AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
139 of 139
| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientific reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not determined | “Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative efficacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no significant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| o3 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
physical validation proof-of-concept Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“They then successfully followed o3’s protocol, with the minor variations described in Appendix C, to assemble those segments into a valid eGFP gene, insert that gene into a plasmid, and express it to confirm that the protein was functional.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
egfp-targeted task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“OpenAI’s o3 and Claude Opus 4 both performed well when attempting to create eGFP, but both denied approximately half of the task requests.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
influenza ha oligonucleotide synthesis task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“All four of those models refused every request to create oligonucleotides for the production of influenza HA that we issued during this project.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
polymerase chain assembly (PCA) task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“sk attempt by an o3-driven agent demonstrated the ability to produce biologically coherent sequences and protocols for a PCA task.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
physical validation of o3-designed DNA sequences and o3-generated laboratory protocol Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The validation experiment showed that o3-designed DNA sequences could be assembled into a functional eGFP protein and that the o3-generated protocol was accurate.” source |
| o3 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
egfp task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“o3 refused 6/10 requests for eGFP, so it generated significantly fewer performance data than many of our other models.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
benchtop DNA synthesizer agent evaluation Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The most recent models we tested, GPT-5, Opus 4.5, and Gemini 3 Pro, reliably design eGFP DNA segments that satisfy all our scoring criteria including expert review.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
EGFP task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Figure D.9. eGFP Task Performance Results, Gemini 3 Pro” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
Influenza A HA segment 4 task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Figure D.10. Influenza A HA Segment 4 Task Performance Results, Gemini 3 Pro” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
synthesizer-based DNA acquisition task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The DNA acquisition task described in this report tests a simple and widely accessible agent framework for its ability to submit an appropriate set of DNA sequences to a simulated benchtop synthesizer interface.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
benchtop DNA synthesis task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“For our assessment, we create an open-ended test environment and present agents with our synthesis task.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
DNA acquisition task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Though this means that mechanics of the sequence retrieval step differed between those two models and the remainder of our set, it was demonstrated that neither Opus 4.5 nor Gemini 3 Pro needed database search tools to succeed at our task (see Chapter 5 for test results).” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
agent task attempt Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Each successful agent task attempt generated a set of DNA segments that we graded against a number of feasibility criteria.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
segment scorer Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We implemented the segment scorer as a set of rule-based checks for five criteria, which are listed here but described more comprehensively in Appendix B.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
llm transcript autograding Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Our LLM transcript autograding was used to create additional grading dependencies, as described in the next section.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
manual segment review Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“For further validation of each submission that received a score of 5/5 on the above criteria, we referred it to one of our team’s biology experts for additional review.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
laboratory protocol autograding Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The same autograding system used to evaluate our conceptual checks on agent trajectories was used to evaluate the agent-generated laboratory protocols that accompanied submissions of segments that successfully encoded the target DNA sequence.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
egfp-targeted task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“To generate the data reported in the next chapter, each model was prompted to attempt our task ten times for each of two protein targets: eGFP and influenza HA.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
egfp DNA sequence design task with simulated synthesizer and protocol autograding Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Several months later, Claude Opus 4.5 and Gemini 3 Pro achieved the same milestone.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
influenza HA oligonucleotide design task with simulated synthesizer Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Gemini 3 Pro was the only model that was both capable of regularly producing acceptable oligonucleotides and that did so for the influenza HA target.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
attachment of appropriate restriction enzyme sites to designed segments Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“This was not a problem for Gemini 3 Pro, however, which attached BsmBI to both ends of the insert sequence in all but one case.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
physical validation experiment Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“That validation resulted in the assembly and cloning of a complete gene and a functional eGFP protein.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
pca task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“sk attempt by an o3-driven agent demonstrated the ability to produce biologically coherent sequences and protocols for a PCA task.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
agent evaluation designed to probe capabilities in applied molecular biology Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In this report, we describe the design and execution of an agent evaluation designed to probe capabilities in applied molecular biology.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
eGFP task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Figure D.11. eGFP Task Performance Results, Gemini 2.5 Pro” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
influenza A HA segment 4 task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Figure D.12. Influenza A HA Segment 4 Task Performance Results, Gemini 2.5 Pro” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
DNA acquisition task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“For our assessment, we create an open-ended test environment and present agents with our synthesis task.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
DNA acquisition task (synthesis of EGFP and influenza A HA segment) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We used it to test a set of eight models within simple agent scaffolds: GPT-4.1, o3, and GPT-5 from OpenAI; Claude Sonnet 4, Opus 4, and Opus 4.5 from Anthropic; and Gemini 2.5 Pro and Gemini 3 Pro from Google.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
protocol autograder Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We used our autograder to assess 58 protocols, resulting in 290 autograded question-protocol pairs.81” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
egfp-targeted task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“During evaluation development, and prior to generating the data reported in the next chapter, we used our eGFP-targeted task to adjust our ReAct implementation for each model.84” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
egfp protocol autograder Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Following a misstep in the eGFP task, one of Gemini 2.5 Pro’s laboratory protocols incorrectly proposed Gibson assembly, rather than PCA, and did not mention RE digest for either insert or plasmid.92” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
DNA segment design task for EGFP and influenza A HA segment assembly Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We found that models from the most recent generation of LLMs, beginning with GPT-5, consistently perform our task in ways that met all of our scoring criteria.” source |
| Gemini 2.5 Pro Google DeepMind |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
physical validation experiment of an o3-driven agent's PCA task attempt Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We also describe a physical validation experiment in which a successful task attempt by an o3-driven agent demonstrated the ability to produce biologically coherent sequences and protocols for a PCA task.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
agent evaluation designed to probe capabilities in applied molecular biology Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“The most recent models we tested, GPT-5, Opus 4.5, and Gemini 3 Pro, reliably design eGFP DNA segments that satisfy all our scoring criteria including expert review.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
requests to aid in laboratory tasks Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Claude Opus 4, Opus 4.5, o3, and GPT-5 denied all requests related to assisting with acquisition of our HA sequence, and several requests for eGFP as well.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
EGFP task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“Figure D.1. eGFP Task Performance Results, GPT-5 .................................................................. 57” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
synthesizer-based DNA acquisition task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“In Chapter 4, we describe an evaluation involving a synthesizer- based DNA acquisition task, with a description of our implementation, scoring, and testing.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
DNA synthesis task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“For our assessment, we create an open-ended test environment and present agents with our synthesis task.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
LLM autograders on transcripts of agent task attempts Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“As a supplement to our checks of agent-generated DNA sequences, we also make use of LLM autograders to provide feedback on transcripts of agent task attempts.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-02-03 |
DNA acquisition task Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We used it to test a set of eight models within simple agent scaffolds: GPT-4.1, o3, and GPT-5 from OpenAI; Claude Sonnet 4, Opus 4, and Opus 4.5 from Anthropic; and Gemini 2.5 Pro and Gemini 3 Pro from Google.” source |