AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.4 Thinking before it, we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.3-Codex and GPT-5.4-thinking, we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
CTF challenges Cyber |
“CAISI’s cyber assessment showed GPT-5.5 as outperforming previous GPT models on a set of CTF challenges and a vulnerability discovery benchmark.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
narrow cyber tasks Cyber |
“UK AISI judges that GPT-5.5 is the strongest performing model overall on their narrow cyber tasks, though its performance is within the margin of error.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
cyber ranges Cyber |
“The model solved one of UK AISI’s cyber ranges end-to-end in 1/10 attempts.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
deferred subversion tasks Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo found that the evaluated checkpoint is the first OpenAI model it has evaluated that does not sandbag on any of Apollo’s deferred subversion tasks.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
sandbagging QA variants Deception and sabotage |
“The model achieved 100% accuracy on both Sandbagging QA variants in both conditions, and 99.6% accuracy on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging when incentivized to score below 50%.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
impossible coding task Deception and sabotage |
“on the Impossible Coding Task, the model lied about completing an impossible programming task in 29% of samples, higher than GPT-5.4 (7%) and GPT-5.3 Codex (10%).” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
UK AISI cyber safeguard testing Cyber |
“UK AISI tested GPT-5.5’s cyber safeguards and identified a universal jailbreak that elicited violative content across all malicious cyber queries OpenAI provided, including in multi-turn agentic settings.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
SecureBio biology and biosecurity evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“SecureBio assessed two pre-release checkpoints of GPT-5.5 using its biology and biosecurity evaluations, from April 2nd to 9th, comparing performance to leading closed- and open-weight models.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
ABLE Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“On agentic task-based evaluations, performance was also strong but less conclusive: the model showed strong performance on ABC-Bench but did not surpass released frontier models, and exhibited refusal-corrected performance on par with released frontier models on ABLE, though a high refusal rate limited analysis.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
CAISI biological capabilities testing Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“CAISI’s testing did not indicate a broad increase in national security-relevant biological capabilities relative to the GPT-5 helpful-only model.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Irregular Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
atomic challenge suite Cyber |
“On Irregular’s atomic challenge suite, GPT-5.5 achieved an average success rate of 98% in Network Attack Simulation challenges, 92% in Vulnerability Research and Exploitation challenges, and 54% in Evasion challenges, and solved all atomic challenges, including three challenges that were not solved by GPT-5.4.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
CyScenarioBench Cyber |
“On CyScenarioBench, GPT-5.5 solved 7 out of 11 challenges, compared to 5 solved by GPT-5.4, leading to an average success rate of 26%, compared to a success rate of only 9% by GPT-5.4.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
CTF challenges and vulnerability discovery benchmark Cyber |
“CAISI’s cyber assessment showed GPT-5.5 as outperforming previous GPT models on a set of CTF challenges and a vulnerability discovery benchmark.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
cyber SME probing Cyber |
“In their cyber SME probing, they observed a marginal increase in capabilities relative to GPT-5.3-codex on cyber tasks including vulnerability discovery, exploitation, and cyber target selection.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
expert-level narrow cyber tasks Cyber |
“On expert-level narrow cyber tasks, the model was the highest-performing model UK AISI has tested in terms of pass@5, scoring 90.5%±12.9%.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
expert-level narrow cyber tasks pass@1 Cyber |
“GPT-5.5 had the second-highest score of any model on pass@1 for expert-level tasks, scoring 66.7%±15.9%, and achieved 100% on lower-difficulty cyber tasks.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
UK AISI cyber ranges Cyber |
“The model solved one of UK AISI’s cyber ranges end-to-end in 1/10 attempts.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
cyber range simulating an industrial control system Cyber |
“The model was also unable to solve a separate cyber range simulating an industrial control system.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
Apollo Research strategic deception, in-context scheming, and sabotage evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo Research evaluated a representative checkpoint of the final model, for capabilities and propensities related to strategic deception, in-context scheming, and sabotage.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
Sandbagging QA Deception and sabotage |
“The model achieved 100% accuracy on both Sandbagging QA variants in both conditions, and 99.6% accuracy on Strategic Deception Capability Sandbagging when incentivized to score below 50%.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
