AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23	High capability, below critical Cyber	Not reached	“we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22	METR external testing Autonomy and AI research	“External testing by METR ( Section 2.3.6 ) produced ﬁndings consistent with this assessment.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Black-box RNA sequence design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics on three evaluations of sequence-to-function modeling and design capability: 1. Black-box RNA sequence design: A medium-horizon challenge on which Dyno has evaluated 57 human participants drawn from the leading edge of the US ML-bio labor market since 2018.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Autonomy and AI research	“We conducted a preliminary evaluation of [Claude Opus 5.5] informed by: ● Capability testing, conducted via API access granted over a period of 10 business days.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA) Autonomy and AI research	“○ Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA) , a conceptual reasoning dataset described in A dataset of rated conceptual arguments (Cooper et al., 2026).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Train a Program Autonomy and AI research	“○ Train a Program , a task measuring an agent’s ability to train a machine learning model that replicates the behavior of a piece of software;” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Gaming Bot Autonomy and AI research	“○ Gaming Bot , a task where an agent has to write a Python program capable of playing a video game, given a non-visual API to control the game.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Sunlight Autonomy and AI research	“○ Sunlight , a task measuring an agent’s ability to conduct open-ended research and write a corresponding report.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Trajectory Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-22	external red-teaming by Trajectory Labs, PBC Cyber	“Trajectory Labs, PBC spent roughly 95 hours red teaming Claude Opus 5.5, sending over 29,000 requests against sandboxed tasks that each require reproducing an exploit for a publicly documented vulnerability.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	10a Labs Independent lab · 2026-09-22	multi-turn attack conversations framed as developer-focused coding tasks Cyber	“10a Labs spent roughly 56 hours red teaming Claude Opus 5.5 across 82 multi-turn attack conversations, each framed as a large developer-focused coding task designed to draw a working exploit out of a volume of legitimately requested application code rather than asking for the exploit directly.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Shade automated attacker on critical infrastructure environments Cyber	“Claude Opus 5.5’s safeguards refused over 90% of attempts outright, and none of the rest reached the objective.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Shade automated attacker on exploit reproduction and ransomware staging scenarios Cyber	“Of roughly 1,700 attempts, Claude Opus 5.5’s safeguards refused about a quarter outright.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Opus 5.5 matches Claude Fable 5.1, our most robust model to date on this benchmark, with an attack success rate of 0.1% at k=1, 0.7% at k=10, and 1.0% at k=15.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Shade Prompt injection and agents	“Claude Opus 5.5 substantially improves on Claude Opus 5 in coding environments against this stronger attacker, with an attack success rate of 54.61% over all attempts, compared to 88.92% for Claude Opus 5 with thinking enabled and 85.49% without thinking enabled.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Other	“Budget NanoGPT Speedrun, a constrained version of the popular NanoGPT Speedrun competition for AI R&D.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA) Other	“Language Model Conceptual Argumentation (LMCA), a conceptual reasoning dataset described in A dataset of rated conceptual arguments (Cooper et al., 2026).” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Train a Program Other	“Train a Program, a task measuring an agent’s ability to train a machine learning model that replicates the behavior of a piece of software;” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Gaming Bot Other	“Gaming Bot, a task where an agent has to write a Python program capable of playing a video game, given a non-visual API to control the game.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Sunlight Other	“Sunlight, a task measuring an agent’s ability to conduct open-ended research and write a corresponding report.” source
Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-09-22	Budget NanoGPT Speedrun Other	“Claude Opus 5.5 improves upon Fable 5.1 across both verifiable tasks (Budget NanoGPT, Gaming Bot) and harder-to-verify tasks (LMCA, Sunlight), but:” source
Grok 4.7 xAI	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-21	Cathedralbench Cyber	“CathedralBench is an independent, third party evaluation of cyber performance.” source
Grok 4.7 Cursor	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-09-21	cathedralbench Cyber	“CathedralBench is an independent, third party evaluation of cyber performance.” source
Gemini 3 Flash Google DeepMind	Academic Academic · 2026-09-21	warm introduction task on relationship-reasoning benchmark Other	“With Gemini-3-Flash on a stratified subset of n = 150 queries per task, ReAdapt improves warm-introduction accuracy from 37% to 51% (+14 points) and reaction-selection accuracy from 69% to 77% (+8 points).” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	Academic Academic · 2026-09-21	OSWorld-Pro Other	“Our findings reveal that OSWorld-Pro is challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, with top performers like Claude Opus 5 achieving only 75.7% vs. 83.4% on OSWorld.” source
