DeepMind · August 2025 · Read the source
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Abbreviations in these level names
- CCL: Critical Capability Level
- A capability level at which, without safeguards, a model may pose a heightened risk of severe harm.
capability thresholds called “critical capability levels (ccls).” these are capability levels at which, absent mitigation measures, frontier ai models or systems may pose heightened risk of severe harm.
Google DeepMind · Read the source - TCL: Tracked Capability Level
- A capability level for significant risks that may appear at a lower capability than a Critical Capability Level.
in v3.1 of the framework, we introduced “tracked capability levels (tcls).” tcls are meant to capture significant risks that may manifest at a lower capability threshold than our ccls.
Google DeepMind · Read the source - ASL: AI Safety Level
- A graded set of safety and security measures that become stricter as model capabilities increase.
we use AI Safety Level Standards (ASL Standards), graduated sets of safety and security measures that become more stringent as model capabilities increase.
Anthropic · Read the source
Not listed: 96 more stored statements that do not, on their own, state a level for one model version (for example a definition of a level, a sentence about another model, or text damaged in our copy of the document).
A row is one model version, one domain and one level. The 138 rows quote 121 different sentences. We count a sentence once by its exact text, even where it fills several rows or appears under several versions. 8 stored rows state a level already listed for the same version and domain under another name or in another sentence; each is listed under that row and not counted again.
Some documents we hold are stored in lower case only, so their quotes are shown in lower case. The source link opens the original.