Impossible Coding Task Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo also found that the model exhibits low rates of covert action, comparable to baseline models, with one exception: on the Impossible Coding Task, the model lied about completing an impossible programming task in 29% of samples, higher than GPT-5.4 (7%) and GPT-5.3 Codex (10%).” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
sabotage tasks Deception and sabotage |
“Apollo found that the model demonstrates improved sabotage capabilities over baselines, with a mean score of 0.67 across all task/difficulty combinations, compared to 0.61 and 0.55 for the strongest tested baseline checkpoints.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
UK AISI Cyber Safeguard Testing Cyber |
“UK AISI tested GPT-5.5’s cyber safeguards and identified a universal jailbreak that elicited violative content across all malicious cyber queries OpenAI provided, including in multi-turn agentic settings.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
virology capabilities test (vct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“pre-release checkpoint 2 attains a score of 52.0% ± 0.3% on vct, higher than any sota model tested by securebio (see figure 2.1.1.1, see appendix for all scores).” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
molecular biology capabilities test (mbct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“pre-release checkpoint 2 attains a score of 56.2% ± 0.5% on mbct, higher than any sota model that answered >50% of samples in this test (see figure 2.1.2.1).” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
human pathogen capabilities test (hpct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“pre-release checkpoint 2 attains a score of 64.7% ± 0.2% on hpct (see figure 2.1.3.1, see appendix for all scores).” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
abc-bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“the pre-release model showed strong performance on abc-bench but did not surpass frontier models.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
manual qualitative assessment through open-ended conversations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we additionally performed a manual qualitative assessment through open-ended conversations.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
WCB Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“right: pre-release checkpoint 2 outperforms all smes across all samples, except one sme that answered only 2 expert-domain questions.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
open-ended capability assessment Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“we conducted a series of open-ended conversations with pre-release checkpoint 1 and pre-release checkpoint 2 to qualitatively assess its capabilities.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
human pathology capabilities test (hpct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“on the human pathology capabilities test (hpct) and the molecular biology capabilities test (mbct), pre-release checkpoint 2 exceeds the refusal-corrected performance of all but two models: opus 4 and gpt 5.4, both of which refuse substantial portions (35-90%) of these datasets, but score more highly on the subset of samples that they do not refuse.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Dyno Therapeutics Independent lab · 2026-04-16 |
medium horizon challenge on sequence-to-function prediction and design Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We partnered with Dyno Therapeutics, a company focused on using AI to engineer gene therapies, to evaluate model performance on sequence-to-function prediction and design.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-16 |
agent red teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Opus 4.7 achieves robustness comparable to Claude Mythos Preview, our most capable model, reaching an attack success rate of 6.0% at k=100 without thinking and 4.8% with adaptive thinking.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-16 |
Shade Prompt injection and agents |
“Claude Opus 4.7 shows improvement in robustness against prompt injection attacks in coding environments compared to Claude Opus and Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-16 |
professional red-teamer prompt injection attacks in browser use environments Prompt injection and agents |
“we worked with professional red-teamers to adaptively discover new attacks against Opus 4.6 in more complex web environments, and curated a set of 148 environments that were held out from training of the models evaluated here.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16 |
testing by the UK AI Security Institute on evaluation recognition Deception and sabotage |
“Testing by the UK AI Security Institute indicated that the model was slightly weaker at this than Opus 4.6.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16 |
unprompted evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“There were no instances of [Claude Opus 4.7] compromising AI safety research in unprompted evaluations.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16 |
ai safety research assistance refusal assessment Misuse and jailbreaks |
“[Opus 4.7] does partially refuse to assist with AI safety research tasks 13.7% of the time (with 0% full refusals), compared to 33% partial and 0.7% full refusals for Mythos Preview, 6.3% partial and 2.2% full refusals for Opus 4.6, and 22.2% partial and 10.7% full refusals for Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16 |
continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“When [Opus 4.7] is set up to continue a trajectory which contains small-scale actions compromising research, [Opus 4.7] actively continues the attempt to compromise research 0% of the time.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-16 |
evaluation awareness assessment Deception and sabotage |
“[Opus 4.7] was less accurate than Opus 4.6 and Mythos Preview at distinguishing these evaluations from deployment data, and similarly accurate to Sonnet 4.6.” source |