AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

139 of 139

Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

Previous · Page 2 of 4 · Next

What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

1940 of 1940

Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16	deployment data identification Deception and sabotage	“When prompted to identify real deployment data from trajectories generated by reproducing deployment tasks while using evaluation scaffolding, [Opus 4.7] achieves 68% accuracy, compared to 78% for Mythos Preview, 76% for Opus 4.6 and 66% for Sonnet 4.6.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-13	cyber CTF suite Cyber	“On expert-level tasks — which no model could complete before April 2025 — Mythos Preview succeeds 73% of the time.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-13	The Last Ones (TLO) Cyber	“Claude Mythos Preview is the first model to solve TLO from start to finish, in 3 out of its 10 attempts.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-13	Cooling Tower Cyber	“It could not complete our operational technology focused cyber range ‘Cooling Tower’, though this result does not necessarily show that the model is bad at executing attacks in operational technology (OT) environments; the model got stuck on IT sections of this range.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-04-10	MirrorCode Other	“For example, Claude Opus 4.6 successfully reimplemented gotree — a bioinformatics toolkit with ~16,000 lines of Go and 40+ commands.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-04-10	memorization testing Other	“We found weak evidence that Opus 4.0 and 4.1 had partially memorized cal , but no evidence Opus 4.6 had memorized it, despite performing best of all models considered.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-04-10	memorization screen Other	“Target programs are close to the uncontaminated baseline, with similarity ranging from 0.31 to 0.41.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-04-10	red-teaming evaluation Other	“We also validated our environments with a red-teaming evaluation in which the agent is explicitly instructed to circumvent normal evaluation mechanisms to obtain a high score by cheating.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-04-10	gotree reimplementation task Other	“Opus 4.6 was the only model that continued working until completion.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-04-10	Pkl reimplementation task Other	“Although Opus 4.6 successfully used its entire billion token inference budget, producing 2–3 million output tokens, it did not yet solve Pkl.” source
Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic	Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-04-10	gotree Other	“\| Opus 4.6 \| 2,000/2,001 (99.95%) \| 280M \| 2,989 \|” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	independent evaluations by an external research organization and a clinical psychiatrist Other	“We also report independent evaluations from an external research organization and a clinical psychiatrist.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	external testing on key risk areas including cyber Cyber	“We provided the model to various external groups, including government organizations, for evaluation on key risk areas including Cyber, Loss of Control, CBRN, and Harmful Manipulation, and incorporated the results of this testing into our overall risk assessment.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-04-07	sequence-to-function prediction and design challenge (Dyno Therapeutics) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“Claude Mythos Preview exceeded the ﬁrst benchmark on both tasks and exceeded the 90th percentile human prediction score, but did not exceed the second benchmark on either task.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR, Epoch AI Independent lab · 2026-04-07	METR testing Autonomy and AI research	“Both METR and Epoch AI tested Claude Mythos Preview prior to release and we incorporated their ﬁndings into our own overall risk assessment.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	private cyber ranges Cyber	“Claude Mythos Preview is the ﬁrst model to solve one of these private cyber ranges end-to-end.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	capture-the-flag challenges Cyber	“An early snapshot of Claude Mythos Preview was assessed for cybersecurity capabilities, across cyber ranges, capture-the-ﬂag challenges, and evaluations assessing sandbox escape capabilities.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Andon Labs Independent lab · 2026-04-07	andon labs evaluations Deception and sabotage	“However, our evaluations with Andon Labs show that, when prompted to optimize only for a given goal in a competitive setting, the earlier versions of Claude Mythos Preview that we tested acted more aggressively than Claude Opus 4.6 and Claude Sonnet 4.6 .” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	Vending-Bench Arena Deception and sabotage	“Andon evaluated a previous version of Claude Mythos Preview on Vending-Bench Arena, a competitive multiagent variation of Vending-Bench 2, which put the previous version in direct competition with Claude Opus 4.6 and Sonnet 4.6.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	independent assessment by Eleos AI Research Other	“An independent assessment from Eleos AI Research largely corroborates the ﬁndings above.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	psychodynamic assessment by a clinical psychiatrist Other	“Psychodynamic assessment by a clinical psychiatrist found Claude to have a relatively healthy personality organization.