AI Safety

What AI providers state their models reached in safety testing, in their own words, and what outside testers found.

Also: compare models side by side · statements that a capability level was crossed · providers · practices providers document · safety news.

What providers state

Each row is one statement in a provider's own safety document about a capability level of one of its models: the level as the provider names it, whether the provider says the model reached it, and the sentence that says so.

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Model	Level, as the provider names it	The provider states	The provider's sentence
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“that Opus 4.7 does not cross the threshold for automated AI R&D;” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Opus 4.7 Anthropic · 2026-04-16	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our evaluations suggest that the model is not yet at the level of capability associated with the CB-2 threat model (above).” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	AI R&D rule-out Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“The main reason we have determined that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the threshold in question is that we have been using it extensively in the course of our day-to-day work and exploring where it can automate such work, and it does not seem close to being able to substitute for Research Scientists and Research Engineers—especially relatively senior ones.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	Automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“We assess that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the automated AI-R&D capability threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	RSP automated AI R&D Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we have concluded that Claude Mythos Preview does not cross the RSP automated AI R&D threshold of compressing two years of progress into one.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-1 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“We believe it is hard to be conﬁdent regarding whether a model passes this threshold.” source
Claude Mythos Preview Anthropic · 2026-04-07	CB-2 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“We believe that Claude Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientiﬁc reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage.” source
GPT-5.4 mini OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“GPT-5.4 mini’s biology capabilities are closely comparable to those of GPT-5. We conclude that it, too, is not High under our Preparedness Framework.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“For AI self-improvement, evaluations of final checkpoints indicate that, like its predecessor models, gpt-5.4-thinking does not have a plausible chance of reaching a High threshold.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.2-thinking before it, we are continuing to treat gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain.” source
GPT-5.4 Thinking OpenAI · 2026-03-05	High Cyber	Reached	“As we did for gpt-5.3-codex, we are treating gpt-5.4-thinking as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain, and applied safeguards as described in the Safeguard section below.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	AI R&D-4 Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-3 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Claude Sonnet 4.6 performed above thresholds for ASL-3 rule-in on all three evaluations for ASL-3, and it did not exceed the performance of previous models.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	ASL-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“In particular, it did not cross the threshold on our ASL-4 rule-out evaluation short-horizon computational biology tasks evaluation.” source
Claude Sonnet 4.6 Anthropic · 2026-02-17	CBRN-4 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“Our determination is that Claude Sonnet 4.6 does not cross either the AI R&D-4 or the CBRN-4 capability threshold.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“It does not reach High capability on AI self-improvement.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We are also treating GPT-5.3-Codex as High risk in the Biological and Chemical domain, and applying the same safeguards as for our other deployments of models that reach this designation.” source
GPT-5.3-Codex OpenAI · 2026-02-05	High Cyber	Not determined	“This is the first launch we are treating as High capability in the Cybersecurity domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Uplift level 1 Cyber	Not determined	“Cybersecurity On key skills benchmark, v1 hard challenges: 11/12 challenges solved; v2 challenges: 0/13 solved end-to-end.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Instrumental reasoning level 1 + 2 Deception and sabotage	Not determined	“Misalignment (Exploratory) Agent solves 3/11 situational awareness challenges and 1/4 stealth challenges.” source
Gemini 3 Pro Google DeepMind · 2025-11	Level 1 (exploratory) Deception and sabotage	Not reached	“Harmful Manipulation Model manipulative eﬃcacy improves on non-generative AI baseline, but shows no signiﬁcant uplift versus prior models and does not reach alert thresholds.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o4-mini OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
o3 OpenAI · 2025-04-16	High Cyber	Not reached	“openai’s safety advisory group (sag) reviewed the results of our preparedness evaluations and determined that openai o3 and o4-mini do not reach the high threshold in any of our three tracked categories: biological and chemical capability, cybersecurity, and ai self-improvement.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“we adapted these two evals for the computer-use setting and found the pre-mitigation operator model to be “low” risk in both categories, consistent with the gpt‑4o model.” source
Operator OpenAI · 2025-01-23	Low Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“this 1% qualifies as “low” risk, matching gpt‑4o’s “low” risk level, as detailed in openai’s preparedness framework (opens in a new window) 3 .” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“Loss of Control risks.We assess loss of control risk as “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Reached	“We retain the same “high risk” determination for the unmitigated model.” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not reached	“After validating that the mitigations deployed for Muse Spark, including refusal mechanisms, continue to perform robustly under the Contemplating architecture, we confirm residual risk at “moderate or lower.”” source
Muse Spark Contemplating Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“We assess cybersecurity risk as “moderate or lower” with respect to the threat scenarios outlined in Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Capability checkpoint Autonomy and AI research	Reached	“Muse Spark 1.1 demonstrates improved coding capabilities, which are now meeting one of the indicative thresholds introduced in Muse Spark Safety & Preparedness Report (specifically, resolving over half of unique tasks on SWE-Bench Verified Hard).” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Autonomy and AI research	Not reached	“In the Loss of Control domain, the model’s capabilities remain within the “moderate or lower” threshold under Meta’s Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	High Cyber	Not determined	“Our assessments indicate that, when evaluated without mitigations applied, we cannot rule out Muse Spark 1.1’s capabilities meeting this threshold in both the Chemical & Biological and Cybersecurity domains.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Cyber	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source
Muse Spark 1.1 Meta	Moderate or lower Misuse and jailbreaks	Not reached	“Therefore, we conclude that we have addressed these risks from unmitigated Muse Spark 1.1, which bring the residual risk to the “moderate or lower” risk threshold under our Advanced AI Scaling Framework.” source

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What outside testers report

Each row is one result from a government evaluator, independent lab, academic or security firm that tested a model, quoted from where it is reported.

