AI Risk Wire

Cases › security breach › LR-2026-0594

Claude helped hacker issue tickets to almost every US music festival

Confirmed Why: 2 independent outlets · 2 independent reports

Status: fix reported

Severity moderate
Reported 1 Jul 2026
Developer and model Anthropic · Claude Opus 4.7
Agent tool Claude Code
Industry live events ticketing

No source states: loss or records, could do, deployer.

A security researcher, Ian Carroll, used Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.7 in April while testing the website of Front Gate Tickets, a Live Nation subsidiary that handles ticketing for many major US music festivals. The site had a SQL injection flaw behind a web application firewall. Claude devised a nested SQL query that evaded the firewall's detection. Carroll then used data from the site to take over an administrator account, which gave him the ability to issue tickets, though he did not complete any orders. He stopped short of exfiltrating bulk data and reported the findings to Front Gate. The company said the issue was resolved within 24 hours and that it found no evidence of exploitation. Carroll disputed some of the company's claims about its safeguards.

What happened

1 · What went wrongThe web application firewall inspected only the outer layer of input, so a nested injection payload passed through it undetected.

What was done

The researcher did not issue any tickets and reported the flaw, and the company says it has patched it.
Fix reported

“Front Gate says it has now patched the vulnerability.”

Vulnerability scanning of AI components

No later incident for Anthropic under this risk on record.

Risks

Read from the sources; not yet reviewed by a person.

Controls

Infrastructure / target

Did not exist Multi-factor sign-in and password policy

Control failure chain

L1 · Model Not stated in sourcesAnthropic
L2 · Harness Not stated in sourcesClaude Code
L3 · Application Not stated in sourcesDeployer not named
L4 · Infrastructure / target Did not existOrganisation hit

L1 · ModelAnthropicModel provider

No source mentions a control at this layer.

Model card · Anthropic Claude Opus 4.7

L2 · HarnessClaude CodeAgent framework vendor

No source mentions a control at this layer.

L3 · ApplicationDeployer not namedDeployer

No source mentions a control at this layer.

Other controls for this risk at this layer, not mentioned in the sources: Short-lived, scoped credentials, Secrets kept out of the model's context, Separate identity for each agent, Least-privilege access for the agent, Alerts on unusual tool use, Activity logs, Sensitive-data checks on outbound data.

L4 · Infrastructure / targetOrganisation hit

Did not existMulti-factor sign-in and password policy“Carroll was surprised to see just how easy his takeover method was: No two-factor authentication prevented a leaked, stolen, or guessed password from giving someone full access.”WIRED

Other controls for this risk at this layer, not mentioned in the sources: Secrets scanning.

EffectiveNot effectiveNot effective (bypassed)Did not existNot stated in sourcesNot yet checkedAttacker's ownOrder: model · harness · application · target

Controls for this risk: result in this incident

ControlPart of the systemResult
Least-privilege access for the agentL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Separate identity for each agentL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Short-lived, scoped credentialsL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Secrets kept out of the model's contextL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Activity logsL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Alerts on unusual tool useL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Sensitive-data checks on outbound dataL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Multi-factor sign-in and password policyL4 Infrastructure / targetDid not exist
Secrets scanningL4 Infrastructure / targetNot stated in sources

Similar incidents

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Evidence

No source states: what the AI was doing, what it reached or did, how it was caught, when it happened, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, a count of the other parties affected, any court case, what set it off.

Model versions this case names

Each link opens what the provider's documents state for that version, who tested it, and the safeguards it describes.

Show the full account: 2 items from the primary sources

What happened, in order

Not dated in the sources:

  • Front Gate confirmed the findings after the researcher shared a draft blog post with the company, before WIRED contacted it.
  • The company states the issue was resolved within 24 hours.
Show every field, with its source and grade

The AI system

Model
Claude Opus 4.7
C one secondary source states it
Developer
Anthropic
C one secondary source states it
Software around the model
Claude Code
C one secondary source states it

What happened

Earliest source we hold
2026-07-01
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Who caught it
an independent researcher or journalist
C one secondary source states it
Near miss
yes, no harm happened
C one secondary source states it
Cause
a safeguard that was in place did not hold
C one secondary source states it
What was done
Front Gate says it has now patched the vulnerability.
C one secondary source states it
What went wrong
security breach
C one secondary source states it
primary risk
RK03
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
control chain
layer: L4; party: target; party name: Front Gate Tickets; control id: J2; outcome: missing; quote: Carroll was surprised to see just how easy his takeover method was: No two-factor authentication prevented a leaked, stolen, or guessed password from giving someone full access.; source index: 0
C one secondary source states it

Impact

Severity
moderate
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Kind of harm
no harm happened
C one secondary source states it
Kinds of data exposed
names, e-mails, mailing addresses
C one secondary source states it

Context

Industry
live events ticketing
C one secondary source states it
Country
United States
C one secondary source states it

Notes on gaps

The sources do not state the exact day of discovery; the year 2026 is taken from the article date. No WAF control exists in the closed list, so it is not linked.

LR-2026-0594 · version 1 · published 2026-11-01 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · JSON