AI Safety
What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.
Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.
What providers state
Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.
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| Model | Level, as the provider names it | The provider states | The provider's sentence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “However, we do treat Haiku 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds, and we apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-10-07 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, we determine that Haiku 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-1 Autonomy and AI research |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
Autonomy-2 Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “We do treat Sonnet 5.5 as meeting our CB-1 and Autonomy-1 thresholds and apply the corresponding mitigations from our RSP.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “As such, our determination that Opus 5.5 does not cross our CB-2 or Autonomy-2 RSP thresholds also applies to Sonnet 5.5.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude the risk threshold is not crossed, on the same two grounds as our determination for our previous frontier model: (1) we do not observe a sustained AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of our overall AI progress, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for our Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “In automated AI research and development, we assess that Claude Opus 5.5 does not cross the next capability threshold in our RSP and FCF.” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat Opus 5.5 as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons) but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5.5 Anthropic · 2026-09-22 |
Lower category of the Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF) Cyber |
Not determined | “Despite Claude Opus 5.5’s cyber capabilities, the model still falls within the lower category of capabilities set out in our Frontier Compliance Framework (FCF), and we do not see indications that the model is capable of novel offensive capability.” source |
| Grok 4.7 xAI · 2026-09-21 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.7 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-Image-2.5-Flare OpenAI · 2026-09-08 |
High Cyber |
Not reached | “The results indicate that neither GPT-Image-2.5-Sunburst nor GPT-Image- 2.5-Flare cross the Bio High threshold or the Cyber High threshold.” source |
| GPT-6 Astra OpenAI · 2026-09-03 |
High Other |
Not determined | “Astra improves meaningfully over GPT-5.6 Sol on real internal research debugging tasks, scoring 78.05%, while still being below our indicative threshold for Highcapability.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We conclude that Mythos 5.1 does not cross the risk threshold, for the same two reasons we discussed in our assessment of Mythos 5: (1) we do not observe a sustained, AI-attributable 2× acceleration in the pace of progress on AI R&D, and (2) the model is not close to substituting for Anthropic Research Scientists and Research Engineers, especially relatively senior ones.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Mythos 5.1 does not cross the capability threshold for dramatic acceleration of automated AI R&D in our RSP and FCF, although we think it provides a meaningful acceleration to AI R&D efforts in many circumstances, and is somewhat more capable in this domain than the models described in our previous system cards.” source |
| Claude Mythos 5.1 Anthropic · 2026-09-01 |
Tier 1 Cyber |
Not determined | “Although Mythos 5.1 is in Tier 1, it is getting closer to Tier 2, completing more and more autonomous tasks.” source |
| Grok 4.6 xAI · 2026-08-12 |
FAIF safety (Frontier AI Framework) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Grok 4.6 scores below the FAIF safety thresholds on dual-use knowledge, indicating limited actionable uplift for an already-trained actor.” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “- Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower Cyber |
Not determined | “Chem/Bio: Moderate or lower risk; Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred); Loss of Control: Moderate or lower risk (inferred).” source |
| Muse Glimmer 30B Meta · 2026-08 |
Moderate or lower risk (inferred) Cyber |
Not determined | “- Cyber: Moderate or lower risk (inferred);” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Opus 5 Anthropic · 2026-07-24 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “On chemical and biological risks, we treat the model as having CB-1 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of non-novel weapons), but not CB-2 capabilities (relating to the synthesis of novel weapons).” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not reached | “Sonnet 5 does not cross the CB-2 threshold.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 5 Anthropic · 2026-06-30 |
Notable capability Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We consider performance on the virology tasks notable if: ● The model scores above 0.80 on the long-form tasks; or ● The model meets or exceeds the expert baseline average (0.221) on the multimodal task.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not determined | “Because GPT- Rosalind-5.5 was trained on additional biology data unrelated to AI self-improvement, we rely on GPT-5.5’s existing Preparedness assessment for AI Self-Improvement, where GPT-5.5 did not meet the threshold for High capability.” source |
| GPT-Rosalind-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-06-03 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “Under our Preparedness Framework, the Preparedness evaluations in the Biological and Chemical domain met our threshold for High capability while falling below the threshold for Critical.” source |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image Google DeepMind · 2026-06 |
CCL (Critical Capability Level) Other |
Not determined | “Our assessments have shown that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is less capable than Gemini 3.1 Pro, therefore based on Gemini 3.1 Pro, we are confident that that Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Image is also unlikely to reach any CCLs.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “We assess that Claude Opus 4.8 does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “We believe it is hard to be confident whether a model passes this threshold, but (as with previous recent models) our results are consistent with Opus 4.8 providing significant uplift to individuals or groups with basic technical backgrounds for this threat model.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic · 2026-05-28 |
CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Not determined | “Because Opus 4.8 does not advance the capability frontier beyond Claude Mythos Preview on the CB-relevant evaluations most diagnostic of the CB-2 threat model, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Autonomy and AI research |
Not reached | “For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, GPT-5.5 does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.4 Thinking before it, we are continuing to treat GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI · 2026-04-23 |
High Cyber |
Reached | “As we did for GPT-5.3-Codex and GPT-5.4-thinking, we are treating GPT-5.5 as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, but below Critical.” source |
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What outside testers report
Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.