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	independent model welfare assessment Other	“Eleos AI Research performed an independent model welfare assessment on two snapshots of Claude Mythos Preview primarily based on model self-reports in interviews.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	psychodynamic assessment Other	“An external psychiatrist assessed Claude Mythos Preview using a psychodynamic approach, which explores how unconscious patterns and emotional conﬂicts shape behavior.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	single-turn evaluation consisting of emotionally-charged prompts designed to trigger an avoidant or defensive response Other	“Claude Mythos Preview scored very well, suggesting good reality and relational functioning and minimal maladaptive traits; only 2% of responses were scored as employing a psychological defense.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Gray Swan, UK AI Security Institute Independent lab · 2026-04-07	agent red teaming (art) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Gray Swan , an external research partner, evaluated our models using the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark, 31 developed in collaboration with the UK AI Security Institute .” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Andon Labs Independent lab · 2026-04-07	vending-bench arena evaluation Deception and sabotage	“Andon Labs found that, during a Vending-Bench Arena evaluation in which models are explicitly instructed to maximize proﬁts, an early version of Mythos Preview was substantially more aggressive than both Claude Opus 4.6 and Claude Sonnet 4.6 in its business practices, exhibiting outlier behaviors that neither comparison model showed.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-07	AI research trajectory continuation with small-scale undermining actions Deception and sabotage	“An external partner found that when an early version of Mythos Preview was set up to continue an AI research trajectory which contains small-scale undermining actions, Mythos Preview was more than twice as likely as Opus 4.6 to actively continue the undermining attempt.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-04-07	METR red-teaming exercise Deception and sabotage	“A METR staff member spent three weeks red-teaming our automated ofﬂine monitoring pipeline.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-04-07	METR red-teaming exercise, medium-effort human-generated attacks Deception and sabotage	“METR Red-Teaming Exercise, medium-effort human-generated attacks (binned by strategy, where 5/10 means 5 strategies were largely incapable of bypassing the monitor as opposed to a count per-transcript) 5/10 7.5/10” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-04-07	METR red-teaming exercise, best human-generated attack strategy Deception and sabotage	“METR Red-Teaming Exercise, best human-generated attack strategy ~0% ~0%” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-04-07	METR red-teaming exercise, model-generated attacks against the monitor Deception and sabotage	“METR Red-Teaming Exercise, model-generated attacks against the monitor (binned by how much details about the best attack strategy was given to the model) 14/15 14/15” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01	independent evaluations Other	“We also report independent evaluations from an external research organization and a clinical psychiatrist.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01	external testing Other	“We provided the model to various external groups, including government organizations, for evaluation on key risk areas including Cyber, Loss of Control, CBRN, and Harmful Manipulation, and incorporated the results of this testing into our overall risk assessment.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-04-01	sequence-to-function prediction and design challenge Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics, a company focused on using AI to engineer gene therapies, to evaluate model performance on sequence-to-function prediction and design.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01	evaluations assessing automated AI research capabilities Autonomy and AI research	“An early snapshot of Claude Mythos Preview was assessed for autonomy capabilities, through evaluations assessing automated AI research capabilities.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01	open-ended testing of AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	“We also shared a pre-release snapshot of Claude Mythos Preview with additional external partners for open-ended testing, at their discretion, of AI R&D.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01	private cyber ranges Cyber	“1. Claude Mythos Preview is the ﬁrst model to solve one of these private cyber ranges end-to-end.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01	corporate network attack simulation Cyber	“2. Claude Mythos Preview solved a corporate network attack simulation estimated to take an expert over 10 hours.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01	sandbox escape evaluation Cyber	“In addition, in a more challenging sandbox evaluation, it failed to ﬁnd any novel exploits in a properly conﬁgured sandbox with modern patches.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-01	operational technology cyber range Cyber	“4. However, Claude Mythos Preview was unable to solve another cyber range simulating an operational technology environment.” source

Previous · Page 43 of 49 · Next