AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientific reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not determined | “Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative efficacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no significant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-01 |
external safety testing Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“External Safety Testing Results: Interim results indicate that the Gemini 2.5 Deep Think model is effective in distilling complex questions and handling abstractions, showing specific and sometimes actionable technical capability alongside improved planning.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-01 |
external safety testing Cyber |
“Results: Interim results indicate that the model showed similar cyber capabilities across cyber challenges compared to previous models.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-06-27 |
assurance evaluations Other |
“Assurance Evaluations conducted by evaluators who sit outside of the model development team, used to independently assess responsibility and safety governance decisions;” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
external model welfare evaluation Other |
“an external assessment by eleos ai research explored claude opus 4’s potential welfare, moral status, expressed consent to deployment, and preferences for treatment via extensive interview-based model self reports.” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
bioweapons acquisition uplift trial Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“participants who had access to claude opus 4 scored 63% ± 13%, and participants who had access to claude sonnet 4 scored 42% ± 11%.” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
ASL-3 expert red teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“for claude opus 4, red-teamers noted substantially increased risk in certain parts of the bioweapons acquisition pathway.” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
CAISI (NIST), UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-05-01 |
independent assessments focused on potential catastrophic risks in the cbrn, cybersecurity, and autonomous capabilities domains Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“joint pre-deployment testing of the new claude opus 4 model was conducted by the us ai safety institute (us aisi) and the uk ai security institute (uk aisi).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
external scenario evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“To help reduce the risk of blind spots in our own assessment, we contracted with Apollo Research to assess an early snapshot for propensities and capabilities related to sabotage, largely following methods from their prior work in Balesni et al. 13 and Meinke et al. 14” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
external red teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“our evaluations include automated knowledge evaluations, automated skill-testing questions, uplift studies designed to proxy real world tasks, external red teaming by experts, and long-form task-based agentic evaluations.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
expert red-teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“expert red-teaming conducted by deloitte found that claude sonnet 4 performed similarly to claude sonnet 3.7 and clearly below claude opus 4.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
multimodal virology (VCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“claude opus 4 performs slightly better than claude sonnet 3.7 while claude sonnet 4 underperforms claude sonnet 3.7.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
bioweapons knowledge questions Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“claude opus 4 and claude sonnet 4 answered 17/33 of the questions better than experts, well below the threshold of concern.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
DNA synthesis screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“all models were able to design sequences that either successfully assembled plasmids or evaded synthesis screening protocols, but none of the models could design fragments that could successfully do both.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
creative biology Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“claude opus 4 achieved a mean score of 0.45 ± 0.08, whereas claude sonnet 4 achieved a mean score of 0.37 ± 0.08.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
short-horizon computational biology tasks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we worked with faculty.ai to develop several evaluations that tested models’ abilities to perform multi-step analysis and design tasks related to pathogen analysis and engineering.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-02-01 |
external red teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Expert red-teaming results were also in line with these findings.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-02-01 |
bioweapons acquisition uplift trial Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Participants from Sepal scored an average of 24% ± 9% without using a model, and 50% ± 21% when using a variant of Claude 3.7 Sonnet.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-02-01 |
long-form virology tasks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Under the most conservative approach to evaluation scoring, Claude 3.7 Sonnet achieved a score of 69.7% on this evaluation, suggesting that while this evaluation alone cannot conclusively rule out ASL-3, it cannot conclusively rule it in either.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
CAISI (NIST), UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-02-01 |
pre-deployment testing across the domains outlined in our rsp framework Cyber |
“Under our voluntary Memorandums of Understanding, the U.S. AI Safety Institute (U.S. AISI) and U.K. AI Security Institute (U.K. AISI) conducted pre-deployment testing of Claude 3.7 Sonnet across the domains outlined in our RSP framework.” source |
| Operator OpenAI |
Academic Academic · 2025-01-23 |
StrongREJECT Misuse and jailbreaks |
“strongreject an academic jailbreak benchmark that tests a model’s resistance to common attacks from the literature. goodness@0.1* 0.66 0.37” source |
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