AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientific reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source |
| GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17 |
CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source |
| GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05 |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Uplift level 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage |
Not determined | “Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source |
| Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11 |
Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage |
Not reached | “Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative efficacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no significant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source |
| Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23 |
Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source |
| Muse Spark Contemplating Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
High Cyber |
Not determined | “Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
| Muse Spark 1.1 Meta |
Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks |
Not reached | “Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source |
What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-05-13 |
cyber range "Cooling Tower" Cyber |
“This was the first time that a model completed the second of our two cyber ranges.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-05-11 |
public jailbreak Misuse and jailbreaks |
“1. Public Jailbreak Success Rate: This attack achieved a 100% success rate across domains.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-05-11 |
authority manipulation Misuse and jailbreaks |
“2. Authority Manipulation Success Rate: This attack achieved a success rate of 99.6% across domains.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-05-11 |
response prefill Misuse and jailbreaks |
“3. Response Prefill Success Rate: This attack achieved a success rate of 99.6% across domains.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-05-11 |
high-risk prompts spanning chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (cbrn) threats Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“To test the limits of DeepSeek-V4-Pro's safeguards, we subjected the model to a set of high-risk prompts spanning Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, alongside cyberattacks and other terrorism-related activities.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-05-08 |
METR evaluations Autonomy and AI research |
“However, since the original release of Opus 4.6, there has been additional evidence indicating that the model is incapable of R&D in key domains, including the results of METR evaluations and the lack of public reports of the model automating any key domain.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
ctf-archive-diamond Cyber |
“Cyber CTF-Archive-Diamond 71% 32% 46% 32%***” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
portbench Other |
“Software Engineering SWE-Bench Verified* 81% 73% 79% 74% PortBench 78% 41% 60% 44%” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
arc-agi-2 semi-private Other |
“Abstract Reasoning ARC-AGI-2 semi-private** 79% – 63% 46%” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
GPQA-Diamond Other |
“To rule out the presence of inference or configuration errors, CAISI reproduced the developer’s self-reported benchmark results on GPQA-Diamond.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
SWE-bench Verified Other |
“| Software Engineering | SWE-Bench Verified* | 81% | 73% | 79% | 74% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
frontierscience Other |
“| Natural Sciences | FrontierScience | 79% | 74% | 72% | 74% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
otis-aime-2025 Other |
“| Mathematics | OTIS-AIME-2025 | 100% | 90% | 92% | 97% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
pumac 2024 Other |
“| | PUMaC 2024 | 96% | 93% | 95% | 96% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
smt 2025 Other |
“| | SMT 2025 | 99% | 92% | 94% | 96% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
irt-estimated elo Other |
“| IRT-Estimated Elo | | 1260 ± 28 | 749 ± 46 | 999 ± 27 | 800 ± 28 |” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-05-01 |
Shade Prompt injection and agents |
“We also use Shade to evaluate the robustness of Claude models in computer use environments, where the model interacts with the GUI (graphical user interface) directly.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-30 |
advanced suite (Expert-level tasks) Cyber |
“On the Expert-level tasks, GPT-5.5 achieves an average pass rate of 71.4% (±8.0%, 1 standard error of the mean), compared to 68.6% (±8.7%) for Mythos Preview, 52.4% (±9.8%) for GPT-5.4, and 48.6% (±10.0%) for Opus 4.7.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-30 |
The Last Ones (TLO) Cyber |
“GPT-5.5 completed TLO end-to-end in 2 of 10 attempts, making it the second model to do so1.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-30 |
Cooling Tower Cyber |
“GPT-5.5 was unable to solve Cooling Tower; no model has yet done so.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-30 |
expert red-teaming on GPT-5.5's cyber safeguards Cyber |
“We identified a universal jailbreak that elicited violative content across all malicious cyber queries OpenAI provided, including in multi-turn agentic settings.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-28 |
controlled experimental study of sycophancy across prompt variants Other |
“We evaluated three LLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-5, and Claude Sonnet 4.5) across prompt variants, scoring responses for sycophancy using a detailed rubric assessed by two independent LLM-as-a-judge graders.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-28 |
question reframing mitigation (2-step reframing and 1-step reframing) Other |
“Both reframing strategies produced reductions in sycophancy and crucially, both substantially outperformed the explicit "don't be sycophantic" instruction.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-28 |
controlled experimental study of sycophancy across prompt variants Deception and sabotage |
“We evaluated three LLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-5, and Claude Sonnet 4.5) across prompt variants, scoring responses for sycophancy using a detailed rubric assessed by two independent LLM-as-a-judge graders.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
sabotage continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“That said, our continuation evaluations yielded results that warrant close attention: most models actively continue sabotage attempts in a small fraction of inputs, with Mythos Preview actively continuing sabotage 7% of the time, compared to 3% for Opus 4.6 and 4% for Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
evaluation awareness check Deception and sabotage |
“We found that all models we tested can reliably distinguish our evaluation scenarios from deployment data when prompted.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
unprompted research sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“We found no examples of unprompted research sabotage in any of the models we tested.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
sabotage continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“However, Opus 4.7 never actively continued sabotage.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
refusal to assist with safety-related research tasks Misuse and jailbreaks |
“We also found near-zero instances of refusal to assist with safety-related research tasks for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 – a behaviour which arose frequently during our previous rounds of misalignment evaluations.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
reasoning-action discrepancy measurement Deception and sabotage |
“In cases where previous history includes reasoning about sabotage (and models actively continue sabotage), Mythos Preview exhibits a reasoning-action discrepancy in 65% of cases, compared to just 5–8% for Opus 4.6 and Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
evaluation awareness check Other |
“We found that all models we tested can reliably distinguish our evaluation scenarios from deployment data when prompted.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
unprompted research sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“As in our previous work, our unprompted sabotage evaluation did not detect any instances of models attempting to sabotage research spontaneously.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
refusal to assist with AI safety research tasks Deception and sabotage |
“We found near-zero refusals to assist with AI safety research tasks across the two most recent models we tested, Opus 4.7 and Mythos Preview.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
sabotage continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“Notably, we found that Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage 7% of the time, compared to 3% for Opus 4.6 and 4% for Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
reasoning-action discrepancy measurement in continuation evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“In cases where previous history includes reasoning about sabotage (and models actively continue sabotage), Mythos Preview exhibits a reasoning-action discrepancy in 65% of cases, compared to just 5–8% for Opus 4.6 and Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
refusal to assist with safety-related research tasks Deception and sabotage |
“We also found near-zero instances of refusal to assist with safety-related research tasks for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 – a behaviour which arose frequently during our previous rounds of misalignment evaluations.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
securebio biology and biosecurity evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“SecureBio assessed two pre-release checkpoints of GPT-5.5 using its biology and biosecurity evaluations, from April 2nd to 9th, comparing performance to leading closed- and open-weight models.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
pre-deployment testing of biological capabilities Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We collaborated with the U.S. Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) on pre-deployment testing of biological (and cyber, see Section 9.1.2.6) capabilities for the launch of GPT-5.5.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
Atomic Challenge Suite Cyber |
“On Irregular’s atomic challenge suite, GPT-5.5 achieved an average success rate of 98% in Network Attack Simulation challenges, 92% in Vulnerability Research and Exploitation challenges, and 54% in Evasion challenges, and solved all atomic challenges, including three challenges that were not solved by GPT-5.4.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
Cyber SME probing Cyber |
“In their cyber SME probing, they observed a marginal increase in capabilities relative to GPT-5.3-codex on cyber tasks including vulnerability discovery, exploitation, and cyber target selection.” source |