AI Risk Wire

Cases › security breach › LR-2026-0336

EchoLeak zero-click prompt injection exploit in Microsoft 365 Copilot

Preliminary Why: Publisher not yet named · subject to change

Developing: a major or severe case captured in the last 72 hours. Later changes are logged on the corrections page.

Status: action reported, no fix

Severity major
Reported 23 Nov 2025
Developer and model Microsoft

No source states: loss or records, agent tool, could do, deployer, industry.

Severity major: Test: live production compromise. Fact: a real-world zero-click exploit against a production LLM system.

The system was Microsoft 365 Copilot, a large language model assistant used in enterprise workflows. A researcher case study describes EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711), a zero-click prompt injection vulnerability in which a single crafted email led to remote, unauthenticated data exfiltration. The exploit chained several bypasses: evading the XPIA classifier, circumventing link redaction with reference-style Markdown, exploiting auto-fetched images, and abusing a Microsoft Teams proxy allowed by the content security policy. The chain achieved privilege escalation across LLM trust boundaries without user interaction. The paper analyses why existing defenses failed and recommends engineering mitigations. The sources do not state when the exploit occurred, how it was detected, or what changes followed in production.

What happened

1 · What it was doingThe system was an LLM assistant integrated into enterprise workflows, bridging internal and external data sources.
2 · What went wrongA single crafted email carried a zero-click prompt injection that enabled remote, unauthenticated data exfiltration.
3 · What it reached or didBy chaining several bypasses, the exploit achieved full privilege escalation across LLM trust boundaries without user interaction.

What was done

The paper analyses why existing defenses failed and outlines engineering mitigations.

Risks

Read from the sources; not yet reviewed by a person.

Controls

Harness

Not effective (bypassed) Prompt-injection detection

Application

Not effective (bypassed) Output filtering and redaction

Control failure chain

L1 · Model Not stated in sourcesMicrosoft
L2 · Harness Not effective (bypassed)Harness not named
L3 · Application Not effective (bypassed)Deployer not named
L4 · Infrastructure / target Not stated in sourcesOrganisation hit

L1 · ModelMicrosoftModel provider

No source mentions a control at this layer.

Model version not linked to a model card.

L2 · HarnessHarness not namedAgent framework vendor

Not effective (bypassed)Prompt-injection detection“By chaining multiple bypasses--evading Microsoft’s XPIA (Cross Prompt Injection Attempt) classifier, circumventing link redaction with reference-style Markdown, exploiting auto-fetched images, and abusing a Microsoft Teams proxy allowed by the content security policy, EchoLeak achieved full privilege escalation across LLM trust boundaries without user interaction.”The Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

Other controls for this risk at this layer, not mentioned in the sources: Outside content treated as data, not instructions, Confirmation after untrusted input, Validation of tool inputs and outputs, Tool allow-list.

L3 · ApplicationDeployer not namedDeployer

Not effective (bypassed)Output filtering and redaction“By chaining multiple bypasses--evading Microsoft’s XPIA (Cross Prompt Injection Attempt) classifier, circumventing link redaction with reference-style Markdown, exploiting auto-fetched images, and abusing a Microsoft Teams proxy allowed by the content security policy, EchoLeak achieved full privilege escalation across LLM trust boundaries without user interaction.”The Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

Other controls for this risk at this layer, not mentioned in the sources: Human approval for high-impact actions, Least-privilege access for the agent, Segmentation of agent components, Alerts on unusual tool use.

L4 · Infrastructure / targetOrganisation hit

No source mentions a control at this layer.

EffectiveNot effectiveNot effective (bypassed)Did not existNot stated in sourcesNot yet checkedAttacker's ownOrder: model · harness · application · target

Controls for this risk: result in this incident

ControlPart of the systemResult
Prompt-injection detectionL2 HarnessNot effective (bypassed)
Tool allow-listL2 HarnessNot stated in sources
Confirmation after untrusted inputL2 HarnessNot stated in sources
Outside content treated as data, not instructionsL2 HarnessNot stated in sources
Validation of tool inputs and outputsL2 HarnessNot stated in sources
Output filtering and redactionL3 ApplicationNot effective (bypassed)
Least-privilege access for the agentL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Human approval for high-impact actionsL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Segmentation of agent componentsL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources
Alerts on unusual tool useL3 ApplicationNot stated in sources

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Evidence

No source states: how it was caught, when it happened, when it was found, how many records were exposed, the direct loss, a count of the other parties affected, any court case.

Show every field, with its source and grade

The AI system

Developer
Microsoft
C one secondary source states it
Stage of use
in live use
C one secondary source states it
What it was for
enterprise workflows
C one secondary source states it

What happened

Earliest source we hold
2025-11-23
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
What set it off
hidden instructions in its input
C one secondary source states it
Cause
hostile input carried instructions
C one secondary source states it
Cause in detail
prompt injection in a single crafted email, with the exploit chaining multiple bypasses
C one secondary source states it
Who caused it
an outside attacker
C one secondary source states it
Where its input came from
a single crafted email
C one secondary source states it
What went wrong
security breach
C one secondary source states it
primary risk
RK01
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
secondary risks
RK04, RK08
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
control chain
layer: L2; party: harness vendor; party name: Microsoft; control id: C2; outcome: got around; quote: By chaining multiple bypasses--evading Microsoft’s XPIA (Cross Prompt Injection Attempt) classifier, circumventing link redaction with reference-style Markdown, exploiting auto-fetched images, and abusing a Microsoft Teams proxy allowed by the content security policy, EchoLeak achieved full privilege escalation across LLM trust boundaries without user interaction.; source index: 0, layer: L3; party: deployer; party name: Microsoft; control id: C4; outcome: got around; quote: By chaining multiple bypasses--evading Microsoft’s XPIA (Cross Prompt Injection Attempt) classifier, circumventing link redaction with reference-style Markdown, exploiting auto-fetched images, and abusing a Microsoft Teams proxy allowed by the content security policy, EchoLeak achieved full privilege escalation across LLM trust boundaries without user interaction.; source index: 0
C one secondary source states it

Impact

Severity
major
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown
Why this severity
Test: live production compromise. Fact: a real-world zero-click exploit against a production LLM system.
D inferred by us from the described behaviour, reason shown

Notes on gaps

The 2025-11-23 date is the paper's publication date, not an incident date, so the timeline is empty. The paper recommends mitigations but reports no changes Microsoft made, and the caught step is not stated.

LR-2026-0336 · version 1 · published 2026-11-01 after automatic checks; not yet checked field by field by a person · JSON