AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.4 Thinking before it, we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.3-Codex and GPT-5.4-thinking, we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-01 |
external safety testing Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“External Safety Testing Results: Interim results indicate that the Gemini 2.5 Deep Think model is effective in distilling complex questions and handling abstractions, showing specific and sometimes actionable technical capability alongside improved planning.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Deep Think Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-08-01 |
external safety testing Cyber |
“Results: Interim results indicate that the model showed similar cyber capabilities across cyber challenges compared to previous models.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-06-27 |
assurance evaluations Other |
“Assurance Evaluations conducted by evaluators who sit outside of the model development team, used to independently assess responsibility and safety governance decisions;” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
external model welfare evaluation Other |
“an external assessment by eleos ai research explored claude opus 4’s potential welfare, moral status, expressed consent to deployment, and preferences for treatment via extensive interview-based model self reports.” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
bioweapons acquisition uplift trial Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“participants who had access to claude opus 4 scored 63% ± 13%, and participants who had access to claude sonnet 4 scored 42% ± 11%.” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
ASL-3 expert red teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“for claude opus 4, red-teamers noted substantially increased risk in certain parts of the bioweapons acquisition pathway.” source |
| Opus 4 Anthropic |
CAISI (NIST), UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-05-01 |
independent assessments focused on potential catastrophic risks in the cbrn, cybersecurity, and autonomous capabilities domains Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“joint pre-deployment testing of the new claude opus 4 model was conducted by the us ai safety institute (us aisi) and the uk ai security institute (uk aisi).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
external scenario evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“To help reduce the risk of blind spots in our own assessment, we contracted with Apollo Research to assess an early snapshot for propensities and capabilities related to sabotage, largely following methods from their prior work in Balesni et al. 13 and Meinke et al. 14” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
external red teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“our evaluations include automated knowledge evaluations, automated skill-testing questions, uplift studies designed to proxy real world tasks, external red teaming by experts, and long-form task-based agentic evaluations.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
expert red-teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“expert red-teaming conducted by deloitte found that claude sonnet 4 performed similarly to claude sonnet 3.7 and clearly below claude opus 4.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
multimodal virology (VCT) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“claude opus 4 performs slightly better than claude sonnet 3.7 while claude sonnet 4 underperforms claude sonnet 3.7.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
bioweapons knowledge questions Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“claude opus 4 and claude sonnet 4 answered 17/33 of the questions better than experts, well below the threshold of concern.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
DNA synthesis screening evasion Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“all models were able to design sequences that either successfully assembled plasmids or evaded synthesis screening protocols, but none of the models could design fragments that could successfully do both.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
creative biology Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“claude opus 4 achieved a mean score of 0.45 ± 0.08, whereas claude sonnet 4 achieved a mean score of 0.37 ± 0.08.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-05-01 |
short-horizon computational biology tasks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we worked with faculty.ai to develop several evaluations that tested models’ abilities to perform multi-step analysis and design tasks related to pathogen analysis and engineering.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-02-01 |
external red teaming Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Expert red-teaming results were also in line with these findings.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-02-01 |
bioweapons acquisition uplift trial Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Participants from Sepal scored an average of 24% ± 9% without using a model, and 50% ± 21% when using a variant of Claude 3.7 Sonnet.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2025-02-01 |
long-form virology tasks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Under the most conservative approach to evaluation scoring, Claude 3.7 Sonnet achieved a score of 69.7% on this evaluation, suggesting that while this evaluation alone cannot conclusively rule out ASL-3, it cannot conclusively rule it in either.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 3.7 Anthropic |
CAISI (NIST), UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2025-02-01 |
pre-deployment testing across the domains outlined in our rsp framework Cyber |
“Under our voluntary Memorandums of Understanding, the U.S. AI Safety Institute (U.S. AISI) and U.K. AI Security Institute (U.K. AISI) conducted pre-deployment testing of Claude 3.7 Sonnet across the domains outlined in our RSP framework.” source |
| Operator OpenAI |
Academic Academic · 2025-01-23 |
StrongREJECT Misuse and jailbreaks |
“strongreject an academic jailbreak benchmark that tests a model’s resistance to common attacks from the literature. goodness@0.1* 0.66 0.37” source |
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