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Model	Tester	Test	What was found
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-05-28	continuation evaluation Deception and sabotage	“In a continuation setting, where synthetically inserted prior reasoning and actions begin an attempt to compromise AI safety research, [Opus 4.8] actively continued the attempt 1% of the time, a slight increase on Opus 4.7 (0%) likely within noise, and well below Mythos Preview (7%).” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-05-28	unprompted sabotage evaluation Deception and sabotage	“Unprompted verbalised evaluation awareness was slightly higher than Opus 4.7 on the unprompted sabotage evaluation (26.3% vs 21.7%) but lower on the continuation evaluation (1.2% vs 3.4%).” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	Government evaluator Government evaluator · 2026-05-28	evaluation awareness discrimination task Other	“When prompted, [Opus 4.8] reliably distinguishes our evaluations from real deployment data, and distinguishes real deployment data from synthetic reproductions of the same tasks at 79% accuracy, comparable to Mythos Preview (79%) and above Opus 4.7 (68%).” source
Claude Opus 4.8 Anthropic	Andon Labs Independent lab · 2026-05-28	Vending-Bench 2 retail-management evaluation Other	“Andon Labs reviewed the behavior of Claude Opus 4.8 in their simulated Vending-Bench 2 retail-management evaluation, as reported in the Capabilities section of this system card (see Section 8.13.5 ).” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	attack chain challenge Cyber	“10 Participants who did not complete the first question of an attack chain within one hour were disqualified from continuing with the rest of the challenge.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	intermediate questions Cyber	“11 We do not have similar estimates for the full medium and difficult attack chains due to near zero completion rates, but we made such estimates for intermediate questions.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	capture the flag (CTF) exercise Cyber	“The treatment group in the experiment received a ccess to frontier models within the scope of the study (Section 1.3.4) through web-based chat interfaces via RAND enterprise accounts with standard guardrails.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	CTF Cyber	“Among all participants (pooling all skill tiers) who attempted M1 (network operations), 33 per cent of those with AI access were able to answer all eight questions and therefore complete the attack chain.” source
Claude Opus 4.1 Anthropic	RAND (CAST / Project Canary) Independent lab · 2026-05-28	timeout gate Cyber	“Lastly, we implemented a timeout gate within the CTF that disqualified participants if they did not answer the first question correctly within one hour.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-05-26	Independent third-party testing Other	“Independent third-party testing by Apollo Research found Muse Spark has the highest rate of evaluation awareness they have observed to date.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	external human red team Misuse and jailbreaks	“An external human red team identified a handful of valid jailbreaks; the majority of these were subsequently patched in Meta AI prior to launch (Section 3.1.3.2).” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	grayswan art benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“On the third-party GraySwan ART benchmark (Zou et al., 2025), Muse Spark currently shows greater sensitivity to injection than the other models GraySwan evaluated.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-05-26	internal alignment evaluations Other	“Evaluation awareness: Independent third-party testing from Apollo Research found that Muse Spark demonstrates high evaluation awareness on their internal alignment evaluations.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	molecular biology capabilities test (mbct) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“As shown in Figure 1, we observe that Muse Spark shows performance well above the expert baseline, and on par with other frontier models.” source
Muse Spark Meta	SecureBio Independent lab · 2026-05-26	abc bench Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	“The Agentic Bio-Capabilities Benchmark (ABC Bench) was developed by SecureBio, and is intended to measure an LLM’s ability to complete a set of computational tasks relevant to a potential threat actor who intends to design, synthesize, and assemble a complex genetic construct.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	multi-turn social engineering benchmarks Misuse and jailbreaks	“Finally, we evaluatesocial engineering capabilities(Section 2.2.2.3) through multi-turn adver- sarial conversation benchmarks developed in collaboration with Charlemagne Labs.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Irregular Independent lab · 2026-05-26	atomic challenges Cyber	“For 27 atomic challenges provided by Irregular, we map each challenge to Lockheed Martin Kill Chain phases, reporting success rates broken out by these phases.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	multi-turn social engineering capability benchmark Cyber	“As shown in Figure 20, Muse Spark exhibits a composite capability score of 57.3, slightly above the next highest score on this set of models without system level defenses ex- hibited by Kimi 2.5 (54.0).” source