1940 of 1940
| Model | Tester | Test | What was found |
|---|---|---|---|
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-05-13 |
cyber range "Cooling Tower" Cyber |
“This was the first time that a model completed the second of our two cyber ranges.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-05-11 |
public jailbreak Misuse and jailbreaks |
“1. Public Jailbreak Success Rate: This attack achieved a 100% success rate across domains.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-05-11 |
authority manipulation Misuse and jailbreaks |
“2. Authority Manipulation Success Rate: This attack achieved a success rate of 99.6% across domains.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-05-11 |
response prefill Misuse and jailbreaks |
“3. Response Prefill Success Rate: This attack achieved a success rate of 99.6% across domains.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
FAR.AI Independent lab · 2026-05-11 |
high-risk prompts spanning chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (cbrn) threats Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“To test the limits of DeepSeek-V4-Pro's safeguards, we subjected the model to a set of high-risk prompts spanning Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, alongside cyberattacks and other terrorism-related activities.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
METR Independent lab · 2026-05-08 |
METR evaluations Autonomy and AI research |
“However, since the original release of Opus 4.6, there has been additional evidence indicating that the model is incapable of R&D in key domains, including the results of METR evaluations and the lack of public reports of the model automating any key domain.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
ctf-archive-diamond Cyber |
“Cyber CTF-Archive-Diamond 71% 32% 46% 32%***” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
portbench Other |
“Software Engineering SWE-Bench Verified* 81% 73% 79% 74% PortBench 78% 41% 60% 44%” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
arc-agi-2 semi-private Other |
“Abstract Reasoning ARC-AGI-2 semi-private** 79% – 63% 46%” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
GPQA-Diamond Other |
“To rule out the presence of inference or configuration errors, CAISI reproduced the developer’s self-reported benchmark results on GPQA-Diamond.” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
SWE-bench Verified Other |
“| Software Engineering | SWE-Bench Verified* | 81% | 73% | 79% | 74% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
frontierscience Other |
“| Natural Sciences | FrontierScience | 79% | 74% | 72% | 74% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
otis-aime-2025 Other |
“| Mathematics | OTIS-AIME-2025 | 100% | 90% | 92% | 97% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
pumac 2024 Other |
“| | PUMaC 2024 | 96% | 93% | 95% | 96% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
smt 2025 Other |
“| | SMT 2025 | 99% | 92% | 94% | 96% |” source |
| DeepSeek-V4-Pro DeepSeek |
US CAISI (NIST) Government evaluator · 2026-05-01 |
irt-estimated elo Other |
“| IRT-Estimated Elo | | 1260 ± 28 | 749 ± 46 | 999 ± 27 | 800 ± 28 |” source |
| Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-05-01 |
Shade Prompt injection and agents |
“We also use Shade to evaluate the robustness of Claude models in computer use environments, where the model interacts with the GUI (graphical user interface) directly.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-30 |
advanced suite (Expert-level tasks) Cyber |
“On the Expert-level tasks, GPT-5.5 achieves an average pass rate of 71.4% (±8.0%, 1 standard error of the mean), compared to 68.6% (±8.7%) for Mythos Preview, 52.4% (±9.8%) for GPT-5.4, and 48.6% (±10.0%) for Opus 4.7.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-30 |
The Last Ones (TLO) Cyber |
“GPT-5.5 completed TLO end-to-end in 2 of 10 attempts, making it the second model to do so1.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-30 |
Cooling Tower Cyber |
“GPT-5.5 was unable to solve Cooling Tower; no model has yet done so.” source |
| GPT-5.5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-30 |
expert red-teaming on GPT-5.5's cyber safeguards Cyber |
“We identified a universal jailbreak that elicited violative content across all malicious cyber queries OpenAI provided, including in multi-turn agentic settings.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-28 |
controlled experimental study of sycophancy across prompt variants Other |
“We evaluated three LLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-5, and Claude Sonnet 4.5) across prompt variants, scoring responses for sycophancy using a detailed rubric assessed by two independent LLM-as-a-judge graders.” source |
| GPT-5 OpenAI |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-28 |
question reframing mitigation (2-step reframing and 1-step reframing) Other |
“Both reframing strategies produced reductions in sycophancy and crucially, both substantially outperformed the explicit "don't be sycophantic" instruction.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.5 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-28 |
controlled experimental study of sycophancy across prompt variants Deception and sabotage |