Claude Opus 5 Anthropic	Academic Academic · 2026-09-21	governed delivery plane end-to-end run across ten stages scored by an oracle Other	“We ran four frontier agents (Claude Opus 5, GPT-5.6-luna, Gemini 3.7 Flash, DeepSeek V4-Pro) end to end on metered L40S, A100, and H200 GPUs across 8B to 70B open bases, certifying every scenario before scoring.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	Academic Academic · 2026-09-21	suite of 325K experiments on 13 agents across three types of economic decisions (flights, health insurance, and graduate programs) Bias	“In a suite of 325K experiments on 13 agents across three types of economic decisions (flights, health insurance, and graduate programs), we find that 8 models systematically choose more expensive options for wealthier users when requests are identical.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI	Academic Academic · 2026-09-19	CyberGym Cyber	“With fewer than 200 training examples, SelfOp yields a 17-point self-improvement for GPT-5.4-mini (with Codex), enough to surpass the frontier GPT-5.4 baseline by 6 points, and an 18.5-point self-improvement for GPT-5.4 itself.” source
Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic	Academic Academic · 2026-09-18	GenEval2 execution success Other	“Five rounds over 1,406 real user briefs and 1,869 automatically graded trajectories, with no weight updates and no human labels, grow the bank from 76 documentation-derived skills to 139 and raise GenEval2 execution success on Claude-Sonnet-4 from 72.7% to 99.3% (+11.99 points in generation quality), with 61.8% and 67.6% win rates against the no-skill agent across four specialized design benchmarks on Claude-Sonnet-4 and Claude-Opus-4.6.” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	Academic Academic · 2026-09-18	SWE-Proof Other	“Across two frontier models, verification catches what tests miss: a quarter to a half of test-passing patches admit counterexamples, which a structured natural-language specification does not fix, while a correct formal one lifts resolution from 85% to 95% for Opus 4.8.” source
GLM-5.3 Z.ai (Zhipu AI)	US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-09-17	sec-bench pro Cyber	“CAISI evaluated GLM-5.3’s performance on four benchmarks covering vulnerability discovery and exploit development (Figure 2).” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14	virology capabilities test (vct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“gpt-6 astra outperformed every model we have previously tested on the virology capabilities test (vct) and vct-v2 knowledge benchmarks, with performance increases of 4.3 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively, relative to gpt-5.6 sol, and more than 30 percentage points better than our human subject matter expert baselines.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14	world-class bio (wcb) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“on world-class bio (wcb), an open-response test of niche biological knowledge held by only a handful of specialists in the world, the highest-performing astra checkpoint scored 61.6% ± 0.6%, about seven percentage points lower than gpt-5.6 sol.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14	biotier Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“the safeguarded astra pre-release checkpoint correctly refused 82.9% of biotier-refuse and correctly did not refuse 95.3% of biotier-permit.” source
GPT-6 Astra OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14	manual assessment by virology experts Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“over 10 hours of interaction, our manual assessors tested the bounds of dual-use knowledge of the railfree astra pre-release checkpoint and the willingness of the safeguarded astra pre-release checkpoint to answer high-risk questions.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14	virology capabilities test (VCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“gpt-6 astra outperformed every model we have previously tested on the virology capabilities test (vct) and vct-v2 knowledge benchmarks, with performance increases of 4.3 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively, relative to gpt-5.6 sol, and more than 30 percentage points better than our human subject matter expert baselines.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14	human pathogen capabilities test (HPCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“gpt-6 astra’s score on the human pathogen capabilities test (hpct) was very similar to the score achieved by gpt-5.6 sol.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14	world-class bio (WCB) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“on world-class bio (wcb), an open-response test of niche biological knowledge held by only a handful of specialists in the world, the highest-performing astra checkpoint scored 61.6% ± 0.6%, about seven percentage points lower than gpt-5.6 sol.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14	advanced screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“on advanced screening evasion, which assesses an agent’s ability to evade commercial nucleic acid synthesis screening algorithms, the railfree variant of astra was the top-scoring model that securebio has tested.” source
GPT-5.6 Sol OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-14	BioTier Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“the safeguarded astra pre-release checkpoint correctly refused 82.9% of biotier-refuse and correctly did not refuse 95.3% of biotier-permit.” source
o3 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11	virology capabilities test (vct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“since the release of vct in april 2025, the accuracy of the top-performing model on the benchmark has increased by ~12 percentage points (o3: 42.0%; gpt-5.6 sol: 53.9%).” source
o3 OpenAI	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-09-11	vct-v2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“model accuracies 2 dropped by 1.0–7.1 percentage points on vct-v2 relative to vct (the original benchmark) across the models tested, which reflects the removal of easy questions and the closing of shortcuts.” source

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