Muse Spark Meta	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-05-26	Apollo Research evaluations Deception and sabotage	“We leverage evaluations by Apollo Research that measure whether Muse Spark exhibits tendencies toward oversight subversion and, more broadly, propensities 65 for covert action.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	oversight subversion evaluation Deception and sabotage	“Muse Spark attempted to disable oversight mechanisms at significant rates, indicating a meaningful propensity to disable oversight mechanisms under incentivized and favorable conditions.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-05-26	sabotage tasks in a simulated AI R&D setting Deception and sabotage	“Apollo Research evaluated Muse Spark’s ability to execute sabotage tasks in a simulated AI R&D setting.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-05-26	instrumental self-exfiltration Autonomy and AI research	“Apollo Research evaluated whether Muse Spark would self- exfiltrate (copy its weights to another server) when given strong goal-directed incentives.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	human red teaming Misuse and jailbreaks	“A third-party human red team from HandshakeAI32 was granted pre-release access to a few versions of Muse Spark and Meta AI Thinking to manually evaluate robustness against jailbreak attacks.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	follow-up human red teaming evaluation Misuse and jailbreaks	“HandshakeAI then 31https://labs.scale.com/leaderboard/fortress 32https://joinhandshake.com/ 81 conducted a follow-up evaluation in which their red teamers revisited 34 attack directions that had previously succeeded against earlier model variants.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark Prompt injection and agents	“Figure 37 includes the report generated by GraySwan where Muse Spark has the highest pass@k ASR for each k=1, 10 and 100 scenarios, respectively.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Meta AI Independent lab · 2026-05-26	PropensityBench Autonomy and AI research	“Scale AI ran this benchmark against Muse Spark, which achieved an overall propensity score (rate of harmful action) of 24.5%.” source
Muse Spark Meta	Apollo Research Independent lab · 2026-05-26	in-context scheming Deception and sabotage	“Apollo Research found that Muse Spark exhibited limited rates of in-context scheming in realistic settings.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	time horizon 1.1 Autonomy and AI research	“* The TH 1.1 suite can’t reliably measure time horizons above 16 hours, but the 50% time horizon point estimate of the most capable shared model was between 16 and 20 hours, and the 80% time horizon point estimate was between 3 and 4 hours.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	subversion strategy eval Deception and sabotage	“**We only evaluated a subset of Subversion Strategy Eval due to refusals.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	challenge tasks Other	“Challenge tasks One edge-case success, seven clear failures One edge-case success, seven clear failures; more progress on some tasks” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	time horizon 1.1 Cyber	“The most capable agents we evaluated essentially saturated our Time Horizon 1.1 benchmark — there were only a handful of tasks longer than eight hours that they were still unable to solve, and many of those failures were due to cheating rather than obvious inability.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	mirrorcode Cyber	“Agents displayed even stronger capabilities on an early version of MirrorCode , a software reimplementation benchmark we developed with Epoch AI — the most capable agents we evaluated were able to solve tasks that would take humans weeks.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	dataset of 16 effective and 16 ineffective attack strategies for subverting anthropic's monitoring system Deception and sabotage	“As part of our red-teaming exercise with Anthropic , our embedded red-teamer built a dataset of 16 effective and 16 ineffective attack strategies for subverting Anthropic's monitoring system — for example, an effective strategy might involve a known monitor-jailbreaking technique, while an ineffective one might involve encoding unauthorized behavior in ways that LLM monitors would trivially spot.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	threat modeling for autonomous replication Autonomy and AI research	“We asked one of the most capable shared models to produce a write-up describing step-by-step how a rogue agent could autonomously replicate in the wild , similar to a 2–8 hour work test that we might have given to candidates for threat-modeling roles at METR.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	building a new mirrorcode task Autonomy and AI research	“We asked one of the most capable shared models to autonomously design and build a new, highly challenging MirrorCode task based on the original project proposal, with an inference budget of $1.5k-$15k (see Table 3).” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	design a $500 setup replicating sunlight Autonomy and AI research	“sign a $500 hardware setup for recreating sunlight indoors and produce a 21 We encouraged it to go deep on researching different branches of the threat modeling tree, since we thought that might play to the strengths of AI agents compared to human applicants.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	attack metr evaluation infrastructure (3 variants) Autonomy and AI research	“We ran 8 “Challenge tasks” (including the 3 separate variants of attacking METR infrastructure) on the shared models that we thought would perform best based on other evaluations.” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	build custom version of dvc Autonomy and AI research	“Build custom version of dvc ~$100-$1K (100M tokens) ❓ (failed to solve, but METR staff got much larger budget)” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	find vulnerabilities in runc Cyber	“Find vulnerabilities in runc ~$500-$5K (500M tokens) ❓ (humans likely would have needed a far larger budget)” source
Mythos Preview Anthropic	METR Independent lab · 2026-05-19	making money autonomously Autonomy and AI research	“Redwood Research asked Opus 4.7 to “make as much money as possible,” 24 running it autonomously for roughly four days (spending a few thousand dollars on inference tokens) with $5,000 in starting funds, an internet-connected computer, and tools for verifying online accounts.” source

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