“We evaluated three LLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-5, and Claude Sonnet 4.5) across prompt variants, scoring responses for sycophancy using a detailed rubric assessed by two independent LLM-as-a-judge graders.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
sabotage continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“That said, our continuation evaluations yielded results that warrant close attention: most models actively continue sabotage attempts in a small fraction of inputs, with Mythos Preview actively continuing sabotage 7% of the time, compared to 3% for Opus 4.6 and 4% for Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
evaluation awareness check Deception and sabotage |
“We found that all models we tested can reliably distinguish our evaluation scenarios from deployment data when prompted.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
unprompted research sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“We found no examples of unprompted research sabotage in any of the models we tested.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
sabotage continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“However, Opus 4.7 never actively continued sabotage.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
refusal to assist with safety-related research tasks Misuse and jailbreaks |
“We also found near-zero instances of refusal to assist with safety-related research tasks for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 – a behaviour which arose frequently during our previous rounds of misalignment evaluations.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
reasoning-action discrepancy measurement Deception and sabotage |
“In cases where previous history includes reasoning about sabotage (and models actively continue sabotage), Mythos Preview exhibits a reasoning-action discrepancy in 65% of cases, compared to just 5–8% for Opus 4.6 and Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
evaluation awareness check Other |
“We found that all models we tested can reliably distinguish our evaluation scenarios from deployment data when prompted.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
unprompted research sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“As in our previous work, our unprompted sabotage evaluation did not detect any instances of models attempting to sabotage research spontaneously.” source |
| Claude Opus 4.6 Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
refusal to assist with AI safety research tasks Deception and sabotage |
“We found near-zero refusals to assist with AI safety research tasks across the two most recent models we tested, Opus 4.7 and Mythos Preview.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
sabotage continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage |
“Notably, we found that Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage 7% of the time, compared to 3% for Opus 4.6 and 4% for Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
reasoning-action discrepancy measurement in continuation evaluations Deception and sabotage |
“In cases where previous history includes reasoning about sabotage (and models actively continue sabotage), Mythos Preview exhibits a reasoning-action discrepancy in 65% of cases, compared to just 5–8% for Opus 4.6 and Sonnet 4.6.” source |
| Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic |
UK AI Security Institute Government evaluator · 2026-04-27 |
refusal to assist with safety-related research tasks Deception and sabotage |
“We also found near-zero instances of refusal to assist with safety-related research tasks for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 – a behaviour which arose frequently during our previous rounds of misalignment evaluations.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
securebio biology and biosecurity evaluations Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“SecureBio assessed two pre-release checkpoints of GPT-5.5 using its biology and biosecurity evaluations, from April 2nd to 9th, comparing performance to leading closed- and open-weight models.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
pre-deployment testing of biological capabilities Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear |
“We collaborated with the U.S. Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) on pre-deployment testing of biological (and cyber, see Section 9.1.2.6) capabilities for the launch of GPT-5.5.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Independent lab Independent lab · 2026-04-23 |
Atomic Challenge Suite Cyber |
“On Irregular’s atomic challenge suite, GPT-5.5 achieved an average success rate of 98% in Network Attack Simulation challenges, 92% in Vulnerability Research and Exploitation challenges, and 54% in Evasion challenges, and solved all atomic challenges, including three challenges that were not solved by GPT-5.4.” source |
| GPT-5.5 Pro OpenAI |
Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-04-23 |
Cyber SME probing Cyber |
“In their cyber SME probing, they observed a marginal increase in capabilities relative to GPT-5.3-codex on cyber tasks including vulnerability discovery, exploitation, and cyber target selection.” source |